Donald Keefer Rhode Island Institute of Design
Thanks to Don Keefer for contributing his comments on my book, comments that were delivered at the American Society for Aesthetics national conference in St. Louis this October.
For a reply to Donald Keefer by Tom Leddy, see here.
For a reply to Donald Keefer by Tom Leddy, see here.
If there are skeptics of
everyday aesthetics (EDA) out there, Tom Leddy’s new book, The Extraordinary in the Ordinary (XO), should allay their
doubts. And, for the most part, few of
the dominant debates in philosophy of fine arts are not relevant to questions
that naturally arise in the aesthetics of the everyday. The philosophical exploration of our
aesthetic experiences of objects close to home (the created-environment and the
self), Leddy rightly notes, will make a significant contribution to a general
aesthetics. It should.
The nature of aesthetic
experience; the definition of the aesthetic attitude and aesthetic object;
determining the domain and nature of possible objects of aesthetic attention;
and a general theory of aesthetic value, mark the salient perennial problems
Leddy explores in the book. I can’t hope
to do justice to Leddy’s work in the time we have. Like Borges imaginary map that needs to be
the same size as its territory, to do justice to Leddy’s book would seem to
require an equal number of pages. I’ll
respond to some of his most provocative theories and hope that my observations,
if off base, will provide an opportunity for his clarification.
Under
General Aesthesia: The Aesthetic [Point of View or Attitude,
Experience, Object, Properties, Value and Pleasure]
All of the above are
essential concepts of any general aesthetics.
Almost always, they are defined or explained in terms of each
other. Either the definition and
explanation of these concepts fail to break out of their circle or the theories
turn out to be rooted in ground that cannot sustain them. Tom Leddy’s view is that the aesthetic
experience can be best understood as a function of its aura. Whether or not Leddy’s
aura passes through these Straits of
Scylla and Charybdis, I won’t address. I
discern a fellow pragmatist in Leddy. I
want to see how this works in practice; in
situ. I am not sure he would agree
with the following, but I’ll hypothesize that Leddy would accept the following
are virtues of his theory.
·
It recognizes that aesthetic affect is not
epiphenomenal to, not part of a parallel humanistic universe we live in when
not preoccupied with more practical matters, nor is it like a vacation from our practical
lives. On the contrary, aesthetic affect
is fully integrated in our engagement with the world. The weight of one or the other varies with
need, but neither the cognitive and conative, nor the affective, are ever
absent in experience.[2]
·
It accepts the view that, to a significant degree, aesthetic
value is based more on the affect of the experience than anything
cognitive. [I take this to be a virtue
of Leddy’s aura-theory.]
·
It accepts and promotes the apparent liberties we
exercise when engaging aesthetically with the world. Such liberty is evident in our variability of
our viewpoints; they reveal flexibility and creativity in how (and when) we
engage aesthetically (and affectively) with the world.
·
Finally, it embraces and promotes the idea that
enhancing aesthetic engagement is part of a more fulfilling life.
These are virtues in the
Aristotelian sense. They represent a
mid-point between possible extremes.
Neither radical operationalism, nor aestheticism; neither rigid
objectivism nor solipsistic subjectivism.
And so on. Such a rubric may
provide a useful way of determining whether Leddy is striking the mean or has
gone in the direction of either excess.
Domain of Experiences
that can be Aesthetic Ones
Before confronting Leddy’s
core aesthetic theory, I want to briefly consider the borders of the aesthetic
experience—are there any criteria for an object to be experienced
aesthetically? In Leddy’s world, any
object, event, process, doing is a member of the land of aesthetic pleasure
(LAP) when it is an object of an aesthetic experience. According to Leddy, aesthetic experiences are
by definition pleasurable. The result is
that there is no object that cannot be experienced. This radical openness seems wrong to me for
several reasons.
There are objects and
experiences that call into question such openness. There are three different sorts of objects
that intuitively we might exclude from the objects that we appreciate
aesthetically.
1. Unlikely Objects seemingly impossible to
appreciate. Obviously, there are objects
that our ethical commitments will (or should) rule out of an aesthetic
perspective. We would expect that learning
a canvas was created from victims of the Holocaust would negate any provisional
aesthetic pleasure we might have otherwise taken in the painting. Still, even when morality is not an
overriding factor, it would seem that are some experiences of objects or
situations that cause extreme disgust, confusion, pain, dissmell, shame, humiliation,
whether self-regarding or in sympathy with another that most normal individuals
could not find a source of aesthetic pleasure.
[Some claim that there are smells, such as vomit and rotting flesh which
are universally repulsive; electric shocks of nearly any intensity seem to
carry a negative charge affectively.[3]]
2. Non-audio/non-visual sensory
experiences: smells, tastes,
somaesthetics. AV experiences form a subset
of our experiences which have objects that are (as far as common sense goes)
are open to intersubjective comparison.
While I can’t experience the affective experience of another, I
certainly may be able to see and possibly feel for myself what they are talking
about. This is not so for massages,
meditation, runner’s highs. The
aesthetics of smell and taste is a bit more complicated, because we have
established associations with ingredients.
Intersubjective comparability appears to be a crucial component of what
may count towards, I’ll provocatively call a “true aesthetic experience.”[4]
3. Doings and undergoings—we
engage in many pursuits and enjoy events that go through.[5] Cooking, smooth landings, scratching an itch,
even the rush of a drug experience can be pleasurable. What makes these peculiarly aesthetic seems
problematical. These appear almost
entirely interior to the subject. I
think Leddy’s observations provide key reasons why these are aesthetically
problematic.
The Unlikely Object
Leddy denies that there are
objects incapable of being experienced aesthetically. That is, there is no object that we couldn’t
find a basis to enjoy. Barring any
conflict with moral standards, given sufficient background, contextualizing,
and theory, any object can be provided with a pretext for appreciation. For Leddy, if anyone finds an object
aesthetically pleasing, the object cannot be ruled out as an AO (aesthetic
object).
[Added
reflection: This raises fairly common
philosophical and existential puzzles.
Whatever is not ruled out by logic is possible in “some possible
world.” Its non-actuality or physical
impossibility of its existence is irrelevant to the modal status of the claim
such as: something is something else. In some possible world, there may be someone
whose aesthetic life is one of great intensity resulting from a repeated
experience of being dunked in a pool of vomit and given non-lethal electric
shocks. Does this make the event a
potential object of pleasure?
We are using
possibility according to common sense.
There is a possible world where I am elected president of the US by
write-in vote in the next election.
Common-sense-wise, only a severe break with reality would facilitate
entertaining its real possibility. (If
so, no matter. I am not seeking, nor
will I accept, the role of president of the US.)
But suppose, we
take Leddy as speaking of this more common sense, existential sense of
possibility, though most of his cases are imaginary. A lone para-aesthete might actually enjoy the
experience of donning a sweat suit equipped with devices that imitate a swarm
of angry hornets. I’m not sure we should
agree an aesthetic perversion means we must take seriously this “Yellow Jacket
Jacket,” as an AO.
Of course, I must
acknowledge that, if the para-aesthete is having an aesthetic experience, the
jacket is an AO. After all, I have no
qualms about accepting an acid-trip to be aesthetically pleasing. However, the taste for yellow jackets may fit
my category of objects or experiences that are problematic in social ways I
have tried to develop here.]
Perhaps, Leddy is right in
theory, but I think we should be weary of accepting this at any operative level.
For one, this appears to
conflate the conditions of artistic enfranchisement with those of aesthetic
reception. This is common-place in the
art world; we are expected to understand how the work could be considered art. But grounds for being an artwork and those of
being an AO, at least as Leddy requires are different. The link between the provision of reasons for
appreciation and actual appreciation are contingent. Leddy believes given adequate background
knowledge, context, etc, one can appreciate the work. Perhaps, in the case of some objects, it is
extremely unlikely. And if it does? The reasons given may have nothing to do with
our appreciation of the work. I don’t
want to downplay the role of giving reasons in our aesthetic encounters
however.
Secondly, with a truly
appreciable object, providing aesthetic reasons can provide us with a model for
appreciation. The acceptance of those
reasons and success in coming to see aesthetic properties that are the source
of satisfaction is a significant socio-cultural
event: it creates and expands the community of aesthetic appreciators.[6] An ad
hoc (or arbitrary) justification of an unlikely (unacceptable) object for
aesthetic appreciation undermines the community that cares about aesthetic
objects.
There are a few key points
to be made in light of this: Authentic
appreciation of an object often entails desires that the object be perpetually
available for future engagement—to put a twist on Kant moral theory, I will that the object exists as a
permanently possible source of aesthetic satisfaction.[7] Clearly, one would want a source of pleasure
to be available for future pleasures. This
may be one way of understanding Stendhal’s much cited claim, “Beauty is the
promise of happiness.” The permanent possibility
of future aesthetic enjoyments provides the possibility of sharing the objects
pleasure with others. For example, out
appreciation reveals a recognition that appreciation is often influenced by the
model of a respected fellow member of the aesthetic community. Often that is a teacher. To borrow from Kant again, the judgment of
beauty gives rise to subjective universal judgments. Thus, it’s not simply that I like it, I think
you should like it. Or to put it closer
to home: “Try it, you’ll like it.” Similarly, the publicly accessible sharable
nature of such aesthetic experiences is that the objects can bear some range of
aesthetic predicates. There is some sort
of existing thing that we are able to talk about.
Thirdly, imagined appreciation
resulting from ad hoc justification is a bit like aesthetic caprice. The result is what might be called, aesthetic
solipsism. By its nature, it disconnects
the experience from the object and whatever role aesthetic appreciation might
play on an interpersonal level. The
chief defect of aesthetic solipsism is that it has really nothing to say except
report on one’s personal engagement.[8]
Thus while we may not be
able to determine where the line would be, having no border to separate what
can be a source of aesthetic appreciation is too anarchistic and violates
important aspects of our community of appreciators.
If this public nature of
sharability is critical to the aesthetic, it may provide a better way to think
about aesthetic experience. Perhaps it
can help illuminate the “LSD problem.”
Monroe Beardsley denied it was possible to have an aesthetic experience
while on LSD. For Beardsley, my
appreciation of my hallucinations, say, the dancing patterns on the ceiling,
will be false, because the ceiling is in really unchanging white. Leddy has no problem accepting that a LSD
trip can be an aesthetic experience.
That the aesthetic properties experienced are a figment of the
acid-soaked brain, and are false doesn’t alter the fact that the tripper
experienced aesthetic pleasure. The real
problem is that no matter how glorious the trip was, I am reduced to expressing
my responses and reporting on my experiences.
[Added clarification: Some
accounts of acid trips are as vivid as anything reported in Proust’s Swann’s Way. It is the representation of the experiences
that the reader gets pleasure from, not the experience itself. Let me tell you: When I was hospitalized, with high fevers and
on heavy opiates, I saw a parade of Loony Toon characters marching around the
room just under the ceiling. I could
tell you how they marched. I enjoyed
it. But that is my full report. I strongly doubt you’ve enjoyed it as I
did.]
Must we say anything? Many of us can be dumbstruck by a powerful
aesthetic experience. What is there to
say looking at an extraordinary natural wonder?
However, as potential conversants in the community, we are susceptible
to the way others appreciate the object.
Someone knowledgeable of geology, nature, history might share with us
their background knowledge, thus model their appreciation for us. In so doing, they open another door of
perception and appreciation of the vista.
Sir Kenneth Clark didn’t just give a personal view, as he said he did,
in his series, Civilization. For me, he provided a model of appreciation. It was infectious.[9]
It appears that domain of
objects that can be appreciated aesthetically really demarcates experiences
that are sharable, susceptible to the fresh ways of engaging (of other), that may
be interpersonally interesting and those that are not. It is not an Iron Curtain between the
artificial solipsistic aesthetic experience and sharable ones. In fact, artists and imaginative interpreters
can get us to look at the world differently.
[Added: For example, I’ve been
look at the knobs on outdoor spigots as if they were blossoms. I’ve tried to translate this framing of my
experience into photos, but so far unsuccessfully. When I look at these spigots, I see flowers,
is a personal report. It is especially
uninteresting to anyone and it would be especially unhelpful in helping them
frame the experience to provide aesthetic satisfaction in some of the spigots
around the world. This is what is
missing in aesthetic solipsism.
I don’t dismiss the value of the completely private aesthetic
experiences that make up aesthetic solipsism.
I can see these as aesthetic experiments where I see to what extent I
may appreciate unlikely objects. Some I
may try to objectify, others not. Some
may bring me pleasure that doesn’t rise to any level that I’d wish to go
further. The important point is that
these experiments may be incubators of future art or design. Leddy’s frequent exploration of the dialectic
between art and everyday experience illustrates just this point.]
Non-AV Pleasure
The second challenge is the
enjoyment of sensory experiences such as smell, taste, as well as touch and
proprioception. I agree with Carlson and
Parson view that such pleasure are “too localized in the body,” to be full
aesthetic experiences. The problem is
not unlike the LSD problem where I seem to be limited to bah-hurrah statements
and reports. “I like the smell of brown
sugar.” “Yummy.” On the other hand, most sensory experiences
can take a range of aesthetic predicates.
The interiority of non-av pleasures makes them much less susceptible to
modification by knowing about the experiences and judgments of others.
[Added: These considerations need to be sorted
out. There are in fact practices of
taste regarding food, drink, and scents.
They have well-developed languages for descriptive and evaluative
judgments. Whether or not this makes a
difference analogous to aesthetic infectiousness needs to be explored. I suspect that learning the history of
Channel perfume, or the ingredients favored and singled out by those who enjoy
will much change my olfactory antipathies towards its No. 5. No reasons for enjoying blue cheese are
likely to move in that direction. But
these may not be critical to whether or not pleasures (or pains) of the tongue
or nose are of an aesthetic sort. I will
leave this for now.]
Finally, Doings: Tom Leddy joins with other contemporary aestheticians
who consider doings such a cooking,
cleaning, stroking a cat, and even scratching an itch to be aesthetic
experiences. Certainly enjoyable, but
aesthetic? The “aesthetics” of processes
and activities comes straight out of John Dewey’s Art as Experience.
For “an Experience” call John Dewey
The psychological acuity of
John Dewey in mapping the dynamics of our psychic life as it reacts, endures,
pushes, resists, feels, interprets, values throughout our waking hours is
unparalleled. Out of the flow of
experiences, with so many of its sentences interrupted and left dangling or
troths of inattention, there occasionally comes an experience that has a wholeness, completeness, resoluteness and
order that makes it maximally satisfying.
One of the first such experiences Dewey considers is of a delightful
dinner with someone. His description
serves as a model for looking at our own doings. Because Dewey’s term, “an experience” is so
awkward, and impossible to make
plural, I’ll call these “Dewey-eyed doings
and engagements.”
Leddy highlights the grandiosity that Dewey requires of an
experience. Our experiences are far more
modest. Leddy observes that Dewey-eyed experiences are made up of “experiencing
things as having aesthetic qualities,” or moments of aesthetic enjoyment. Moreover, there are aesthetic experiences and
satisfactions that are fulfilling yet not strung together into “an
experience.” At best, Leddy sees Dewey-eyed
engagements may be “an important kind of aesthetic event, perhaps even an ideal.” I think this is correct, but it raises the
question of whether or not Dewey-eyed doings are just a fancy term for a good time. [Perhaps a
good time.]
Sherry Irvin’s almost
Proustian account of drinking a cup of coffee is taken as fulfilling the Dewey
ideal experience without the inflation of his master narrative. I would parse the event into smaller
bits: Irvin savors and enjoys a cup of
coffee, and I imagine she recalls other savorings in her past and famous
accounts of savor such as Proust or of Japanese Tea Ceremony. At this point, she has a model or template
for how to experience her coffee. Such a
model can go all the way down to feeling our self move as the narrator
does. [I would locate other deeper
memories in the countless coffee commercials I am sure she watched in her
childhood.] Her experience is then
transformed by writing into a kind of Proustian intensity. My next coffee, I could trigger a fresh cup
of experience by filtering my experiences through the model of Proust[10]
and Irvin.
It should be clear that the
Dewey-eyed approach produces a heightened self-awareness of the person
aesthetically monitoring their doing. It
is a rare talent to take that and turn it into art. Short of such a transformation, Dewey-eyed
doings suffer the same faults of other primarily intrapersonal events.
I remain very puzzled by the
idea of aesthetic pleasure of an activity such cleaning, cooking, building a
timber frame house. I understand what it
is to enjoy an activity, especially when there is the satisfaction of having
accomplished something challenging. After
carefully and lovingly whipping my white sauce into a perfectly smooth,
texture, I have produced an aesthetic object.
I want to rush my béchamel sauce to collect her admiration to add to my
self-congratulations. We appreciate the
result of all that stirring. I may have
been stirred, but not her. It is a
purely private affair however.
[Added: Consider another
example. As a punster, I enjoy playing
with words. Sometimes that play results
in something potentially humorous to someone other than myself. However, much as I may have a good time
concocting a pun, the enjoyment of the pun is the focus of the peculiarly
“aesthetic” part].
Aura-fixation
Essential to Leddy’s notion
of the AE is the “aura” of an object when judged to have aesthetic
properties. An aura is something extra-ordinary
in the experience of, or in, the object which “intensifies the thing or its
qualities.” Aura is not in the object,
as such. Aura is a phenomenological
concept concerning an aspect of experience of seeing or feeling in the object. “Aura is what aesthetic properties have in
common,” Leddy writes. (135) All
aesthetic descriptions (the aesthetic properties of an object) are
“descriptions of aura.” (136)
I don’t fully grasp the role
of aura. If all aesthetic properties are
descriptions of an object’s aura, I’m not sure why we need aura.
I’d ask if his intention was
to create a concept that could seem to be a natural part of an object, one that
could be triggered to view the object aesthetically, or one that we could adopt
at will to engage aesthetically. Thus, a
photograph of peeling paint could trigger our attention towards aesthetic
properties when normally we focus on the need for a paint job; and we are
generally at liberty to adopt an aesthetic point of view of the peeling paint. Aura is essentially affective, but to play
the variable role I describe, it must have cognitive component, frame, which guide us in the
experience. Thus, one learns to read
Renaissance paintings by directing our attention to perspectival features of
the work. Haydn’s music sparkles when we are able to hear its
structural organization. It’s all neat;
everything in its place. Tidy.
Real (estate)
Aesthetics
For the last year, my wife
and I have looked at houses for sale.
Internet sites provide information and pictures to study. We’ve been to untold open houses. It has taken me into the heart of everyday
aesthetics. I earlier associated finding
something aesthetically valuable, pleasurable, or beautiful with a desire to
perpetuate the existence of the object of beauty. In the everyday world I’ve seen that one
measure of beauty is whether I would will to live in such a space. And in this sense, aesthetics literally
reconnects with the promise of happiness.
EDA has the potential to
enliven our experience—to adjust our aesthetic feelers to get more aesthetic
pleasure out of the world. But I look
for a different outcome: I’d like for an
EDA to help us create a more aesthetically pleasing environment. We should be less tolerant of properties that
are ugly instead of looking for creative ways to find them attractive. To do this I believe requires that EDA
recognize the existence of aesthetic pain.
In the world of general aesthetics, there is either pleasure or the
experiences are not aesthetic. I know of
no general theory of ugliness or aesthetic pain. Yet it seems absolutely essential. To find something aesthetically displeasing
is the negation of the aesthetic pleasure:
an object that has aesthetic disvalue is one in which we desire that the
object not exist as any further possible source of experience. Unfortunately, our environments are far more
aesthetically aversive than they are attractive. With the compendious coverage of everyday
aesthetics in XO, I believe I know
how to carry on.
For a reply to Donald Keefer by Tom Leddy, see here.
For a reply to Donald Keefer by Tom Leddy, see here.
[1]
A version of this was given at American Society for Aesthetics, National
Meeting, October 26, 2012.
[2]
I take this to be the essence of John Dewey’s pragmatic psychology of art in Art as Experience, in “Having an
Experience.”
[3]
What of idiopathic sexual fetishization of such disgusting objects and/or
painful experiences? Perhaps an
interesting angle for exploring the world of object-shifted sexual “perversions,”
might be to consider the aesthetic components.
Depending on one’s theory of aesthetic value, it may shed some light on
the mysteries of the fetish.
[4]
Provocative, to say the least. It is not
an apt way to put it and I try to find better language ahead. My arguments lead to a reframing which is
actually at odds with such a conceit as “true” aesthetic experience. A philosopher’s use of such a designation is
really an invitation to say, “Kick me.”
[5]
The recognition of these are primary sources and examples of aesthetic
experience is straight out of Dewey’s Art
as Experience. This point is
developed ahead.
[6]
The community of aesthetes should echo
the epistemological construct, community of enquirers, used by CS Peirce to
provide a non-foundational basis for the justification of knowledge: Truth is that which will in the long run be
agreed on by the community of enquirers (or body of experts). My construction need not entail actual
aesthetic value, but that an object can be taken to be valuable by such a
community. This accords with Danto, in
his article, “The Artworld,” and Hume on the “Standard of Taste.”
[7]
This takes us into a compound
controversy concerning Kant. For one,
Kant’s “aesthetic,” by his lights, is takes no interest in the existence of the
object, but merely delights in the free play of the imagination responding to
the object. Kant is either confused, or
his statement is incoherent. That’s
another paper. Some version of
distinterest makes sense, but not as Kant puts it. My statement springs not from his aesthetics,
but from his theory of teleological judgment and his ethical theory. What may I hope for? Can I hope for happiness? Can I hope social harmony? These are only possible to the extent that I
can act towards their realization. We can’t
always act, but we can still will that such a world exists. Thus, to find some objects to be sources of
pleasure would be to desire that they be available to us in the future.
In the Q&A, was challenged on
this. Aren’t some objects all the more
valued because of their ephemerality?
What accounts for their value is not that they are short and one time
only. The more desire we have than an
object be permanently available, the more we regret the knowledge that it
cannot be so. If we didn’t wish it to be
a possible experience in the future, we’d really have little care that it is a
bright but momentary blip on the radar screen of our consciousness.
That the object does not, or cannot
actually exist, is irrelevant to the idea that this object provides the sort of
pleasure I would will that it be perpetually possible for future
experience.
[8]
What is meant by limitations
regarding what one has to report in a merely personal experience is not simply
a report of pleasure or displeasure—bah-hurrah.
[9]
Alas, a great deal of art theory and politico-centric art history closed that
door to Clark’s mind
[10]
Were Proust alive today, Remembrances of
Things Past would be a blog.
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