“Truth as having
Three Aspects”
Tom Leddy, Annual
Philosophy Conference, San Jose State, May 3, 2008
My own interest in truth as a concept (and not as a goal)
comes by way of my interest in aesthetics and the philosophy of art, although
much that I have to say about truth comes from my reading of some of my
favorite philosophers, Plato, Nietzsche, James and Heidegger. But before I go into that I want to say one
little thing about debates over the nature of truth. One of the oddest things about such debates,
and I imagine someone somewhere has already noted this (Rick [Tieszen] says it has been
discussed in the philosophy of mathematics), is that whatever you are doing
when you present a theory of truth you are claiming that your theory is true,
and in claiming your theory is true, you must, to be consistent, be claiming
that it meets the standards set by your theory of truth. So this is a paradox of truth, that any
theory of truth is going to be self-confirming if self-consistent. For example, someone who believes in the
pragmatist theory of truth is not going to think his or her theory of truth is
true primarily according to the correspondence theory of truth. Not only that, he/she will think it true
according to the specific version of the pragmatist theory he/she is offering. If not, then he/she is being
inconsistent. In short, your theory of
truth is going to be judged true because it fits whatever theory of truth you
are actually presenting. You are going
to assume your theory of truth in the very act of evaluating it. On the face of it then, based on this
paradox, the whole project of a theory of truth seems hopelessly circular. It isn’t just circular in the relatively
innocuous way in which some theories in aesthetics are circular. These theories are circular because they
include the word "art" in their definition of art. One might always argue that such a circularity
is merely apparent and that the second appearance of the term art is eliminable
in some way. But whenever you present a
theory of truth you are presenting it as true and hence as meeting your theory
of truth. So unlike circularity in
theories of art, theories of truth will always be circular. To get a picture of what I am talking about
imagine any theory of truth stated in sentence form with quote marks around it
and followed by the two words “is true” and then consider replacing the word
“true” in this second instance with the theory of truth itself, i.e. the
supposed definition of truth, and you will see something very much like what
happens when you get a circular definition of a term, a kind of endless regress. I don’t know how to resolve this question, so
like most people, I’ll just ignore it.
What interests me the most about truth is whether and to
what extent the theories of truth that have been offered mainly to satisfy
needs in other domains in philosophy actually apply or apply in the same way to
the domain of aesthetics and philosophy of art.
On the face of it there would seem to be a problem since many of the
phenomena that would be dismissed outside of the world of art as simply false
or cognitively meaningless are taken quite seriously within the world of
art. Fictions and metaphors are two
examples. The faculty of imagination is
taken very seriously in the world of art, perhaps more so then in the worlds of
science, history and philosophy. OK I
know that there are lots of exceptions (for example philosophers use science
fiction examples), but this does seem to me to be roughly right. A tricky aspect of this is that
aestheticians, who are often philosophers first and art lovers second, often
stand for philosophy and not for art in this matter and often insist on giving
a certain primacy to concepts of truth that are perhaps more important for
science, history or philosophy then for the arts. So the question I would like to ask is
whether truth is different in the arts, or put differently, whether there is a
sense of “truth” that is more appropriate to the arts. Any answer to this question would have
broader implications for a theory of truth.
That is, an excellent theory of truth should cover all sorts of truth
including the sorts that are most appropriate for the arts.
The most immediate question related to this that comes to
mind is whether works of art have cognitive value. It has often been argued that they do
not. It is claimed that visual arts do
not usually assert true sentences and that even when they do, as when a
sentence appears on a canvas or is spoken in a performance piece, the truth of
these sentences has nothing to do with the value of the work, and thus has
nothing to do with art as art. I think
that knowledge is more holistic than that.
If art can give us some greater understanding of the world, and I think
that it can do that sometimes, then it also allows truth to emerge. So even when an artwork does not give us true
propositions it still has something to do with truth. Another way to look at this is that people
are not just artists or scientists or philosophers but have a little of each in
them, and that when their knowledge increases in one area this is not
unconnected with advances of knowledge in other areas. That is, if a culture is an organic whole the
gaining of truth is not to be limited to activities within science or science,
history and philosophy. I would add that
if it is questionable that art gives us truth then it is almost equally
questionable whether philosophy does.
Whatever truths philosophy can give us are, by the very nature of
philosophy, not verifiable in scientific terms:
if they were then they would be scientific, not philosophical
truths. This is also the case for
history, the truths of which are not based on verifiable experiments. It the term “truth” is to be broad enough to
include the truths of philosophy and history as well as those of science there
is no reason in principle why it could not also be extended to art, or even for
that matter to religion.
Anyway, from thinking about truth and art in this way I have
come to think of truth in a pluralist way.
Shortly I am going to give a definition of truth, but before I do this I
should say something about what I take philosophical definitions to do. I see philosophical definitions as primarily
directed to concepts that are essentially contested, that is, concepts over
which there is a philosophical debate about the definition. The concepts of triangle and water are not
essentially contested. There are not any
ongoing debates over the essential nature of these things. There is no philosophy of triangles or of
water. Essentially contested concepts
give rise to competing “philosophy ofs” that thing. Democracy, love, art, good, knowledge and
true are all concepts of this sort. Contra Plato, Aristotle and many contemporary
realists, there are no eternally and unchangingly true definitions of these
concepts. An argument against this form
of realist would take longer than we have, but briefly, all proofs for such
entities fail. Nonetheless, it is still worthwhile
to try to come up with a definition of such concepts and to engage in debates about
those definitions. Such definitions,
their explication, and the debate that surrounds them help us to recalibrate
our understanding of the world so as to better respond to changing conditions. Philosophers tend to try to come up with a
definitions of art, and such subconcepts of art as architecture, which are both
uniquely right and eternally true. However I prefer definitions like that of
Robert Venturi for architecture.
Recognizing that every architect works with a definition of architecture
in mind, and that every generation has its own definitions, Venturi consciously
called his definition “our current definition.” In a sense he was projecting a definition that
he hoped would be true for his generation, and if not so, at least for his firm.
The definition of architecture that he
provided was “shelter with symbols [or decoration] on it.”[1] I will not now go into why this was such a
powerful definition, or how it changed our everyday built world, although I
will say that it formed one important basis for the entire style of postmodern
architecture. I am more interested in
the characteristics of the definition as a definition. These include that it was novel, not based on
a dictionary meaning, and provided guidelines for how to produce good items of
the type defined. It had an evaluative
dimension and a future-oriented one. The
power of this definition can be expressed in part by saying that it is true. This would not be so, however, if the only
theory of truth was the correspondence theory:
there is nothing which the phrase “architecture consists of shelter with
symbols on it” that accurately matches something in reality. Yet it does fit something; something more in
the realm of potentiality than in that of actuality. I think that most philosophical definitions
are better seen as like Venturi’s definition than like definitions of triangle
or water. I would also suggest that art
gives us truth in a similar way, that for example, Venturi’s actual architectural
practice contained implicitly the truth of philosophically stated definition,
and that the definition would be meaningless without the art practice context
in which it occurred.
Truth is also an essentially contested concept perhaps every
bit as much as democracy, art, and architecture. Such concepts do not simply exhibit
differences in people’s attitudes towards the subject matter in hand but also
their general attitude towards life. I
suspect that different types of people are attracted to the correspondence,
coherence, pragmatist and deflationary theories of truth. If true, my own view of truth will probably
only attract a certain type of person, only persons with theoretical
commitments similar to mine. My ideal
however would be to provide a theory of truth, or more modestly a suggestion
about how one ought to develop of theory of truth, which would work
particularly well for our own time, for example in the way that Venturi’s
theory of architecture worked for his own time.
But this is just to say that I hope my theory of truth meets my own
standards of truth which, in turn, are, as I mentioned earlier, dependent on my
theory of truth.
My theory of truth (to use the simpler phrase) is pluralist. My pluralism is of a special sort and should
not be confused with relativism or with the idea that there are just distinct
domains each with its own appropriate theory of truth. As I see it, truth has three sides or aspects
(I would consider candidates for a fourth or fifth side…I am not wedded to the
number three). These three sides are all
in constant conflict with each other, each side receiving ascendency at
different times in history in the process of reformulation to meet the needs of
the place and time in which the theory is put forward. My theory thus incorporates the essentially
contested natured of the concept of truth, while at the same time being nothing
more than just another offering in the contest over the nature of truth. The conflict between these three sides is
often fruitful, and I doubt that truth would be a lively or even a useful concept
if this was not the case. Nietzsche was
the first, and perhaps the only philosopher, to define an essentially contested
concept in terms of conflicting sides.
In The Birth of Tragedy he
defined art in terms of the Apollonian/Dionysian duality. Most definitions of concepts are in terms of
necessary and sufficient conditions and I am not saying that Nietzsche’s
definition of art could not be stated in this way. But Nietzsche was unique in saying that the
two key conditions of a concept are dynamically related to each other, that
they can conflict, and that they can also be periodically reconciled. He thought that the Apollonian and the
Dionysian were reconciled in Greek tragedy and then again later in Wagnerian
opera. Part of the reason why I think that viewing other essentially contested concepts
in this way is that I believe Nietzsche’s approach was immensely useful in the
domain of art.
So what are the three sides of truth? The first has to do with one to one fit of
elements between the candidate for truth and that to which it is said to be
truth. This covers the correspondence
theory of truth, which is often expressed in terms of the formula “”Snow is
white” is true if and only if snow is white.
But my view of this aspect of truth goes a bit beyond the correspondence
theory because it does not limit the candidate for truth to sentences. No one doubts that it is often useful to
speak of sentences as being true to the facts or of beliefs as corresponding to
reality. One could even state
non-scientific, non-mathematical truths in terms of the traditional truth
formula, i.e. “the sentence “Art is an Apollonian/Dionysian duality” is true if
and only if Art is an Apollonian/Dionysian duality.” However, as we shall see, this formula does
not capture the other two aspects of truth. As I
said above, this aspect of truth is not limited to sentences. It also includes any situation in which there
is a good one-to-one fit or match between two things, for example when we say
that we have “trued” the spokes on a bicycle.
This is the precision or accuracy aspect of truth. When applied to representations such as
sentences and pictures it entails that the true item must be an accurate copy
of the original. For example we can
speak picture as being true to its subject in that it copies the subject well. A portrait of someone can be spoken of as
being true in this sense although often the truth of a portrait also reflects
some other aspects of truth, as for example when it is not only accurate but
also captures something of the sitter’s essence. This would take it into the last aspect of
truth. But first, let us turn to the
second aspect of truth.
This second aspect might initially be thought to be
associated with pragmatism. But Peirce’s
definition of truth in terms of “concordance
of an abstract statement with the ideal limit towards which endless
investigation would tend to bring scientific belief” would fit the first aspect
of truth better. Peirce was still
working with a correspondence theory but he was at least heading in another
direction by way of emphasizing process and future orientation. I don’t like the phrase “pragmatist theory of
truth” because it confuses Peirce’s and James’ theories. The second aspect of truth is best expressed
by James’ idea of truth which I see as a considerable advance of Peirce’s. It is often not observed that James begins
his discussion with the idea that truth is a matter of agreement.[2] So he is not exactly disagreeing with the
correspondence theory of truth, but he is taking the idea of agreement in a
different direction. In particular he
rejects the idea that truth must be a matter of copying reality. He also rejects the idea that truth is an
inert, static relation. Rather, true ideas are ones that we can prove to be
true, and their truth lies in the process of verification. As he puts it, “Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events.” James
understands this process as one of “agreeable leading” in which the ideas
“remain in agreement.” (In this he seems
to have incorporated an aspect of the coherence theory of truth.) For James, verification takes place in
experience. He also thought that one
could not talk about truth without talking about the practical value of
truth. For example, when you are lost in
the woods, thinking truly that there a house at the end of a path can be
immensely important. This would seem to
some people to mean no more than that truths are useful. But James believed that to say that something
is useful because it is true means the
same as to say it is true because it is useful. Truth is a matter of experience, of going
from one moment in experience to another that is more worthwhile. A true thought is a leading that is
worthwhile, a dipping into experience to make connections that are useful. When we see the house at the end of the path
the initial thought of the house is verified, made true. This is what James meant when he said that
truth is that which is good in the way of believing.
James’ idea of truth seems consistent with the thought about
truth that the 18th century Italian philosopher Giambatista Vico provided. Vico
said that verum ipsum factum--"truth itself is
constructed." No one would deny that true sentences are constructed.
But the claim isn't that the bearer of truth is constructed. Rather,
truth itself is constructed. I am not entirely happy with the
construction metaphor. It is not as though we take smaller elements, add
them together, and get truth, a building-like entity. But I do think
there is some insight contained in the statement. Truth wouldn't exist
without the making activity of intelligent beings. This is also similar
to Heidegger’s idea that truth is something that happens. However, Heidegger’s idea enters more fully
into the third aspect of truth.
The third aspect of truth is the quality of heightened
reality we experience when we believe we have captured the essence of something
and the first two aspects have been or could be met. It is exemplified in Venturi’s definition of
architecture, but also in virtually any definition offered by a thinker in a
philosophical contest over some essence or nature. I think that Plato describes this aspect
nicely, although in a tentative way, in his theory of truth as described in the
section of The Republic traditionally
called “the line.” There, Plato
describes the truth as something that comes from the sun, which in his story
represents the Good, the very essence of the essences themselves. In pursuit of the nature of the Good, which
for Plato is the highest of the Forms, the true becomes manifest as a kind of
light reveals the essences of things, what he considered to be the Forms. As I my Socratic quest article, although I do
not accept Plato’s Forms I do think that the Socratic search for essences is
well worth the trouble and that trying to come up with definitions can be
immensely fruitful, as in the case of Venturi’s definition.
This point may seem surprising to some, but I think that
Plato and Heidegger totally agree on this point. For Heidegger in his great essay The Origins of the Work of Art, Van
Gogh’s painting lets truth emerge by revealing to us the equipmental nature of
equipment, in this case a pair of shoes.
These shoes, it turns out, can only be understood existentially and
phenomenologically in terms of the experience of the shoe-wearer in her
interaction with her world and with the earth.
Heidegger’s idea that truth is unconcealment goes along with the notion
that this aspect of truth is that in which the essential nature of a thing
reveals itself in a vibrant and startling way. I would say that truth, when it
happens deeply in this way, is emergent upon an activity, for example upon the
activity of Van Gogh's painting, and then again, in a somewhat different way,
upon the activity of Heidegger's interpretation of the painting, and then
again, quite possibly in our interpretation of Heidegger. Heidegger not only shows how art can be true
but how a concept of truth limited to the accuracy aspect or even to the
accuracy plus the pragmatic aspect would be incomplete.
Finally, I would argue that none of these aspects of truth
are reducible to or replaceable by any of the others. They are equally important sides to truth,
what I call the sides of accuracy, usefulness, and radiance. Moreover, only when truth has risen through
these three stages that we get the final story about truth. There is a ladder of truth just as there is a
ladder of love in Plato’s Symposium,
although unlike Plato I would not recommend discarding the first stage when we
reach the last. Accuracy could be filled
out or completed in usefulness and ultimately in radiance. But so too, radiance (e.g. the experience of
sudden insight) can only be filled out or completed in usefulness and
ultimately in accuracy. Exclusive focus
on one side of truth neglects its rich and full character and leads to
difficulties, illusions and even sometimes to disaster. For example if one were to just see truth in
the last, Platonic/Heideggerian way without any attention to the accuracy or usefulness
sides of truth then one might become immersed in harmful illusions as Plato and
Heidegger themselves were when they pursued friendships with vicious dictators
in the belief perhaps that good ends justify distasteful means. To return to Nietzsche’s metaphor but in a
different way I would say that truth combines and Apollonian and a Dionysian. An overly mechanistic approach to truth that
focuses on such concepts as accuracy, precision and correctly copying, fails in
the same way that an overly Apollonian approach to art fails. Truth also has a Dionysian side, a side that
is entirely ignored when the truth about truth is summed up in a statement like
“”Snow is white” is true if and only if snow is white.”
Truth is
a triune concept, all sides in constant, necessary, often fruitful,
and often harmful conflict. One side regards one to one fit of
elements between the candidate for truth (proposition, picture, etc.) and
that to which it is said to be true. The second is best expressed by William
James' idea that truth is that which is good in the way of believing. The
third is the quality of heightened reality we experience as when we believe we
have captured the essence of something (e.g. conceptually or through art). None of these is reducible to any of the
others.
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