I just read “The Aesthetic as a Matter of Practices: Form of
Life in Everydayness and Art” by Giovanni Matteucci, Comprendre 18:2 (2016)
9-28 link, a very interesting paper with which I mainly agree.
Here is his abstract: "A set of phenomena that have been marginalized for a long time are now putting to test the traditional boundaries of aesthetics. Today it’s not surprising to find books and
essays concerning the «aesthetics» of food and clothing, sport and daily objects and events. Such expansion de facto of the topics covered by aesthetics is sufficiently justified by the fact that the fore mentioned phenomena – although it is often difficult to
assess their aesthetic significance from a philosophical point of view – have a decisive influence on the current configurations of taste. This role was in the past assigned mainly to art and to its ability in shaping high cultural styles. But nowadays it seems to
have become the prerogative of daily life’s practices which include design, fashion, tourism, gastronomy, recreational and leisure activities, wellness, wellbeing etc. –in other words the crucible in which life-styles (instead of art-styles) are formed."
Matteucci argues for continuity between
aesthetics of everyday life and aesthetics of art, agreeing with John Dewey,
and yet also wishes to raise issues concerning the problems of aestheticization in our contemporary culture. He has an interesting discussion of my
concept of “aura” as developed in my book The
Extraordinary in the Ordinary link but has a problem with what he considers my
failure to consider the dialectical relation between auratic and non-auratic as
well as with my stress on the notion of the exceptional or the
extraordinary.
Matteucci observes that the aura view leaves out the dialectical tension between the auratic and the non-auratic "that is necessary in order to
avoid a dogmatic use of this notion."
I think he is right that aura is dialectical tension with
non-auratic or with what Dewey called "inchoate" experience. Part of that is that we see our auratic
experience as a way of dealing with the dreadful aspects of everyday life. Also I think he is right in his suggestion
that there can be false or repressive aura, for example as generated by advertising campaigns or "reality" shows on television, or currently that which surrounds our President-elect.
Kitsch seems to have aura, but this is very shallow. In the age of mechanical reproduction, as
Walter Benjamin coined it, aura hardly disappears (contra Benjamin): it is just
displaced, but in a way, often, that seems to strip it of most substance. Strangely, original artworks take on even
more aura in the age of mechanical reproduction. Witness the ways in which we treat great works of art as though they were religious relics. But there is a positive side to this too. Some of us still go to museums to contemplate
great art in the original (and in fact, this is a very popular pastime, here in the San Francisco Bay Area...witness the popularity of the Museum of Modern Art).
Matteucci also writes, "It’s not a matter of something exceptional or extraordinary, but of something that appears pointful in our interaction with the environment" I don't have any problem with this as I think that the term "extraordinary" had important rhetorical purposes for me earlier but now can be replaced by other terms for other purposes. "Pointful" might be too broad, however, or at least ambiguous since it might confuse the aesthetic with the important, useful or interesting. We can meaningfully organize our experience without organizing it aesthetically. Aesthetic meaning may be just one type of meaning.
One of the things Matteucci discusses is the change of aura
and everyday aesthetics in a digital era.
This reminds me of a classroom experience I have been having recently. I often show "slides" in my
classroom, but see them on my computer screen more often than on the screen the
students see. And sometimes I notice that what they are looking at is drained of
color or pixilated poorly. The students are
actually getting a worse aesthetic experience than I got when looking at actual
slides projected by way of a light bulb in my undergraduate classes of the 1970s: the color was just richer then. I require my students to take a trip to a
museum or art gallery and writer a paper about a work they have physically
encountered. At least they will get the color, texture and other rich aspects of the work not captured in the digital image, not to speak of the physical context of its placement.
Along similar lines, we might also consider the thinning of
experience within the library, where books are replaced by electronic products
which are remarkably similar to physical books in look and experience and yet are
resistant to the complex interactions we have with physical books, especially
in our ability to flip not only through pages but through entire sections, while also flipping to the back for
footnotes and index, back and forth. In addition, the experience of marking
up the book, and then rereading it with attention to our marks is largely lost with the electronic book. Increasingly our libraries refuse to buy
physical books, and only provide us with (usually more limited) access to
electronic versions of the books. This
is an aesthetic as well as a scholarly loss in the everyday life of the scholar: a conscious loss for the teacher, less conscious for the student.
Also, Matteucci writes, in relation to our
technological age, "even a painted image can enter a person’s aesthetic
background more as a photograph or a screen picture rather than as viewed
without artificial mediations." In
support of this point I have observed that some of my students are no longer
able to distinguish between a photograph, a digitalized image,
and a painting. They often, quite surprisingly, use the word "photo" to refer to all three, even to a painting observed in a gallery. In one instance a student referred to a photo as a painting! They often also use "picture" to refer to all three. Although this is grammatically right, it
shows an unawareness of the differences between each kind of image.
I find it difficult to correlate the idea of
"rational argumentation," which Matteucci seems to support as a basis for legitimization of everyday aesthetics in relation to art (following Kant: the sensus communis works in each case), but which I
think is overrated in everyday aesthetics (do we really engage in rational
argumentation over whether or not a room is neat....only when one is obsessed
with rational argumentation?), and Roger Scruton's very different claim,
supported by Matteucci only a few lines later, that, "[t]he doorframe is not
just preferred but interpreted, and the interpretation involves
metaphors..."! I think Scruton captures better what happens in everyday aesthetics: it is more a matter of interpretation by way of metaphor than one of "rational argumentation."
However, I like Matteucci’s idea of "a form of competence, a
know-how that concerns and supports the ability to manage and enjoy an
aesthetic experience while exploiting the normative criterion of its pointfulness,"
and especially his idea that “The new topic for aesthetic analysis is no longer
the experience of something, but the experience with something. And this is the
source of the current pervasive force of the aesthetic, a reservoir of
experiential intensification in a reality connoted by the saturation of
functional needs” which is to say that the very notion of “an experience” that
Dewey once described so well is under transformation in our own information
age.
Finally, I am not sure I agree with the idea that there has been a shift of aura from art to practices and forms of life. Rather there has been a shift in theoretical interest. Why can't we just say that the newly enlivened field of everyday aesthetics has opened up a new arena of interest that, in no way, takes away interest from the long tradition of fine art.
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