There is little I disagree with in Mark Johnson. I have been reading his The Aesthetics of Meaning and Thought: The Bodily Roots of Philosophy, Science, Morality, and Art (2018). Johnson is every bit as much a Deweyan as I am. That makes the little areas in which we might disagree interesting (to me). What I think generally (our one point of disagreement) is that, with all his emphasis on meaning, Johnson neglects, or misses out on, the importance of beauty. So he says, "Qualities are what we live for - the fresh, soft, translucent greens of leaves in early spring contrasted with the hardened, fatigued, dessicated greens in early fall..." (227) "This is the stuff of our lives." (227) There is something wrong here. It is not the qualities we live for but rather the ways in which these qualities can be experienced as enhanced in a pleasurable way, or, to put it another way, experienced as objects of beauty or sublimity.
Something is telling about Johnson's focus on contrast. Contrast between qualities is interesting, and one may think about the contrast between two qualities of leaves in different seasons. But this is not the "stuff of our lives." The stuff of our lives is the quality of the leaves we experience now (say, in the Spring) and it is only really stuff of our lives, only really important for us, if it is experienced as beautiful. After giving a poem by William Stafford, Johnson writes (by way of summarizing the point of the poem), "The air, the water, the memories---all cool and refreshing. And while it lasts, there you are, too, present, just present, taking it in, feeling the morning and the world and peace. And that is the meaning of it all." (227) Well, you might think that a particular intense aesthetic experience is the meaning of it all, but again it is not the qualities alone by themselves. The qualities have a quality: and it is that quality, commonly called beauty, that gives life meaning.
Johnson may be right that this is essentially Dewey. As he puts it "Dewey's claim about the primordial qualitativeness of our lives would seem almost trivial, were it not for that fact that it is hard to think of a philosophy that does justice to this insight" i.e. that qualities are the "stuff of meaningful experience." (227) Johnson stresses the idea of the prevasive unifying quality in Dewey. He refers to this as "Dewey's big idea." And there is reason to think it is!
But notice this passage from Johnson, which refers to our ability to immediately recognize a Picasso in a museum: "there is a pervasive unifying quality of this particular work you are now engaging....[a]nd the meaning of that particular work is realized, as a horizon of possibilities for meaning, in and through its qualitative unity" (231). Johnson then quotes from Dewey. But what I wish to stress here, and I will give the quote from Dewey to show this, is that the quote agrees with me and not with Johnson. The quote does not support the position that Johnson is trying to support...i.e. that it is all about meaning.
Here is the quote from Dewey: "The total overwhelming impression comes first, perhaps in a seizure by a sudden glory of the landscape, or by the effect upon us of entrance into a cathedral when dim light, incense, stained glass and majestic proportions fuse in one indistinguishable whole. We say with truth that a painting strikes us. There is an impact that precedes all definite recognition of what it is about." (Dewey, 1987, 150) (Johnson, 231). The point is that this impact precedes meaning, precedes "what it is about." Focus on the term "sudden glory." The pervasive unifying quality is precisely the profound beauty or perhaps sublimity of the object. (Or at least it is completely bound up with that beauty.)
So it is missing something to say that, for Dewey, "art reveals, through immediate presentation of qualities unified in a comprehensive whole, the meaning and significance of some aspect of the world." (232) This is true but it is not meaning alone that makes experience meaningful. Beauty, "the glory of it," is what counts, and without that, art, and any aesthetic experience, would be almost pointless, and certainly incomplete.
Another quote from Dewey, also quoted by Johnson regarding the qualitative unity is: "There is no name to be given it. As it enlivens and animates, it is the spirit of the world of art." (Dewey, 1987, 193) The animation, the making it so that we feel the work as something highly real: this is what we mean when we say that it has an aesthetic aura (the term I prefer somewhat to "beauty").
Finally, at the end of his chapter on "Dewey's Big Idea for Aesthetics," Johnson makes clear what his problem is, that he thinks aesthetic theory fetishizes "the aesthetic." It is quite possible that he would think that this is what I am doing here. (240) But his path is perhaps more dangerous: he has reduced the aesthetic to the meaningful. He is worried that the aesthetic road will separate art from life "as if ordinary living was not an aesthetic undertaking" ---and I agree that this would be bad.
He has an additional worry. He says, "It is perfectly acceptable to speak, as Dewey sometimes does, of 'aesthetic experience' when we are trying to observe that certain experiences are marked out as meaningful unities....But what is not acceptable is to treat 'the aesthetic' as some quality or feature that descends ....upon a certain select set of experiences." (240) I get the worry. But it is equally not acceptable to reduce the aesthetic to merely meaningful unities...unless, of course, the word "meaningful" packs within it the idea of aesthetic experience. The quality of the aesthetic does not "descend": it is those experiences in their (usually highly pleasurable) intensity.
But Johnson's final paragraph begins with a sentence with which I fully agree: "Dewey's entire philosophical orientation is founded on his insight that all experience, perception, understanding, imagining, thinking, valuing, and acting begins and ends in the aesthetic dimensions of human experience." (241) And I will end on that positive note.
Showing posts with label beauty. Show all posts
Showing posts with label beauty. Show all posts
Monday, February 10, 2020
Wednesday, October 26, 2016
"On Those Who Are Sublime" Nietzsche and his critique of Kant's aesthetics
Zarathustra saw a solemn person who was sublime, "an ascetic of the spirit" at whom he laughed because of his ugliness. This chapter of TSZ deals with Nietzsche's critique of Kant (and possibly Hegel as well) on the sublime and the beautiful. His main point is that the beautiful is more important than the sublime, although that idea only gets substance when played out in terms of the ideas of the overman and will to power. Kant's notion of the sublime is rather odd in that, for him, when we appreciate the sublime (what he calls the dynamic sublime) we are really appreciating our own power as humans, we are appreciating the ways in which we transcend even the most terrifying aspects of nature: [from his Critique of Judgment] "we willingly call these objects [bold, overhanging, and...threatening rocks...[etc.] sublime, because they raise the energies of the soul above their accustomed height and discover in us a faculty of resistance of quite a different kind, which gives us courage to measure ourselves against the apparent almightiness of nature" and, further, "nature is not judged to be sublime ...in so far as it excites fear, but because it calls up that power in us...of regarding as small the things about which we are solicitous [health, money, etc.]...and of regarding its might ...as nevertheless without any dominion over us..." ["even if the volcano destroys my home, I can rise above that": a kind of Stoic philosophy]
This is what N. means when he speaks of the sublime person as having a "swelled chest" and being decked out with "ugly truths." The so-called "truth" of Kant's sublime man is really just a rather ugly anthropocentrism based on belief in a totally free and transcendent self or soul. Moreover, beauty is somehow lost in all of this.
Kant says that there are two main positive aesthetic qualities, the beautiful and the sublime, but for N., they are in dialectical competition...and the winner is not the sublime but beauty. You would think that N., with all of his talk of the overman, would be more positive about the sublime. Who more sublime than Nietzsche? So the victory of beauty comes as a surprise. But maybe that is because we usually misread Nietzsche, i.e. by way of Hitler.
Of Kant, then, Nietzsche would say: "as yet he has not learned laughter and beauty." That is, he takes himself too seriously. And "out of his seriousness there also peers a savage beast - one not overcome." The sublime person is also in the act of withdrawing from the earth, which, Z. observes ironically, is not to his "taste."
It is funny to see a reference to taste here. Of course Kant discusses taste in a different place than he does the sublime, and he only advocates the idea that "there is no disputing about taste" with regards to that which is merely agreeable, not with regards to beauty. It seems that N. has just misread Kant. Yet, although N. and K. agree that we may dispute about taste, K. may not be serious about that (and N. may see this.) K. does not bother to set up or describe any disputes over taste, and one wonders what such a dispute would look like for K. If someone says X is not beautiful and you disagree, you are free to show him (I suppose Kant thinks) that he has failed to be disinterested or to have focused on the look of purpose in the object, or has not allowed his imagination and understanding to go into free play. After all, when you say something is beautiful you are setting it up on a pedestal and expect, nay demand, that others agree. None of this seems to be much like a dispute in which people offer reasons. Instead, it all seems pretty ad hominem and detached from actually talking about the art object or other object of beauty itself.
N.s comeback is simply: "But all of life is a dispute over taste and tasting." (I love it that he added "and tasting" since this is very body-oriented and brings taste back from something purely mental where it seems to reside for most philosophers even today.) The idea that all of life is a dispute over taste may be the same as the idea that whatever we are doing we are setting up values in opposition to the values of others. We dispute, we argue, and that is what life is about, and this is true even with regards to morality.
The claim extends aesthetics to all of life: quite a radical claim. (So much for philosophy's relegation of aesthetics to backwaters.) To make it, N. must expand his notion of taste. He does this when he says it is "at the same time weight and scales and weigher." These are the things we dispute over. Moreover life is worthless (or at least not quite human) if we try to live without disputing over these things, over how valuable something is, over what scales to use in measuring value, and over the value of the person who does the weighing of value.
So, for Z., the sublime person only becomes beautiful or obtains beauty when he gets tired of the anthropocentrism of his take on the sublime. That sort of person would then be "tasteful" to Z. That is, such a person has to turn "away from himself" and, of course, following Zs line, he must "jump over his shadow - ...into his sun." That is, he must overcome that miniscule thing which he considers his ego and find his true essence, which what would illuminate: essence can be seen as the overman, but not that it is individualize: his sun. Z. does not want followers, or rather he only wants followers who follow their suns.
Nietzsche reiterates: "his [the so called sublime person's] happiness should smell of the earth, and not of contempt for the earth." Kant would have us praise our transcendent souls in the experience of the sublime, but this is not to say "yes" to the earth, which, as we know, is the main message of Z. Of Kant, and similar philosophers, like Hegel: "He subdued monsters and riddles: but he must still redeem his own monsters and riddles, changing them into heavenly children." All virtues come from what was previously considered vice. Further: "As yet his knowledge has not learned to smile and to be without jealousy; as yet, his torrential passion has not become still in beauty." Beauty will come when the passion of the hero philosopher is transformed into a serenity in which a smile is possible. He must transform that which within himself would normally be called "evil." And of course he must overcome, or transform, revenge [the greatest evil]...such an important move for Nietzsche.
So desire is submerged not in satiety but in beauty, and the graciousness of the great-souled person is suffused with grace. Kant encourages us to be heroes, but the most difficult thing for the hero is to achieve the beautiful: "No violent will can attain the beautiful by exertion." Beauty is a matter of subtlety.
One often associates Nietzsche with the Dionysian alone, but here is a call to the Apollonian as well. One even imagines the traditional notion of Greek beauty that N. had overcome in his first book coming back in a way. In Birth of Tragedy we learn that the Apollonian alone is not enough for great art. But here we find that the sublime have to: "stand with relaxed muscles and unharnessed will" like a statue of Apollo, and that this is their most difficult task. If you think you are sublime, you are caught up in ego, but to respond to this would be to unharness your will and relax your heroic muscles.
Now we are prepared for a definition of beauty: "When power becomes gracious and descends into the visible - such descent I call beauty." Plato had seen beauty as a matter of ascent: ascent to the Form of beauty. N. gives primacy to will to power. Will to power is not always cruel: sometimes, at its best, it is gracious, gift-giving, and this involves a descent from heights into the realm of the visible. Beauty then is concentrated visible power found in the gift. The source of the gift determines the power of the beauty. Thus "there is nobody from whom I want beauty as much as from you who are powerful," to which he adds that the kindness of the powerful should be their final "self-conquest." (There is no separation of ethics and aesthetics here!) Grace, graciousness, the creatively powerful individual, the hero of will-lessness, that which conquers itself: these things form the new conceptual nexus of beauty. We haven't seen a vision of beauty like this before, or since.
The powerful (i.e. the powerful in creative action) are capable of "all evil" but then it follows that they should give forth good, a good that is quite different from that which comes out of people who are weak in creative power, and who think they are good just because they have no claws. The gracious hero is then compared to a column which grows "more beautiful and gentle" and also internally harder and "more enduring" as it ascends.
So, in conclusion, the sublime person (he who has accepted and lives by Kant's notion of the sublime) only can hope to "become beautiful one day" and thus have "godlike desires." Although he would then be vain, he would would be suitable for adoration. The soul's secret is that only when she has been abandoned by the hero can she be approached by the "overhero." The chapter ends here.
This is what N. means when he speaks of the sublime person as having a "swelled chest" and being decked out with "ugly truths." The so-called "truth" of Kant's sublime man is really just a rather ugly anthropocentrism based on belief in a totally free and transcendent self or soul. Moreover, beauty is somehow lost in all of this.
Kant says that there are two main positive aesthetic qualities, the beautiful and the sublime, but for N., they are in dialectical competition...and the winner is not the sublime but beauty. You would think that N., with all of his talk of the overman, would be more positive about the sublime. Who more sublime than Nietzsche? So the victory of beauty comes as a surprise. But maybe that is because we usually misread Nietzsche, i.e. by way of Hitler.
Of Kant, then, Nietzsche would say: "as yet he has not learned laughter and beauty." That is, he takes himself too seriously. And "out of his seriousness there also peers a savage beast - one not overcome." The sublime person is also in the act of withdrawing from the earth, which, Z. observes ironically, is not to his "taste."
It is funny to see a reference to taste here. Of course Kant discusses taste in a different place than he does the sublime, and he only advocates the idea that "there is no disputing about taste" with regards to that which is merely agreeable, not with regards to beauty. It seems that N. has just misread Kant. Yet, although N. and K. agree that we may dispute about taste, K. may not be serious about that (and N. may see this.) K. does not bother to set up or describe any disputes over taste, and one wonders what such a dispute would look like for K. If someone says X is not beautiful and you disagree, you are free to show him (I suppose Kant thinks) that he has failed to be disinterested or to have focused on the look of purpose in the object, or has not allowed his imagination and understanding to go into free play. After all, when you say something is beautiful you are setting it up on a pedestal and expect, nay demand, that others agree. None of this seems to be much like a dispute in which people offer reasons. Instead, it all seems pretty ad hominem and detached from actually talking about the art object or other object of beauty itself.
N.s comeback is simply: "But all of life is a dispute over taste and tasting." (I love it that he added "and tasting" since this is very body-oriented and brings taste back from something purely mental where it seems to reside for most philosophers even today.) The idea that all of life is a dispute over taste may be the same as the idea that whatever we are doing we are setting up values in opposition to the values of others. We dispute, we argue, and that is what life is about, and this is true even with regards to morality.
The claim extends aesthetics to all of life: quite a radical claim. (So much for philosophy's relegation of aesthetics to backwaters.) To make it, N. must expand his notion of taste. He does this when he says it is "at the same time weight and scales and weigher." These are the things we dispute over. Moreover life is worthless (or at least not quite human) if we try to live without disputing over these things, over how valuable something is, over what scales to use in measuring value, and over the value of the person who does the weighing of value.
So, for Z., the sublime person only becomes beautiful or obtains beauty when he gets tired of the anthropocentrism of his take on the sublime. That sort of person would then be "tasteful" to Z. That is, such a person has to turn "away from himself" and, of course, following Zs line, he must "jump over his shadow - ...into his sun." That is, he must overcome that miniscule thing which he considers his ego and find his true essence, which what would illuminate: essence can be seen as the overman, but not that it is individualize: his sun. Z. does not want followers, or rather he only wants followers who follow their suns.
Nietzsche reiterates: "his [the so called sublime person's] happiness should smell of the earth, and not of contempt for the earth." Kant would have us praise our transcendent souls in the experience of the sublime, but this is not to say "yes" to the earth, which, as we know, is the main message of Z. Of Kant, and similar philosophers, like Hegel: "He subdued monsters and riddles: but he must still redeem his own monsters and riddles, changing them into heavenly children." All virtues come from what was previously considered vice. Further: "As yet his knowledge has not learned to smile and to be without jealousy; as yet, his torrential passion has not become still in beauty." Beauty will come when the passion of the hero philosopher is transformed into a serenity in which a smile is possible. He must transform that which within himself would normally be called "evil." And of course he must overcome, or transform, revenge [the greatest evil]...such an important move for Nietzsche.
So desire is submerged not in satiety but in beauty, and the graciousness of the great-souled person is suffused with grace. Kant encourages us to be heroes, but the most difficult thing for the hero is to achieve the beautiful: "No violent will can attain the beautiful by exertion." Beauty is a matter of subtlety.
One often associates Nietzsche with the Dionysian alone, but here is a call to the Apollonian as well. One even imagines the traditional notion of Greek beauty that N. had overcome in his first book coming back in a way. In Birth of Tragedy we learn that the Apollonian alone is not enough for great art. But here we find that the sublime have to: "stand with relaxed muscles and unharnessed will" like a statue of Apollo, and that this is their most difficult task. If you think you are sublime, you are caught up in ego, but to respond to this would be to unharness your will and relax your heroic muscles.
Now we are prepared for a definition of beauty: "When power becomes gracious and descends into the visible - such descent I call beauty." Plato had seen beauty as a matter of ascent: ascent to the Form of beauty. N. gives primacy to will to power. Will to power is not always cruel: sometimes, at its best, it is gracious, gift-giving, and this involves a descent from heights into the realm of the visible. Beauty then is concentrated visible power found in the gift. The source of the gift determines the power of the beauty. Thus "there is nobody from whom I want beauty as much as from you who are powerful," to which he adds that the kindness of the powerful should be their final "self-conquest." (There is no separation of ethics and aesthetics here!) Grace, graciousness, the creatively powerful individual, the hero of will-lessness, that which conquers itself: these things form the new conceptual nexus of beauty. We haven't seen a vision of beauty like this before, or since.
The powerful (i.e. the powerful in creative action) are capable of "all evil" but then it follows that they should give forth good, a good that is quite different from that which comes out of people who are weak in creative power, and who think they are good just because they have no claws. The gracious hero is then compared to a column which grows "more beautiful and gentle" and also internally harder and "more enduring" as it ascends.
So, in conclusion, the sublime person (he who has accepted and lives by Kant's notion of the sublime) only can hope to "become beautiful one day" and thus have "godlike desires." Although he would then be vain, he would would be suitable for adoration. The soul's secret is that only when she has been abandoned by the hero can she be approached by the "overhero." The chapter ends here.
Labels:
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dynamic sublime,
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Nietzsche,
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Thursday, September 15, 2016
Love: The Circle Cycle Theory, or Plato's Symposium Take 2
There has always been a close relationship between aesthetics and the theory of love, although one would not notice it by looking at any of the major aesthetics journals. If aesthetics has a lot to do with love insofar as the object of love is often said to be so because beautiful, then perhaps there can be some fruitful interaction between the two theories. In fact, the first great Western work on love, Plato's Symposium, is also the first great Western work on beauty. I have posted on this previously, but will now take a somewhat different angle. Here I will argue (let's just say it is a working hypothesis) that Plato is essentially right about love and beauty if, and I suppose this is a big if, we make one crucial modification to the theory. Previously I have argued that one has to interpret the greater mysteries in terms of the lesser mysteries of love, and I am going to stick by that, but now I will argue that there is a fundamental rightness in the greater mysteries if, again, one makes this rather major modification. I think, and this is purely hypothetical, that the modification can be based on Plato's view about the doctrine of recollection as it is put by Diotima when she describes the lesser mysteries. This, by the way, will make the new theory of love on offer (1) not dualistic and (2) consistent with a Nietzschean way of seeing things, which will be much to the surprise of followers of the orthodox understanding of Plato. So here is the theory. The fundamental problem with the ladder of love is Diotima's (I will use her name from now on, although we have no idea whether the theory is hers, Socrates', Plato's, or something that developed through all three...for now, it doesn't matter) insistence that the lower rungs of the ladder of love need to be cast away once one has reached Beauty itself. First, that is simply inconsistent, since just before grasping Beauty itself, on the penultimate rung of the ladder, the philosopher is viewing the vast sea of beauty, in a sense seeing beauty in all things. This achievement cannot be consistent with dumping the beauties and the types of love he or she appreciated prior to ascending the ladder! So my proposal is to replace the ladder of love with a circle of love, a circle that must be cycled through to gain a full appreciation of love, but in which there is no one privileged position. (This comes out of my previously developed theory of the circle of appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature.) The circle will be conceived as something more like a spiral, however (just to complicate things a bit) in that, although there is backward tracking or cycling back, we will not ignore the element of advancement and growth that enters into Diotima's theory. The cycle theory will be paralleled by a circle of beauty as the object of love. That is, whatever is said about the nature of love can be transferred over to the nature of beauty itself and vice versa. Following Diotima (and here I will be using the Jowett translation) the ladder of love is temporal in that one begins in youth with visiting "beautiful forms" loving one such form only, if, interestingly (and I will say more about this later), one is guided correctly by one's instructor. Beautiful thoughts are then created out of that interchange. After that comes an awareness of the similarity between beautiful forms, including of course, beautiful bodies. The intuition is that, once beauty of form in general is observed, the beauty in every form is perceived as "one in the same." This, as many philosophers have observed, is problematic, since, although I am aware that in saying my beloved is beautiful I am insisting that she shares this predicate with others called beautiful, I am also aware of her unique beauty, and so here beauty is not one in the same. I will have more to say about the concept of "same" later. A deeper problem is that the lover will "despise and deem a small thing" the beauty of the original one loved. The sentence is interesting since Diotima indicates that to make this move (or as a consequence of it) "he will abate his violent love of the one": it is perhaps the violence of the original love that makes it problematic and worthy of rejection? But let's say that the love of the one other, both in body and soul, is soft and gentle? If so, then there would be no need to reject it. Alternatively, one might want to give credit to both violent and gentle moments in the cycle of love: I won't have anything to say about that here. My point is a question to Diotima: why can't the lover cycle back from love of bodies and forms in general to achieve an enhanced appreciation of his or her original love and, indeed, the unique aspects of his/her beauty as well as the general aspects, or on top of them.
Diotima continues to the next stage: the lover moves on to appreciate the beauty of the mind, and to see this as "more honorable than the beauty of the outward form." A revision here is needed, but not an unreasonable one. When we love, say a wife or girlfriend, the external beauty is enhanced by recognition of internal beauty, and perhaps internal beauty is also enhanced by external beauty. There is a cycling between the two. Surely Diotima/Socrates/Plato could have seen that. The beauty of the mind is only more honorable insofar as it can be artificially abstracted from the beauty of the body. If I see a face animated in conversation and the face is seen as beautiful I cannot even separate the animated face from the physical face, and it would be absurd to say that the true face is the one at sleep or in death. So what sense does it even make to say that the beauty of mind is "more honorable" than that of the body it animates? Is there even a beautiful mind independent of its manifestations in the body? Diotima correctly situates this question in terms of the relation between lover and beloved in that the lover will take the virtuous soul of a beloved who is not physically beautiful and be "content to love and tend him" insofar as he will bring out thoughts which may improve him. This very process that leads to the next stage, since these thoughts are already social insofar as they are between lover and beloved. It is from here that we move on to a larger social stage which is that of thoughts about institutions and laws. Yet the the cycle view is relevant here too, since to speak of my beloved as having a beautiful soul is to speak of that soul in action, the most relevant action being the conversations we (she and I) have about things we value, including movies, art, poetry, literature, politics, family, nature, virtue, disapproval of vice, and of course our love itself. Love between the lover and the beloved is nourished by their mutual love of other things, i.e. in institutions, laws, and the creative arts. Moreover, earlier in the dialogue Diotima herself had closely associated the creative arts with the creation of institutions and laws, both as being examples of the higher pregnancy of ideas.
Jowett's translation does not make clear whether it is the lover or the beloved who comes again to see that the beauty of the institutions and laws belong to "one family" and yet this more general appreciation of beauty can happen to both. The problem is that this is associated with her notion that "personal beauty is a trifle." It isn't, and cannot be, since personal beauty is enhanced by this process that comes out of the shared life of the lover and beloved or out of the shared life of close friends.
Then there is the next move up the ladder of love to "the sciences" which, of course, includes all objects of study and skill, including all of the ones that are taught in the university, and not, not only all of what we would call the sciences but also all of the arts (let's not worry about here Plato's negative attitude about the imitative arts). To see their beauty, says Diotima, means that one is not "like a servant" in only focusing on the beauty of one person or institution and serving that one person or institution like a slave. This is a worthwhile warning and one should take into account that not all movements in the cycle of love are conducive to either autonomy or liberality. At the same time, a cycle view which calls on the lover to always cycle back to the particular from the general with a recognition that due attention to each enhances each, leads to a fuller and more adequate account of love and also of beauty. Becoming less "narrow-minded," as Diotima encourages us to be, is not inconsistent with continuing recognition of both the physical and mental beauty of the beloved, not inconsistent with that being enhanced by way of the greater knowledge achieved in studying the sciences and a very inclusive and liberal way. A shared love of the liberal arts is not necessarily inconsistent, and may well help form, a good marriage.
And then the next stage is "contemplating the vast sea of beauty" which is to say, I think, seeing beauty not only in officially recognized objects of beauty but in many many other places as well, in the way a flaneur does when roaming the streets of the city, or in the way John Muir did when roaming the Sierra wilds, and so we find, and here, remember, the relation between the lover and the beloved is still central, that "he [the lover] will create many fair and noble thoughts and notions in the boundless love of wisdom" since wouldn't he also be creating these thoughts and notions also in his or her friends and lovers too?
The penultimate stage in Diotima's ladder recognizes the revelation of "a single science...of beauty everywhere" which then, Diotima calls on Socrates to understand by paying the closest attention. So bear in mind that the student of love must follow "due order and succession." And yet, I argue, this due order and succession should not have to require, contra Diotima, that there is no cycling through that order and no return to love of the individual or the particular thing, or even of such things of everyday life as clothes and food.
The end of this process is perceiving "a nature of wondrous beauty" which is seen as the ultimate end or purpose of the entire project. Yes, but the nature of wondrous beauty contains all of the things previously loved and thought to be beautiful. At this point Diotima (we might as well say Plato here since this is Plato's theory of Forms) describes the realm that is "everlasting, not growing and decaying, or waxing and waning" and also not relative to the individual or the society.
On one level I do not think there there is a thing of that sort to be seen in the way that we see other things, but one can speak of an aspect of something experienced as beautiful as being as if eternal and unchanging, as if non-relative. Diotima herself used this idea when talking in the lesser mysteries about the immortality available to humans where what appears to be the same is really new and where succession preserves mortal things "not absolutely the same, but by sustitution" which she thinks "partakes of immortality."
The cycle view can have a place for this as a "moment": an idealist moment, one that can enhance the entire experience by informing it with something ideal insofar as it partakes of immortality in this way. On this view "beauty absolute, separate, simple, and everlasting" is not just by itself because, after all, it is"imparted to the very-growing and perishing beautiful of all other things" and thus is related to all other things in this way, and depends on that relation for its very being.
Diotima thinks that perceiving this beauty is "not far from the end" which is interesting since one would think that this is the end, but we will see that she herself will express something similar to the cycle view by the end of her speech (which is also the end of the speech of Socrates in the dialogue). She then reviews the ladder of love and the proper sequence where the ascent is all "under the influence of true love." Well yes, but is it just an ascent? Plato himself, in the Republic, speaks of the philosopher entering back into the cave. Heraclitus has said that the path up and the path down are the same, a similar point. The modification I propose is to be carried out here. Diotima speaks of the true order as beginning "from the beauties of earth and" mounting upwards "for the sake of that other beauty." But isn't the mounting to that other beauty also equally for the sake of the beauties of the earth? i.e. for their enhancement as well? The sequence she describes here is from forms to practices to notions to absolute beauty, but I have argued that it is also one in which forms are only what they are because of their relation to practices and practices are only what they are because of their dynamic relations with forms, and both are only what they are because of their relations to notions, and notions are only what they are because they are premised by a search for the ideal, which then in turn informs the entire cycle, and is itself given life by its relation to particular forms.
So Diotima says that the life, above all others, that man should live is one of "contemplation of beauty absolute" which I think is true IF such contemplation is understood as mindful (in the Buddhist sense, possibly) attention to each of the stages and moments of the cycle of beauty insofar as each stage implicates all of the others: beauty absolute just is the possibility of this achievement, it is an ideal that cycling through the circle of love strives to achieve, an not an actual describable thing.
Thus Diotima in the end gets it all wrong when she thinks appreciation of beauty absolute is "not to be after the measure of gold, and garments, and fair boys and youths, whose presence now entrances you [the young Socrates]": rather it is being after these things in the course of life's going on through stages as richer and deeper in meaning on each swing through the cycle. The great poets have always seen this, and yet Diotima somehow misses it (Nietzsche was somewhat right about Socrates' incapacity to grasp the Dionysian here). It isn't just a choice, as Diotima holds, between seeing and conversing with boys with which one is so obsessed as not to eat or drink and the alternative of just contemplating an absolute beauty unrelated to that experience or anything else. If beauty absolute is really unrelated to that then why does Diotima demand that lovers begin at the initial stage of infatuation? There is an inconsistency where the lack of relation depends on a deep relation, where our understanding of enchantment with beauty itself and absolute depends on our experience of, although ultimately followed by rejection of, sexual enchantment. So all this talk of being clogged with "the pollutions of mortality" is a mistake, as Nietzsche and Dewey would have observed.
Ironically, Diotima herself recognizes a kind of cycle at play here since she concludes that in beholding true beauty "with the eye of the mind" one will be able to "bring forth, not images of beauty, but realities" which means bringing forth and nurturing true virtue and which also means becoming immortal "if mortal man may" a reference which takes us back to her theory of human immortality based on similarity and substitution, not on the sameness only available to the gods: again, the lesser mysteries, especially the passage on recollection, is key to the greater mysteries. Indeed, let me suggest that the lesser mystery just is the truth of the cycle theory: recollection is rebirth through substitution, a cycle of rebirth where we constantly recreate ourselves and thus achieve whatever immortality is available to man.
Diotima continues to the next stage: the lover moves on to appreciate the beauty of the mind, and to see this as "more honorable than the beauty of the outward form." A revision here is needed, but not an unreasonable one. When we love, say a wife or girlfriend, the external beauty is enhanced by recognition of internal beauty, and perhaps internal beauty is also enhanced by external beauty. There is a cycling between the two. Surely Diotima/Socrates/Plato could have seen that. The beauty of the mind is only more honorable insofar as it can be artificially abstracted from the beauty of the body. If I see a face animated in conversation and the face is seen as beautiful I cannot even separate the animated face from the physical face, and it would be absurd to say that the true face is the one at sleep or in death. So what sense does it even make to say that the beauty of mind is "more honorable" than that of the body it animates? Is there even a beautiful mind independent of its manifestations in the body? Diotima correctly situates this question in terms of the relation between lover and beloved in that the lover will take the virtuous soul of a beloved who is not physically beautiful and be "content to love and tend him" insofar as he will bring out thoughts which may improve him. This very process that leads to the next stage, since these thoughts are already social insofar as they are between lover and beloved. It is from here that we move on to a larger social stage which is that of thoughts about institutions and laws. Yet the the cycle view is relevant here too, since to speak of my beloved as having a beautiful soul is to speak of that soul in action, the most relevant action being the conversations we (she and I) have about things we value, including movies, art, poetry, literature, politics, family, nature, virtue, disapproval of vice, and of course our love itself. Love between the lover and the beloved is nourished by their mutual love of other things, i.e. in institutions, laws, and the creative arts. Moreover, earlier in the dialogue Diotima herself had closely associated the creative arts with the creation of institutions and laws, both as being examples of the higher pregnancy of ideas.
Jowett's translation does not make clear whether it is the lover or the beloved who comes again to see that the beauty of the institutions and laws belong to "one family" and yet this more general appreciation of beauty can happen to both. The problem is that this is associated with her notion that "personal beauty is a trifle." It isn't, and cannot be, since personal beauty is enhanced by this process that comes out of the shared life of the lover and beloved or out of the shared life of close friends.
Then there is the next move up the ladder of love to "the sciences" which, of course, includes all objects of study and skill, including all of the ones that are taught in the university, and not, not only all of what we would call the sciences but also all of the arts (let's not worry about here Plato's negative attitude about the imitative arts). To see their beauty, says Diotima, means that one is not "like a servant" in only focusing on the beauty of one person or institution and serving that one person or institution like a slave. This is a worthwhile warning and one should take into account that not all movements in the cycle of love are conducive to either autonomy or liberality. At the same time, a cycle view which calls on the lover to always cycle back to the particular from the general with a recognition that due attention to each enhances each, leads to a fuller and more adequate account of love and also of beauty. Becoming less "narrow-minded," as Diotima encourages us to be, is not inconsistent with continuing recognition of both the physical and mental beauty of the beloved, not inconsistent with that being enhanced by way of the greater knowledge achieved in studying the sciences and a very inclusive and liberal way. A shared love of the liberal arts is not necessarily inconsistent, and may well help form, a good marriage.
And then the next stage is "contemplating the vast sea of beauty" which is to say, I think, seeing beauty not only in officially recognized objects of beauty but in many many other places as well, in the way a flaneur does when roaming the streets of the city, or in the way John Muir did when roaming the Sierra wilds, and so we find, and here, remember, the relation between the lover and the beloved is still central, that "he [the lover] will create many fair and noble thoughts and notions in the boundless love of wisdom" since wouldn't he also be creating these thoughts and notions also in his or her friends and lovers too?
The penultimate stage in Diotima's ladder recognizes the revelation of "a single science...of beauty everywhere" which then, Diotima calls on Socrates to understand by paying the closest attention. So bear in mind that the student of love must follow "due order and succession." And yet, I argue, this due order and succession should not have to require, contra Diotima, that there is no cycling through that order and no return to love of the individual or the particular thing, or even of such things of everyday life as clothes and food.
The end of this process is perceiving "a nature of wondrous beauty" which is seen as the ultimate end or purpose of the entire project. Yes, but the nature of wondrous beauty contains all of the things previously loved and thought to be beautiful. At this point Diotima (we might as well say Plato here since this is Plato's theory of Forms) describes the realm that is "everlasting, not growing and decaying, or waxing and waning" and also not relative to the individual or the society.
On one level I do not think there there is a thing of that sort to be seen in the way that we see other things, but one can speak of an aspect of something experienced as beautiful as being as if eternal and unchanging, as if non-relative. Diotima herself used this idea when talking in the lesser mysteries about the immortality available to humans where what appears to be the same is really new and where succession preserves mortal things "not absolutely the same, but by sustitution" which she thinks "partakes of immortality."
The cycle view can have a place for this as a "moment": an idealist moment, one that can enhance the entire experience by informing it with something ideal insofar as it partakes of immortality in this way. On this view "beauty absolute, separate, simple, and everlasting" is not just by itself because, after all, it is"imparted to the very-growing and perishing beautiful of all other things" and thus is related to all other things in this way, and depends on that relation for its very being.
Diotima thinks that perceiving this beauty is "not far from the end" which is interesting since one would think that this is the end, but we will see that she herself will express something similar to the cycle view by the end of her speech (which is also the end of the speech of Socrates in the dialogue). She then reviews the ladder of love and the proper sequence where the ascent is all "under the influence of true love." Well yes, but is it just an ascent? Plato himself, in the Republic, speaks of the philosopher entering back into the cave. Heraclitus has said that the path up and the path down are the same, a similar point. The modification I propose is to be carried out here. Diotima speaks of the true order as beginning "from the beauties of earth and" mounting upwards "for the sake of that other beauty." But isn't the mounting to that other beauty also equally for the sake of the beauties of the earth? i.e. for their enhancement as well? The sequence she describes here is from forms to practices to notions to absolute beauty, but I have argued that it is also one in which forms are only what they are because of their relation to practices and practices are only what they are because of their dynamic relations with forms, and both are only what they are because of their relations to notions, and notions are only what they are because they are premised by a search for the ideal, which then in turn informs the entire cycle, and is itself given life by its relation to particular forms.
So Diotima says that the life, above all others, that man should live is one of "contemplation of beauty absolute" which I think is true IF such contemplation is understood as mindful (in the Buddhist sense, possibly) attention to each of the stages and moments of the cycle of beauty insofar as each stage implicates all of the others: beauty absolute just is the possibility of this achievement, it is an ideal that cycling through the circle of love strives to achieve, an not an actual describable thing.
Thus Diotima in the end gets it all wrong when she thinks appreciation of beauty absolute is "not to be after the measure of gold, and garments, and fair boys and youths, whose presence now entrances you [the young Socrates]": rather it is being after these things in the course of life's going on through stages as richer and deeper in meaning on each swing through the cycle. The great poets have always seen this, and yet Diotima somehow misses it (Nietzsche was somewhat right about Socrates' incapacity to grasp the Dionysian here). It isn't just a choice, as Diotima holds, between seeing and conversing with boys with which one is so obsessed as not to eat or drink and the alternative of just contemplating an absolute beauty unrelated to that experience or anything else. If beauty absolute is really unrelated to that then why does Diotima demand that lovers begin at the initial stage of infatuation? There is an inconsistency where the lack of relation depends on a deep relation, where our understanding of enchantment with beauty itself and absolute depends on our experience of, although ultimately followed by rejection of, sexual enchantment. So all this talk of being clogged with "the pollutions of mortality" is a mistake, as Nietzsche and Dewey would have observed.
Ironically, Diotima herself recognizes a kind of cycle at play here since she concludes that in beholding true beauty "with the eye of the mind" one will be able to "bring forth, not images of beauty, but realities" which means bringing forth and nurturing true virtue and which also means becoming immortal "if mortal man may" a reference which takes us back to her theory of human immortality based on similarity and substitution, not on the sameness only available to the gods: again, the lesser mysteries, especially the passage on recollection, is key to the greater mysteries. Indeed, let me suggest that the lesser mystery just is the truth of the cycle theory: recollection is rebirth through substitution, a cycle of rebirth where we constantly recreate ourselves and thus achieve whatever immortality is available to man.
Labels:
aesthetics,
beauty,
cycle theory of love,
Diotima,
Nietzsche,
Plato,
Symposium,
theory of love
Saturday, February 20, 2016
Diotima's Truth: The Symposium Deconstructed
This is a bit of an unorthodox reading of the Symposium, so students beware: your teachers may not like this. But I also think it is true. The Symposium is not what it seems to be. Diotima takes us down a rosy path, or rather the endpoint is not the end. There is a myth at the center of the Symposium, and perhaps a secret truth. The secret truth is to be found in something somewhat more mundane than one would think. The unorthodox reading, in short, is that the lesser mysteries of love are actually the deeper mysteries, or at least the lesser mysteries are key to understanding the deeper mysteries. This reading is partly inspired by Nietzsche's Birth of Tragedy. Nietzsche well saw that the Apollonian world of Forms, what we find at the end of the ladder of love in the Symposium, is a myth. This is not to say that it is not valuable. Ultimately, the point of the story is not, as it may seem to most readers, the static world of Forms, but rather the dynamic path of the seeker, the philosopher, the lover of beauty...a path that leads us, it is true, to the mythology-like realm of Forms, a clever replacement for the Olympian world of the gods, but then back down into the world that Socrates only superficially denigrates. This deep reading of the dialogue goes radically against the usual surface reading. Hence my strategy is deconstructive in the tradition of Derrida. But don't worry I have no intention to talk about Derrida here or use any of his more explicit ideas.
So, let us look first at the lesser mysteries of Diotima. She informs us that the nature of love is the "everlasting possession of the good" or more circularly "love of the everlasting possession of the good." This comes after a significant expansion of the notion of poetry, interestingly similar to recent efforts to expand the notions of art and aesthetics. I believe that this expansion is no accident. i.e. that this is not a randomly chosen example, but that it points to a close connection between the theory of love/beauty to be offered and a theory of creative art that is implicit and that is much more positive towards the arts than the one presented famously in Book X of the Republic.
Diotima then tells us that the object of love is the beautiful. This introduction of the beautiful marks this discussion as a cornerstone document for aesthetics, which studies aesthetic properties, beauty being the most famous and perhaps the most important. In particular, as Socrates agrees, what is loved is possession of the beautiful, i.e. "that the beautiful be his [the lover's]." Now when a person loves the good (which Diotima seems to assume is ontologically equivalent to the beautiful) he or she wishes to possess the good, which means that he/she wishes to gain something, which it turns out is happiness, i.e. the happy are made happy by the acquisition of good things. (No surprise here...rather surprising only in that it is such a mundane comment coming from Plato.) All men desire this.
Diotima's illustration to explain this, which is more than just an illustration, is that poetry, which was generally considered to be a matter of creative making in ancient Greece, is now defined, very broadly, as "all creation or passage of non-being into being" thus equating poetry with any making at all (indeed, any change!), and yet she then says "and the processes of all art are creative; and the masters of arts are all poets or makers," even though they are not actually called poets, that term usually limited to people who produce music and rhymed verse. The idea is to recognize that there is an important sense in which all makers are, or at least can be, creative in the way poets are. People usually take Plato to be using this as a way to once again denigrate poetry, but I think he (and Diotima) more importantly is upgrading the other forms of making, the practices of everyday life, which are now seen as aesthetic in the strong sense that they participate in this overall process called the love of beauty. In short, poetry is no longer the key example of poetic making.
Diotima uses this extension of the concept of poetry to set up a similar point for love, that love is much broader than we think, where all desire for the good and for happiness is "only the great and subtle power of love" and lovers are not then limited to romantic lovers. Rather, the class of lovers is extended to include various other paths, including those of money-making and gymnastics, as well as philosophy. That is, even money-making, gymnastics and philosophy can be forms of creative making. All of these involve love. What humans love, once again, is everlasting possession of the good, and all of their activities, whether money-making, gymnastics, or philosophy are directed to that. All of these activities are ultimate directed to aesthetic ends.
Then Diotima takes us to another level: "the object which they have in view is birth in beauty, whether of body or soul." This is perhaps the key to the entire dialogue. The object of love is not beauty itself so much as that which can come out of the love of beauty, i.e. the births and the creative discoveries. This is the dynamic soul, the lack of static end point, that is essential to the dialogue, and which is somewhat occluded by a shallow reading of the passages on the ladder of love at the end of Diotima's speech.
But we need to understand what is meant by "everlasting" and it turns out that this is radically other than everlasting presence in the everlasting unchanging world of the Forms. That's a nice myth for beginners in the art of philosophy and the love of beauty. But the true story is to be found earlier. "There is a certain age at which human nature is desirous of procreation" says Diotima, and this procreation is "in beauty" and is a "divine thing." Socrates was accused, says the Apology, of introducing new divine things which were perhaps not actually divinities: this is why he died, since although in the Apology, he insists that divine things must be divinities or children of divinities, there is an irony in the pronouncement, since divine things could just replace divinities and children of divinities. These divine things are precisely things of the a non-divine world. They are, in short, things that can be considered "divine" in an atheistic sense of the word. The divine as traditionally conceived, as a world of eternal things, is not a realm of procreation, since change is contrary to such a realm. So we find something in our world, i.e. procreation, which is to say both conception and generation, which makes up "an immortal principle in the mortal creature" says Diotima.
Diotima begins with bodily procreation, but what she says about it can also be applied to the non-bodily sort: she says, personifying the conceiving power within each of us, that "when approaching beauty, the conceiving power is propitious, and diffusive, and benign, and begets and bears fruit; at the sign of ugliness she frowns and contracts and has a sense of pain, and turns away, and shrivels up, and not without a pang refrains from conception." The easy interpretation, the first level, would be that we are talking about a heterosexual male who is sexually excited by a woman of great physical beauty but runs when confronted with her ugly counterpart. But something else is meant. We have a specific process in mind which is best understood in terms of how it would be applied to creativity in non-sexual productive friendship and also in creative making described broadly under the concept of poetry earlier expanded. So when Diotima says "when the hour of conception arrives, and the teeming nature is full, there is such a flutter and ecstasy about beauty whose approach is the alleviation of the pain of travail" she is talking about the creative process. Beauty is necessarily connected with the creative birth of a virtue, discovery or idea. We all know about the moment of ecstasy that comes with inspiration: we are prepared to conceive, and yet the process of creative making is painful since contrary to conventions and habit, it is not the easy path, and yet again it is alleviated by the presence of beauty, where the object of one's creative activities, the thing coming to birth shines with beauty. Diotima insists again, to stress the point, "love is not, as you imagine, the love of the beautiful only" but "love of generation and the birth in beauty." Beauty pervades creative making. Moreover, this generation to the mortal creature is "a sort of eternity and immortality." It is, indeed, from the atheist perspective, all the immortality we are going to get...and it is enough too, since the other immortality is little more than a destructive illusion (one that Diotima and Socrates never saw, but Freud, Marx and Nietzsche did). It is important that the next passage is one in which Diotima explains her ideas in terms of procreation amongst animals. She at least dimly (perhaps unconsciously) recognizes what Dewey saw clearly that man in an animal interacting with his environment.
The explanation of why generation gives us immortality that follows is central to understanding the truth about love and beauty that Diotima is trying to teach the dim young Socrates. She says, and mark the end of the quote, "the mortal nature is seeking as far as is possible to be everlasting and immortal: and this is only to be attained by generation, because generation always leaves behind a new existence in the place of the old." Immortality in our world, the only world there is, happens by way of the new thing generated by love (in beauty which replaces the old. Moreover this is explained in terms of the fact that in life the same individual is the result of succession, "not absolute unity" (take that! Descartes). Even though we are "called the same" there is a "perpetual process of loss and reparation" in which all parts of us, skin, hair, etc., are changing. She insists that this is also true for the soul and most notably for knowledge since "not only do the sciences in general spring up and decay, so that in respect of them we are never the same; but each of them individually experiences a like change." At this point Plato reintroduces the doctrine of recollection which he had explored in the Meno and the Phaedo. Here it has a specific use: the word "recollection" means the "departure of knowledge, which is ever being forgotten, and is renewed and preserved by recollection, and appears to be the same although in reality new, according to that law of succession by which all moral things are preserved, not absolutely the same, but by substitution, the old worn-out mortality leaving another new and similar existence behind - unlike the divine, which is always the same and not another." So the mortal takes part in immortality by way of a series of substitutions by which the illusion of sameness is achieved and maintained. Moreover, this is in, and by way of, moments of beauty associated with procreation and hence with love. Socrates asks if this is true and Diotima gives, as evidence, something very different but interestingly related: the quest for the immortality of fame. Someone, after all, can have the somewhat delusive unity achieved through "recollection" without being concerned at all with creative making or fame, or vice versa, pursuing fame with no interest in the kind of unity of knowledge called "recollection," that is, if we were to interpret "recollection" in a flat-footed way. But let's not. Diotima explains the search for fame in terms of the desire to leave behind a reputation, a name, that is eternal. If the memory of our virtues is passed down we are immortal in some sense. But there is a deeper story here, and we understand it further from the next paragraph, when we find that souls that are pregnant and "mean who are more creative in their souls than in their bodies" conceive "wisdom and virtue in general" which Diotima immediately and at first associates with "poets and all artists who are deserving of the name inventor." So the expanded notion of the poet appears again at this critical juncture! This of course is quite contrary to what is said of the poet literally speaking in the Republic or in Ion, although Ion also tells another story at another level as I have argued in other posts. Of course Diotima then insists that the greater wisdom is to be found in "ordering states and families." That does fit the vision of the Republic. But it is followed by something that seems right our of Phaedrus and has to do with the lover/beloved relationship in philosophical friendship. I will stop here, and in the next revised version of this post I hope to explain the role of this friendship and how the lesser mysteries illuminate the true meaning of the ladder of love which reaches beyond Beauty itself to that which is generated from grasping Beauty.
So, let us look first at the lesser mysteries of Diotima. She informs us that the nature of love is the "everlasting possession of the good" or more circularly "love of the everlasting possession of the good." This comes after a significant expansion of the notion of poetry, interestingly similar to recent efforts to expand the notions of art and aesthetics. I believe that this expansion is no accident. i.e. that this is not a randomly chosen example, but that it points to a close connection between the theory of love/beauty to be offered and a theory of creative art that is implicit and that is much more positive towards the arts than the one presented famously in Book X of the Republic.
Diotima then tells us that the object of love is the beautiful. This introduction of the beautiful marks this discussion as a cornerstone document for aesthetics, which studies aesthetic properties, beauty being the most famous and perhaps the most important. In particular, as Socrates agrees, what is loved is possession of the beautiful, i.e. "that the beautiful be his [the lover's]." Now when a person loves the good (which Diotima seems to assume is ontologically equivalent to the beautiful) he or she wishes to possess the good, which means that he/she wishes to gain something, which it turns out is happiness, i.e. the happy are made happy by the acquisition of good things. (No surprise here...rather surprising only in that it is such a mundane comment coming from Plato.) All men desire this.
Diotima's illustration to explain this, which is more than just an illustration, is that poetry, which was generally considered to be a matter of creative making in ancient Greece, is now defined, very broadly, as "all creation or passage of non-being into being" thus equating poetry with any making at all (indeed, any change!), and yet she then says "and the processes of all art are creative; and the masters of arts are all poets or makers," even though they are not actually called poets, that term usually limited to people who produce music and rhymed verse. The idea is to recognize that there is an important sense in which all makers are, or at least can be, creative in the way poets are. People usually take Plato to be using this as a way to once again denigrate poetry, but I think he (and Diotima) more importantly is upgrading the other forms of making, the practices of everyday life, which are now seen as aesthetic in the strong sense that they participate in this overall process called the love of beauty. In short, poetry is no longer the key example of poetic making.
Diotima uses this extension of the concept of poetry to set up a similar point for love, that love is much broader than we think, where all desire for the good and for happiness is "only the great and subtle power of love" and lovers are not then limited to romantic lovers. Rather, the class of lovers is extended to include various other paths, including those of money-making and gymnastics, as well as philosophy. That is, even money-making, gymnastics and philosophy can be forms of creative making. All of these involve love. What humans love, once again, is everlasting possession of the good, and all of their activities, whether money-making, gymnastics, or philosophy are directed to that. All of these activities are ultimate directed to aesthetic ends.
Then Diotima takes us to another level: "the object which they have in view is birth in beauty, whether of body or soul." This is perhaps the key to the entire dialogue. The object of love is not beauty itself so much as that which can come out of the love of beauty, i.e. the births and the creative discoveries. This is the dynamic soul, the lack of static end point, that is essential to the dialogue, and which is somewhat occluded by a shallow reading of the passages on the ladder of love at the end of Diotima's speech.
But we need to understand what is meant by "everlasting" and it turns out that this is radically other than everlasting presence in the everlasting unchanging world of the Forms. That's a nice myth for beginners in the art of philosophy and the love of beauty. But the true story is to be found earlier. "There is a certain age at which human nature is desirous of procreation" says Diotima, and this procreation is "in beauty" and is a "divine thing." Socrates was accused, says the Apology, of introducing new divine things which were perhaps not actually divinities: this is why he died, since although in the Apology, he insists that divine things must be divinities or children of divinities, there is an irony in the pronouncement, since divine things could just replace divinities and children of divinities. These divine things are precisely things of the a non-divine world. They are, in short, things that can be considered "divine" in an atheistic sense of the word. The divine as traditionally conceived, as a world of eternal things, is not a realm of procreation, since change is contrary to such a realm. So we find something in our world, i.e. procreation, which is to say both conception and generation, which makes up "an immortal principle in the mortal creature" says Diotima.
Diotima begins with bodily procreation, but what she says about it can also be applied to the non-bodily sort: she says, personifying the conceiving power within each of us, that "when approaching beauty, the conceiving power is propitious, and diffusive, and benign, and begets and bears fruit; at the sign of ugliness she frowns and contracts and has a sense of pain, and turns away, and shrivels up, and not without a pang refrains from conception." The easy interpretation, the first level, would be that we are talking about a heterosexual male who is sexually excited by a woman of great physical beauty but runs when confronted with her ugly counterpart. But something else is meant. We have a specific process in mind which is best understood in terms of how it would be applied to creativity in non-sexual productive friendship and also in creative making described broadly under the concept of poetry earlier expanded. So when Diotima says "when the hour of conception arrives, and the teeming nature is full, there is such a flutter and ecstasy about beauty whose approach is the alleviation of the pain of travail" she is talking about the creative process. Beauty is necessarily connected with the creative birth of a virtue, discovery or idea. We all know about the moment of ecstasy that comes with inspiration: we are prepared to conceive, and yet the process of creative making is painful since contrary to conventions and habit, it is not the easy path, and yet again it is alleviated by the presence of beauty, where the object of one's creative activities, the thing coming to birth shines with beauty. Diotima insists again, to stress the point, "love is not, as you imagine, the love of the beautiful only" but "love of generation and the birth in beauty." Beauty pervades creative making. Moreover, this generation to the mortal creature is "a sort of eternity and immortality." It is, indeed, from the atheist perspective, all the immortality we are going to get...and it is enough too, since the other immortality is little more than a destructive illusion (one that Diotima and Socrates never saw, but Freud, Marx and Nietzsche did). It is important that the next passage is one in which Diotima explains her ideas in terms of procreation amongst animals. She at least dimly (perhaps unconsciously) recognizes what Dewey saw clearly that man in an animal interacting with his environment.
The explanation of why generation gives us immortality that follows is central to understanding the truth about love and beauty that Diotima is trying to teach the dim young Socrates. She says, and mark the end of the quote, "the mortal nature is seeking as far as is possible to be everlasting and immortal: and this is only to be attained by generation, because generation always leaves behind a new existence in the place of the old." Immortality in our world, the only world there is, happens by way of the new thing generated by love (in beauty which replaces the old. Moreover this is explained in terms of the fact that in life the same individual is the result of succession, "not absolute unity" (take that! Descartes). Even though we are "called the same" there is a "perpetual process of loss and reparation" in which all parts of us, skin, hair, etc., are changing. She insists that this is also true for the soul and most notably for knowledge since "not only do the sciences in general spring up and decay, so that in respect of them we are never the same; but each of them individually experiences a like change." At this point Plato reintroduces the doctrine of recollection which he had explored in the Meno and the Phaedo. Here it has a specific use: the word "recollection" means the "departure of knowledge, which is ever being forgotten, and is renewed and preserved by recollection, and appears to be the same although in reality new, according to that law of succession by which all moral things are preserved, not absolutely the same, but by substitution, the old worn-out mortality leaving another new and similar existence behind - unlike the divine, which is always the same and not another." So the mortal takes part in immortality by way of a series of substitutions by which the illusion of sameness is achieved and maintained. Moreover, this is in, and by way of, moments of beauty associated with procreation and hence with love. Socrates asks if this is true and Diotima gives, as evidence, something very different but interestingly related: the quest for the immortality of fame. Someone, after all, can have the somewhat delusive unity achieved through "recollection" without being concerned at all with creative making or fame, or vice versa, pursuing fame with no interest in the kind of unity of knowledge called "recollection," that is, if we were to interpret "recollection" in a flat-footed way. But let's not. Diotima explains the search for fame in terms of the desire to leave behind a reputation, a name, that is eternal. If the memory of our virtues is passed down we are immortal in some sense. But there is a deeper story here, and we understand it further from the next paragraph, when we find that souls that are pregnant and "mean who are more creative in their souls than in their bodies" conceive "wisdom and virtue in general" which Diotima immediately and at first associates with "poets and all artists who are deserving of the name inventor." So the expanded notion of the poet appears again at this critical juncture! This of course is quite contrary to what is said of the poet literally speaking in the Republic or in Ion, although Ion also tells another story at another level as I have argued in other posts. Of course Diotima then insists that the greater wisdom is to be found in "ordering states and families." That does fit the vision of the Republic. But it is followed by something that seems right our of Phaedrus and has to do with the lover/beloved relationship in philosophical friendship. I will stop here, and in the next revised version of this post I hope to explain the role of this friendship and how the lesser mysteries illuminate the true meaning of the ladder of love which reaches beyond Beauty itself to that which is generated from grasping Beauty.
Saturday, December 12, 2015
Iris Murdoch's revival of Plato's Aesthetics
An interesting oddity of Carolyn Korsmeyer's textbook Aesthetics: The Big Questions is that Iris Murdoch's "The Sovereignty of Good Over Other Concept" comes right after a selection from Plato's Republic II, III and X, which, although Murdoch considers herself a follower of Plato, is hardly mentioned in her selection. However, this does give the Philosophy of Art teacher a chance to talk about views of Plato that are much more art-positive than those found in the above-mentioned selections. The Murdoch selection is taken from a longer essay which itself is one of three essays in her book The Sovereignty of Good published in 1970. One sees here why Murdoch decided to stop teaching philosophy even though she was a Fellow at Oxford from 1948-1963, a highly prestigious position. Her essay is very much an attack both on analytic and existentialist styles of philosophy. I think she convinced herself she could do philosophy better as a novelist.
Murdoch begins her discussion rather surprisingly with emphasis on the importance of metaphor (and images in general), not simply as decoration, but as contributing to the development of consciousness. This is surprising because Plato does not mention metaphor positively and is generally negative about imagination, a closely related concept: imagination exists at the lowest level in his epistemology, and such things as dream and shadows are at the lowest level of his metaphysics. What interests Murdoch is that Plato uses metaphors, analogies and allegories as key points in his dialogues. She shares with Stephen Pepper, who defended a similar view in his book World Hypotheses (although she shows no awareness of Pepper's work), the idea that the great philosophical systems play with such metaphors and images. It is impossible to deal with philosophical concepts without using metaphors. Indeed, metaphysical concepts themselves are deeply metaphorical. I think this is essentially right and have argued so in “Metaphor and Metaphysics,” in Metaphor and Symbolic Activity (Special Issue on Metaphor and Philosophy) 10:3 (1995) 205-222, although at the time I wrote that paper I had not known or had forgotten that Murdoch had a similar position. Of course, if you think that philosophy's business is to come up with science-like definitions of concepts then the idea that philosophical theories are essentially metaphors, often in disguise, is going to look misguided. Murdoch and I agree on this point.
Murdoch goes on to say that metaphors often have a "moral charge" which disappears if the analysis of such concepts reduces them to plainer language. As mentioned earlier, she herself favors metaphors to be found in the writings of Plato. However she then asserts two assumptions neither of which would have been shared by Plato, one that humans are naturally selfish and the other that there is no natural end for man (i.e. we humans have no purpose given to us by God or nature). I do not think that man is any more naturally selfish than not, but I do agree with the second point, that we are, as she puts it "transient mortal creatures subject to necessity and chance" - except that I wouldn't want that to exclude by that the possibility of our having free will. So, in general Murdoch rejects the idea that there is a God in the traditional sense of the word. Along similar lines, she says that we are anxiety-ridden animals, which seems basically right, although this too needs qualification: there are certainly lots of days in which we are not particularly anxious, and anxiety seems absent in many children.
What is of particular interest in this essay is the way in which Murdoch posits Plato's idea of Beauty, mainly as presented in the Symposium, as an ideal that is both ethical and aesthetic. What exactly is the relation between ethics and aesthetics? Murdoch thinks that the path to morality is through unselfishness and that this, plus what she calls objectivity and realism, are connected with virtue. Mainly she is interested in showing that something about the experience of beauty is more important than the kind of analysis of vocabulary that was typical of philosophy in her time.
The idea of beauty comes in in a striking image. She writes, "I am looking out of my window in an anxious and resentful state of mind, oblivious to my surroundings...then suddenly I observe a hovering kestrel. In the moment everything is altered. The brooding self with its hurt vanity has disappeared." An experience of beauty in nature can set things right between a person and the world. The self dissolves and, "there is nothing now but kestrel." We can "give attention to nature in order to clear our minds of selfish care." Here Murdoch is in deliberate opposition to Kant whom she takes to believe that experiences of beauty are occasions "for exalted self-feeling." This is perhaps unfair to Kant, although it is true that he sees the experience of the sublime in this way.
Kant aside, the question is whether taking delight in the beauty of flowers and animals has something to do with virtue. To answer this, Murdoch brings Plato in again, arguing that, for Plato, "beauty is the only spiritual thing which we love by instinct." Much of her essay involves quite plausible speculation about the great metaphors or images of the cave, the line, the sun and the ladder of love found in Plato's Republic and Symposium. I too have found these metaphors compelling. It seems that Plato is saying that only with long philosophical training can we grasp the ineffable Good itself, and that when this happens we will be able to see the Good as it manifests itself in things, its symbol being the presence of beauty. In addition, the solution to the main problems of philosophy are not going to be, despite all of the Platonic and Aristotelian efforts in this direction, a series of definitions in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. There would be controversy over this among Plato interpreters, but this is a place where I think Murdoch is perceptive: the end of a Platonic dialogue is seldom an achieved definition, and the ultimate goal is to grasp the Good, which itself cannot be defined at all. So grasping the Good is just a matter of being able to see the Good in things, or, to speak in other terms, to see things in their essential nature or in terms of the values they exemplify. The point of the dialogues in a training in intellectual perception, not the wracking up of true definitions.
Murdoch then moves from beauty in nature to beauty in art. She thinks of art as more edifying than nature in that it is a human product dealing with human affairs. Further, the good artist has virtues as well as talents, namely he or she is "brave, truthful, patient, humble." This is true, she thinks, for both the representational and the nonrepresentational arts. However, the representational arts (painting and literature) are particularly apt since they "hold the mirror up to nature" and are concerned specifically with morality, showing how "the concept of virtue is tied up with the human condition." For Murdoch, virtue is "pointless," meaning that it is not for any practical purpose (and human existence is pointless anyway, as mentioned above), but it is also supremely important. The idea is summed up in the notion that "the enjoyment of art is a training in the love of virtue." She tells us that "good art reveals what we are usually too selfish and too timid to recognize, the minute and absolutely random detail of the world, and reveals it together with a sense of unity and form." This, she contrasts with what she calls "fantasy art." True art, she says "affords us a pure delight in the independent existence of what is excellent." So, it is opposed to "selfish obsession" and it "invigorates the soul." As with nature, the perfection of form offered by art "invites unpossessive contemplation." I cannot help think here of Freud's 1909 essay on poetry and daydreaming in which he understood all of art in terms of wish-fulfillment and therefore fantasy in exactly the way that Murdoch condemns it. Freud deliberately chose popular fiction as his paradigm of art, but of course Murdoch is not going to make that choice. Murdoch even describes bad art in terms of selfish day-dreams which leads me to think that she was thinking specifically of that essay. "Good art," instead, gives us an "objective vision." One could say that it brings us out of the cave.
Before moving on, I want to stress the idea that for Murdoch, objective vision is a matter both of noticing minute an random detail and finding unity and form. One of my favorite quotes from her: "Art shows us the only sense in which the permanent and incorruptible is compatible with the transient" and it reveals to us aspects of the world that we are ordinarily not able to see, although I think she is too optimistic in thinking that art "exhibits virtue in its true guise." Thus, objective vision of the artist is going to be something like the vision of the good judge in Hume. Hume's good judge has delicacy of taste which allows him to perceive minute aspects of a work of art and see how they contribute to its overall unity and form, whereas Murdoch's good artist does the same for what she observes.
On the face of it, and from our current perspective, the idea that anyone seriously can speak of "objective vision" especially when it comes to moral concepts seems naive. But what fascinates me is this image of the detail of the world brought together in form, and I want to discuss that a bit further. Murdoch puts a lot of stress on the fact that Plato asked, in the Parmenides, whether there could be forms of hair and dirt, and "if there are then nature is redeemed into the arms of truthful vision." Murdoch thinks that there are. This would indicate more emphasis on particularity and on detail, i.e. on everyday life as opposed to a separate mathematics-like realm of Forms. Similarly, in Plato, as we climb the ladder of love in the Symposium, we start with the perception of something beautiful and erotic, the shoulders of a boy, and end with awareness that beauty is everywhere, a great sea of beauty.
Murdoch also thinks that the gap between art and morality can be bridged if we take seriously the Platonic idea of techne as intellectual disciplines that are also moral (and that need, on his view, to take the place of the imitative arts), and she then sees the techne of learning a language, in which there is a structure that commands respect and in which attention is rewarded by knowledge of reality, of something the exists independently of her own consciousness: honesty and humility are required here to succeed, thus the connection to morality, studying being an "exercise in virtue." It is doubtful however that any focus on techne is going to guarantee virtue, as the existence of evil scientists, mathematicians and linguists pretty much shows. In the end what I find valuable in Murdoch is the stress she places on metaphor and the way she reads Plato on art starting with the Symposium rather than the Republic, interpreting the sovereignty of the good in terms of beauty, which itself can be found in the details and unities of the world we experience.
Murdoch begins her discussion rather surprisingly with emphasis on the importance of metaphor (and images in general), not simply as decoration, but as contributing to the development of consciousness. This is surprising because Plato does not mention metaphor positively and is generally negative about imagination, a closely related concept: imagination exists at the lowest level in his epistemology, and such things as dream and shadows are at the lowest level of his metaphysics. What interests Murdoch is that Plato uses metaphors, analogies and allegories as key points in his dialogues. She shares with Stephen Pepper, who defended a similar view in his book World Hypotheses (although she shows no awareness of Pepper's work), the idea that the great philosophical systems play with such metaphors and images. It is impossible to deal with philosophical concepts without using metaphors. Indeed, metaphysical concepts themselves are deeply metaphorical. I think this is essentially right and have argued so in “Metaphor and Metaphysics,” in Metaphor and Symbolic Activity (Special Issue on Metaphor and Philosophy) 10:3 (1995) 205-222, although at the time I wrote that paper I had not known or had forgotten that Murdoch had a similar position. Of course, if you think that philosophy's business is to come up with science-like definitions of concepts then the idea that philosophical theories are essentially metaphors, often in disguise, is going to look misguided. Murdoch and I agree on this point.
Murdoch goes on to say that metaphors often have a "moral charge" which disappears if the analysis of such concepts reduces them to plainer language. As mentioned earlier, she herself favors metaphors to be found in the writings of Plato. However she then asserts two assumptions neither of which would have been shared by Plato, one that humans are naturally selfish and the other that there is no natural end for man (i.e. we humans have no purpose given to us by God or nature). I do not think that man is any more naturally selfish than not, but I do agree with the second point, that we are, as she puts it "transient mortal creatures subject to necessity and chance" - except that I wouldn't want that to exclude by that the possibility of our having free will. So, in general Murdoch rejects the idea that there is a God in the traditional sense of the word. Along similar lines, she says that we are anxiety-ridden animals, which seems basically right, although this too needs qualification: there are certainly lots of days in which we are not particularly anxious, and anxiety seems absent in many children.
What is of particular interest in this essay is the way in which Murdoch posits Plato's idea of Beauty, mainly as presented in the Symposium, as an ideal that is both ethical and aesthetic. What exactly is the relation between ethics and aesthetics? Murdoch thinks that the path to morality is through unselfishness and that this, plus what she calls objectivity and realism, are connected with virtue. Mainly she is interested in showing that something about the experience of beauty is more important than the kind of analysis of vocabulary that was typical of philosophy in her time.
The idea of beauty comes in in a striking image. She writes, "I am looking out of my window in an anxious and resentful state of mind, oblivious to my surroundings...then suddenly I observe a hovering kestrel. In the moment everything is altered. The brooding self with its hurt vanity has disappeared." An experience of beauty in nature can set things right between a person and the world. The self dissolves and, "there is nothing now but kestrel." We can "give attention to nature in order to clear our minds of selfish care." Here Murdoch is in deliberate opposition to Kant whom she takes to believe that experiences of beauty are occasions "for exalted self-feeling." This is perhaps unfair to Kant, although it is true that he sees the experience of the sublime in this way.
Kant aside, the question is whether taking delight in the beauty of flowers and animals has something to do with virtue. To answer this, Murdoch brings Plato in again, arguing that, for Plato, "beauty is the only spiritual thing which we love by instinct." Much of her essay involves quite plausible speculation about the great metaphors or images of the cave, the line, the sun and the ladder of love found in Plato's Republic and Symposium. I too have found these metaphors compelling. It seems that Plato is saying that only with long philosophical training can we grasp the ineffable Good itself, and that when this happens we will be able to see the Good as it manifests itself in things, its symbol being the presence of beauty. In addition, the solution to the main problems of philosophy are not going to be, despite all of the Platonic and Aristotelian efforts in this direction, a series of definitions in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. There would be controversy over this among Plato interpreters, but this is a place where I think Murdoch is perceptive: the end of a Platonic dialogue is seldom an achieved definition, and the ultimate goal is to grasp the Good, which itself cannot be defined at all. So grasping the Good is just a matter of being able to see the Good in things, or, to speak in other terms, to see things in their essential nature or in terms of the values they exemplify. The point of the dialogues in a training in intellectual perception, not the wracking up of true definitions.
Murdoch then moves from beauty in nature to beauty in art. She thinks of art as more edifying than nature in that it is a human product dealing with human affairs. Further, the good artist has virtues as well as talents, namely he or she is "brave, truthful, patient, humble." This is true, she thinks, for both the representational and the nonrepresentational arts. However, the representational arts (painting and literature) are particularly apt since they "hold the mirror up to nature" and are concerned specifically with morality, showing how "the concept of virtue is tied up with the human condition." For Murdoch, virtue is "pointless," meaning that it is not for any practical purpose (and human existence is pointless anyway, as mentioned above), but it is also supremely important. The idea is summed up in the notion that "the enjoyment of art is a training in the love of virtue." She tells us that "good art reveals what we are usually too selfish and too timid to recognize, the minute and absolutely random detail of the world, and reveals it together with a sense of unity and form." This, she contrasts with what she calls "fantasy art." True art, she says "affords us a pure delight in the independent existence of what is excellent." So, it is opposed to "selfish obsession" and it "invigorates the soul." As with nature, the perfection of form offered by art "invites unpossessive contemplation." I cannot help think here of Freud's 1909 essay on poetry and daydreaming in which he understood all of art in terms of wish-fulfillment and therefore fantasy in exactly the way that Murdoch condemns it. Freud deliberately chose popular fiction as his paradigm of art, but of course Murdoch is not going to make that choice. Murdoch even describes bad art in terms of selfish day-dreams which leads me to think that she was thinking specifically of that essay. "Good art," instead, gives us an "objective vision." One could say that it brings us out of the cave.
Before moving on, I want to stress the idea that for Murdoch, objective vision is a matter both of noticing minute an random detail and finding unity and form. One of my favorite quotes from her: "Art shows us the only sense in which the permanent and incorruptible is compatible with the transient" and it reveals to us aspects of the world that we are ordinarily not able to see, although I think she is too optimistic in thinking that art "exhibits virtue in its true guise." Thus, objective vision of the artist is going to be something like the vision of the good judge in Hume. Hume's good judge has delicacy of taste which allows him to perceive minute aspects of a work of art and see how they contribute to its overall unity and form, whereas Murdoch's good artist does the same for what she observes.
On the face of it, and from our current perspective, the idea that anyone seriously can speak of "objective vision" especially when it comes to moral concepts seems naive. But what fascinates me is this image of the detail of the world brought together in form, and I want to discuss that a bit further. Murdoch puts a lot of stress on the fact that Plato asked, in the Parmenides, whether there could be forms of hair and dirt, and "if there are then nature is redeemed into the arms of truthful vision." Murdoch thinks that there are. This would indicate more emphasis on particularity and on detail, i.e. on everyday life as opposed to a separate mathematics-like realm of Forms. Similarly, in Plato, as we climb the ladder of love in the Symposium, we start with the perception of something beautiful and erotic, the shoulders of a boy, and end with awareness that beauty is everywhere, a great sea of beauty.
Murdoch also thinks that the gap between art and morality can be bridged if we take seriously the Platonic idea of techne as intellectual disciplines that are also moral (and that need, on his view, to take the place of the imitative arts), and she then sees the techne of learning a language, in which there is a structure that commands respect and in which attention is rewarded by knowledge of reality, of something the exists independently of her own consciousness: honesty and humility are required here to succeed, thus the connection to morality, studying being an "exercise in virtue." It is doubtful however that any focus on techne is going to guarantee virtue, as the existence of evil scientists, mathematicians and linguists pretty much shows. In the end what I find valuable in Murdoch is the stress she places on metaphor and the way she reads Plato on art starting with the Symposium rather than the Republic, interpreting the sovereignty of the good in terms of beauty, which itself can be found in the details and unities of the world we experience.
Friday, January 9, 2015
Does it make sense to speak of after the beautiful?
I have been reading the very interesting new book by Robert B. Pippin, After the Beautiful: Hegel and the Philosophy of Pictorial Modernism. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014.) The book attempts to show how Hegel's philosophy can be applied to modernist painting after his time, in particular the work of Manet and Cezanne. It also has some things to say about Clark, Fried and both Hegel and Heidegger or art and truth. The idea of "after the beautiful" is that the concept of beauty is no longer (or was no longer in the modernist period) of any great importance to art. A possible summary of the position can be found in the following sentence: "if we look at art and art history as a component of a collective attempt at social intelligibility - how we attempt to make ourselves intelligible and answerable to each other - and this is a uniquely sensible affective modality, the success and failures of such a project continue to be available to us in and indispensable way in visual and in other arts." (240) This seems right to me -- are does not die after Hegel or Danto, for that matter, and yet what is not clear is how this pathway excludes the concept of beauty. If beauty is taken as a marker for the value dimension of whatever comes to us in "sensible affective" modalities, then it is hard to see how it can be transcended. I suspect that Pippin has simply identified beauty with various no longer viable or currently questionable concepts of beauty. Yet concepts change, and to identify beauty entirely with Kant's or Hume's concept of beauty makes no more sense than to identify sensibility and the affects with their concepts of these things. Pippin clearly sees "painterly meaning" as replacing such things as "beauty, pleasure, and taste." (65) Yet, if we are going to think in terms of meaning in relation to the aesthetic or the painterly, how can this exclude beauty, pleasure and taste? Like Pippin I find both Manet and Cezanne to be powerful and moving. Surely something here is being communicated. But at the same time I mark them high on the scale of beauty, the possibility of aesthetic pleasure, and as objects of taste. Of course, Hegel, Pippin's favorite author, does neglect beauty, mentioning it infrequently, and downplaying the beauties of nature. But even he, as Pippin is aware, ends his lectures recognizing the, as Pippin quotes at the end of his book!, "indestructible bond of the Idea of beauty and truth" (144). Pippin goes so far as to say that the "modernist equivalent to beauty as the 'promise of happiness' is this promise of meaning..." (59) where success in this promise is related to what Manet's figures do when they "confront" the beholder. But isn't the immense power of Manet's work a matter of just this, and isn't this also how beauty manifests itself here? Let's not confuse surface beautiful effects and mere prettiness with beauty.
Pippin's chapter 4 "Art and Truth: Heidegger and Hegel" has perhaps the most importance for everyday aesthetics, although Pippin himself seems not to be aware of that. Through Pippin's reading of Heidegger on the origin of the work of art, a reading which seems, for the most part, to be correct, one sees the glimmer of a possible alternative theory of beauty, one that can allow for a close relationship between art and everyday life in the way that great art reveals something about the everyday (although perhaps at the same time also concealing something). Pippin writes: "A painting is some kind of embodiment of the 'happening' of truth - basically, as we shall see, the happening or being at work of the 'world' or horizon of possible significance that constitutes a world in various dimensions of the art of an age." (102) Setting aside the somewhat irritating circularity of defining painting in terms of art, what is interesting here is the idea that painting can reveal something in the world that happens. Heidegger speaks of this as the "Being of beings" coming "into the steadiness of its shining" which is the same thing as "the truth of beings setting itself to work." Unlike Pippin, I take "shining" to be the new word for, or signifying a new manifestation of, beauty. Pippin himself puts it this way: "In the most general sense Heidegger is trying to reanimate the question of the relation between 'beauty' and 'truth,' but where the beautiful is not understood as a matter of the subject's experience....and where truth is disclosure...and not 'correctness.'" (111) I am fine with truth not being correctness, but what puzzles me is how beauty would not be a matter of subject's experience. As I understand it, Pippin is defining "experience" in a highly subjective and isolated way, and not, for example, in an expansive Deweyan way, i.e. in terms of the interactions of the (necessarily socialized) live creature with its environment.
The approach to beauty and the relationship to everyday life is made somewhat clearer when Pippin draws together the various comments Heidegger made about Cezanne along with Merleau-Ponty's more extensive discussions of that artist. Here we stress that the "presence" of beings that is brought forth in Cezanne is something revealed in such a way as to have "vitality or vibrancy." (116) The stillness of Cezanne is "accompanied by an extraordinary vitality or vibrancy even a kind of vibration or pulsing of life in the objects..." Pippin thinks that this is best illustrated by a comment from Greenberg (1971) in which he speaks of the paint vibrating and dilating rhythmically both in terms of illusion of depth and flat pattern. But this is typically Greenbergian in failing to recognize the way in which paintings constitute and reconstitute the world: the vibration Heidegger and Merleau Ponty speak of is surely not just in the painting. Pippin is not unaware of this and captures the thought when he says that for Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty "the meaning of this painterly effect, the 'vibration,' is some intimation of the object's actually coming into being, its "birth," as if composing itself....taking intelligible form. He further quotes from Merleau-Ponty about the painter: "The world no longer stands before him through representation; rather it is to the painter to whom things of the world give birth by a sort of concentration or coming-to-itself of the visible." (119)
OK, so the great painter reveals something about the world in getting beneath the surface, through capturing something symbolized by this talk of "giving birth." The painter then reveals the world to us somehow as lost, a pantheistic world in the Spinozistic sense. In that world we were still able to listen to Being, and as Heidegger would put it, these great paintings preserve this possibility. But this is not the ordinary way of seeing objects of everyday life, not ordinary in our Western world anyway. Great painting, particularly of the sort exemplified by Cezanne, challenges the ordinariness of the ordinary. It challenges us, for instance, not to see things as merely a matter of imposing form on matter. Vibrancy is just another word for beauty, although of the deep sort.
It is a major mistake, by the way, for Pippin not to see the way in which the entire Origins essay is about the thing-being of things. I think the problem is that Pippin is overly influenced by a certain reading of Being and Time and applying that to the origins essay.
Perhaps this is why he does not quite get the point when he says that by "event" of birthing "They [Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty] mean to say that it is 'as if' everything of relevance to the bare intelligibility of the object, its simply and meaningfully being there at all, occupying space, confronting us in a kind of mute presence, can be somehow 'made visible' in the painting....powerfully present." (121) Intelligibility by itself is not enough! What is made powerfully present, rather, is the beauty in the strong Neoplatonistic sense of emanation and also the Spinozistic sense of the spiritual aspect of a world which is at the same time entirely material (Spinoza superceding Plotinus here).
Pippin then, not surprisingly, takes a somewhat different approach to Cezanne's later bather paintings (1894-1906) than I would. For him these paintings "could be understood as expressing the ever more limited possibilities of answering [questions concerning the point of modern easel painting and the possibility of social relationships involving mutual intelligibility of action], or perhaps intimations of the suspicion that they cannot be answered or that they can be answered only at the level of the shareability of a rather brutish material meaning." (129) He thinks it not incorrect to say that in these paintings the earth (in Heidegger's sense) is winning over the word, and that the bathers are world-poor. (But this accepts the whole earth/world dichotomy, which itself may be problematic, as a kind of acceptance of dualism.)
I think that Cezanne here is trying to dig even deeper into the possibility of a Spinozistic way of viewing the world, and that this is what Heidegger was trying to get out of Van Gogh. But then I also think that Pippin is engaged in a heroic struggle to fit his progressivist left-Hegelian politics in with his strong responses to painting, and this just can't be done here, even though it can be done to some extent when talking about Manet. Cezanne seems to have gone beyond politics to our deeper existential situation as humans.
Pippin's chapter 4 "Art and Truth: Heidegger and Hegel" has perhaps the most importance for everyday aesthetics, although Pippin himself seems not to be aware of that. Through Pippin's reading of Heidegger on the origin of the work of art, a reading which seems, for the most part, to be correct, one sees the glimmer of a possible alternative theory of beauty, one that can allow for a close relationship between art and everyday life in the way that great art reveals something about the everyday (although perhaps at the same time also concealing something). Pippin writes: "A painting is some kind of embodiment of the 'happening' of truth - basically, as we shall see, the happening or being at work of the 'world' or horizon of possible significance that constitutes a world in various dimensions of the art of an age." (102) Setting aside the somewhat irritating circularity of defining painting in terms of art, what is interesting here is the idea that painting can reveal something in the world that happens. Heidegger speaks of this as the "Being of beings" coming "into the steadiness of its shining" which is the same thing as "the truth of beings setting itself to work." Unlike Pippin, I take "shining" to be the new word for, or signifying a new manifestation of, beauty. Pippin himself puts it this way: "In the most general sense Heidegger is trying to reanimate the question of the relation between 'beauty' and 'truth,' but where the beautiful is not understood as a matter of the subject's experience....and where truth is disclosure...and not 'correctness.'" (111) I am fine with truth not being correctness, but what puzzles me is how beauty would not be a matter of subject's experience. As I understand it, Pippin is defining "experience" in a highly subjective and isolated way, and not, for example, in an expansive Deweyan way, i.e. in terms of the interactions of the (necessarily socialized) live creature with its environment.
The approach to beauty and the relationship to everyday life is made somewhat clearer when Pippin draws together the various comments Heidegger made about Cezanne along with Merleau-Ponty's more extensive discussions of that artist. Here we stress that the "presence" of beings that is brought forth in Cezanne is something revealed in such a way as to have "vitality or vibrancy." (116) The stillness of Cezanne is "accompanied by an extraordinary vitality or vibrancy even a kind of vibration or pulsing of life in the objects..." Pippin thinks that this is best illustrated by a comment from Greenberg (1971) in which he speaks of the paint vibrating and dilating rhythmically both in terms of illusion of depth and flat pattern. But this is typically Greenbergian in failing to recognize the way in which paintings constitute and reconstitute the world: the vibration Heidegger and Merleau Ponty speak of is surely not just in the painting. Pippin is not unaware of this and captures the thought when he says that for Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty "the meaning of this painterly effect, the 'vibration,' is some intimation of the object's actually coming into being, its "birth," as if composing itself....taking intelligible form. He further quotes from Merleau-Ponty about the painter: "The world no longer stands before him through representation; rather it is to the painter to whom things of the world give birth by a sort of concentration or coming-to-itself of the visible." (119)
OK, so the great painter reveals something about the world in getting beneath the surface, through capturing something symbolized by this talk of "giving birth." The painter then reveals the world to us somehow as lost, a pantheistic world in the Spinozistic sense. In that world we were still able to listen to Being, and as Heidegger would put it, these great paintings preserve this possibility. But this is not the ordinary way of seeing objects of everyday life, not ordinary in our Western world anyway. Great painting, particularly of the sort exemplified by Cezanne, challenges the ordinariness of the ordinary. It challenges us, for instance, not to see things as merely a matter of imposing form on matter. Vibrancy is just another word for beauty, although of the deep sort.
It is a major mistake, by the way, for Pippin not to see the way in which the entire Origins essay is about the thing-being of things. I think the problem is that Pippin is overly influenced by a certain reading of Being and Time and applying that to the origins essay.
Perhaps this is why he does not quite get the point when he says that by "event" of birthing "They [Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty] mean to say that it is 'as if' everything of relevance to the bare intelligibility of the object, its simply and meaningfully being there at all, occupying space, confronting us in a kind of mute presence, can be somehow 'made visible' in the painting....powerfully present." (121) Intelligibility by itself is not enough! What is made powerfully present, rather, is the beauty in the strong Neoplatonistic sense of emanation and also the Spinozistic sense of the spiritual aspect of a world which is at the same time entirely material (Spinoza superceding Plotinus here).
Pippin then, not surprisingly, takes a somewhat different approach to Cezanne's later bather paintings (1894-1906) than I would. For him these paintings "could be understood as expressing the ever more limited possibilities of answering [questions concerning the point of modern easel painting and the possibility of social relationships involving mutual intelligibility of action], or perhaps intimations of the suspicion that they cannot be answered or that they can be answered only at the level of the shareability of a rather brutish material meaning." (129) He thinks it not incorrect to say that in these paintings the earth (in Heidegger's sense) is winning over the word, and that the bathers are world-poor. (But this accepts the whole earth/world dichotomy, which itself may be problematic, as a kind of acceptance of dualism.)
I think that Cezanne here is trying to dig even deeper into the possibility of a Spinozistic way of viewing the world, and that this is what Heidegger was trying to get out of Van Gogh. But then I also think that Pippin is engaged in a heroic struggle to fit his progressivist left-Hegelian politics in with his strong responses to painting, and this just can't be done here, even though it can be done to some extent when talking about Manet. Cezanne seems to have gone beyond politics to our deeper existential situation as humans.
Labels:
After the Beautiful,
beauty,
Cezanne.,
Hegel,
Manet,
Robert B. Pippin
Tuesday, October 7, 2014
The Pleasant in Kant's Account of Beauty
This little discussion of the pleasant will be based on the Bernard translation of Kant's Critique of Judgment What Bernard translates as "pleasant" Meredith translates as "agreeable." As becomes evidence in #3, where Kant makes much of the distinction between two sense of "sensation" ("of one's state"), the pleasant is to be distinguished from the beautiful. If everything that pleases were pleasant we would not be able to distinguish between the pleasures that arise out of 1. "impressions of sense which determine the inclination" 2. "fundamental propositions of reason which determine the will" and 3. "mere reflective forms of intuition which determine the judgment," (i.e. between the pleasant, the moral and the beautiful) and we could only estimate the value of things in terms of the gratification they promise, thus allowing no distinction between indiscretion and wickedness. (This intrusion of a seemingly irrelevant moral distinction takes the breath away. However, as we shall see, it is the main basis for the overall rigid nature of the distinction between the pleasant and beautiful for Kant.) So one sense of "sensation" refers to a "determination of the feeling of pleasure or pain" (which is subjective), whereas the other refers to a sensation as "representation of a thing" (which is objective.) Kant decides to call the former "feeling." For example, the pleasantness of a green color of a meadow is a subjective sensation, whereas the greenness itself is objective. If it is pleasant it is an object of desire, the desire directed to "objects of that kind." Such a feeling, Kant believes, presupposes the relation of the existence of the object to my state of mind (presumably my feeling-state), which is what is meant by saying that it not only pleases but gratifies. I am not merely judging it or assenting to it (as I would be for beauty): rather, my "inclination is aroused by it." Indeed, when it is "most lively" there is no judgment of the object at all. Evidence of this is that people who love enjoyment would "dispense with all judgment."
Again, as we discover in paragraph #4, the beautiful (the beauty of a flower, for example) does not depend on a definite concept (as would be the case in morality or when talking about something that is good because it is useful) and yet it does "depend on the reflection upon an object" i.e. in relation to an indefinite concept. (Does Kant ever give us an example of such an indefinite concept?) This distinguishes it from pleasures of mere sensation (i.e. the pleasant.) Kant admits that the pleasant often seems the same as the good, especially for hedonists, but he quickly rejects that idea, for the pleasant only represents objects in relation to sense and not under "principles of reason" which are required to call them good. This entire discussion of the distinction between the pleasant and the good seems a bit of a red herring since the point at issue in this book is the distinction between the pleasant and the beautiful (the moral good being discussed at length in the Critique of Practical Reason), but the strategy generally is to show that the pleasant shares some things with the good and some quite different things with the beautiful, and is distinguishable from both. In any case, it does have an interesting result, which is that Kant says the following: "Even in common speech men distinguish the pleasant from the good. Of a dish which stimulates the taste by spices and other condiments we say unhesitatingly that it is pleasant, though it is at the same time admitted not to be good; for though it immediately delights the senses, yet mediately, i.e. considered by reason which looks to the after results, it displeases." Presumably, the thought is that Indian food might be pleasant, but we know we shouldn't enjoy it, and it displeases us intellectually, because it is unhealthy, according at least to the view held by Prussians of that time. Think of it as being like a lot of wine drunk at once: pleasant at first but unpleasant in the consequences, and unpleasant to reason even in the beginning because of this.
In another attack on hedonism, which Kant seems to (quite extravagantly) hold is believed by everyone (including himself?), he says "in respect of happiness, everyone believes himself entitled to describe the greatest sum of pleasantness of life... as a true, even as the highest, good. However, reason is opposed to this." (101) That is, reason is opposed to a belief everyone has. (This isn't totally absurd, since an evil man may assume that he is entitled to the greatest sum of pleasantness, but he is not so, because of the evil he has done.) Again, Kant holds that if the pleasant were no different from pleasure based on the good there would be no reason to concern ourselves with the means by which we gained pleasure. The distinction Kant makes here is between pleasures that are "obtained passively by the bounty of nature" and ones "by our own activity and work." (101) A hedonist, of course, would reply that both kinds of pleasures are equally good, and that when one cannot gain the first (which is quite common) one can resort to the second: or perhaps the second is of higher quality in which case one goes for the second first, but then accepts the first happily when available. The only reason one should be concerned about the means of obtaining a pleasure is if the means are immoral, i.e. in causing harm to others. (This would be the position of someone we might call a moral hedonist: i.e. a hedonist who follows, e.g., the golden rule, and conditions his or her actions thereby.) In another attack on the hedonist Kant says that "reason can never be persuaded that the existence of a man who merely lives for enjoyment...has a worth in itself" even if he increases the quantity and quality of the enjoyment of others and even shares their enjoyment with them through "sympathy." (This may involve an attack on Hume.)
This whole notion of nature providing us with passive enjoyments is odd itself, since even enjoying a sunset "passively" usually requires the work that can provide oneself with the leisure and possibly the deck and glass of wine to fully do so. Even odder is the idea that "only what he does, without reference to enjoyment, in full freedom and independently of what nature can procure for him passively, gives an absolute worth to his presence in the world as the existence of a person" as though it really makes sense to judge a person in terms of "absolute worth" or to do so in terms of what he does when he is not enjoying himself. I know that the history of this is connected with Calvinism...but it just seems impossible to wrap one's mind around it now in the year 2014 even as an optional way of looking at things, and hence it makes the entire project of a radical separation between the pleasant and the beautiful, and even the distinction between three kinds of pleasure, pretty implausible. At best we can say that some pleasures are prompted immediately by sensation, some mediated by reflection while using an indeterminate concept of some sort, and some by the thought that something is good, i.e. as useful or as morally good, for example the pleasure we take in admiring Martin Luther King's work for civil rights. There is a distinction somewhere between the merely pleasant and the beautiful, but it is pretty subtle. I wouldn't disagree, however, that happiness is far from an unconditioned good, as Kant puts it, for you would not think that the happiness of an evil person is an unconditioned good: but happiness of a person who deserves to be happy is an unconditioned good, surely.
As I argued in my book, the distinction between these different kinds of pleasures is not a strong one: the boundaries are soft. The pleasant often does involve some reflection and some vague concepts, for example. Kant insists that there is no disputing about taste with respect to the pleasant, but we do dispute about these things all the time: we argue over how good Indian food is for example, or which Indian dish or restaurant is the best. Kant says that "pleasantness concerns irrational animals also, but beauty only concerns men" which itself seems another pretty implausible idea, although it is understandable that if beauty requires at least an indistinct concept then the question remains whether other animals use anything like indistinct concepts (recent work with chimps, parrots, dogs, elephants, octopi, and porpoises, seems to so that they do.)
Perhaps Kant's most compelling case for a real distinction between the pleasant and the beautiful is" "As regards the interest of inclination in the case of the pleasant, everyone says that hunger is the best sauce, and everything that is eatable is relished by people with a healthy appetite, and thus satisfaction of this sort shows no choice directed by taste." We are talking about food again, but as opposed to Indian food, where one can talk about subtle differences in spice, or wine, where one can talk about the subtle distinctions Sancho's cousins observe in Hume's essay (although Kant thinks that taste in Canary wine is just a matter of physical taste and hence the pleasant) we are now just talking about what happens when you have a healthy appetite: then everything tastes good to you...and no judgment is really involved. I don't think that is true either, although a healthy appetite can make what is tasty more tasty and what is less good somewhat better. Even with a healthy appetite one can distinguish between finer and lesser cuisines. It might just enhance one's eating experience without making everything pleasant relative.
Again, as we discover in paragraph #4, the beautiful (the beauty of a flower, for example) does not depend on a definite concept (as would be the case in morality or when talking about something that is good because it is useful) and yet it does "depend on the reflection upon an object" i.e. in relation to an indefinite concept. (Does Kant ever give us an example of such an indefinite concept?) This distinguishes it from pleasures of mere sensation (i.e. the pleasant.) Kant admits that the pleasant often seems the same as the good, especially for hedonists, but he quickly rejects that idea, for the pleasant only represents objects in relation to sense and not under "principles of reason" which are required to call them good. This entire discussion of the distinction between the pleasant and the good seems a bit of a red herring since the point at issue in this book is the distinction between the pleasant and the beautiful (the moral good being discussed at length in the Critique of Practical Reason), but the strategy generally is to show that the pleasant shares some things with the good and some quite different things with the beautiful, and is distinguishable from both. In any case, it does have an interesting result, which is that Kant says the following: "Even in common speech men distinguish the pleasant from the good. Of a dish which stimulates the taste by spices and other condiments we say unhesitatingly that it is pleasant, though it is at the same time admitted not to be good; for though it immediately delights the senses, yet mediately, i.e. considered by reason which looks to the after results, it displeases." Presumably, the thought is that Indian food might be pleasant, but we know we shouldn't enjoy it, and it displeases us intellectually, because it is unhealthy, according at least to the view held by Prussians of that time. Think of it as being like a lot of wine drunk at once: pleasant at first but unpleasant in the consequences, and unpleasant to reason even in the beginning because of this.
In another attack on hedonism, which Kant seems to (quite extravagantly) hold is believed by everyone (including himself?), he says "in respect of happiness, everyone believes himself entitled to describe the greatest sum of pleasantness of life... as a true, even as the highest, good. However, reason is opposed to this." (101) That is, reason is opposed to a belief everyone has. (This isn't totally absurd, since an evil man may assume that he is entitled to the greatest sum of pleasantness, but he is not so, because of the evil he has done.) Again, Kant holds that if the pleasant were no different from pleasure based on the good there would be no reason to concern ourselves with the means by which we gained pleasure. The distinction Kant makes here is between pleasures that are "obtained passively by the bounty of nature" and ones "by our own activity and work." (101) A hedonist, of course, would reply that both kinds of pleasures are equally good, and that when one cannot gain the first (which is quite common) one can resort to the second: or perhaps the second is of higher quality in which case one goes for the second first, but then accepts the first happily when available. The only reason one should be concerned about the means of obtaining a pleasure is if the means are immoral, i.e. in causing harm to others. (This would be the position of someone we might call a moral hedonist: i.e. a hedonist who follows, e.g., the golden rule, and conditions his or her actions thereby.) In another attack on the hedonist Kant says that "reason can never be persuaded that the existence of a man who merely lives for enjoyment...has a worth in itself" even if he increases the quantity and quality of the enjoyment of others and even shares their enjoyment with them through "sympathy." (This may involve an attack on Hume.)
This whole notion of nature providing us with passive enjoyments is odd itself, since even enjoying a sunset "passively" usually requires the work that can provide oneself with the leisure and possibly the deck and glass of wine to fully do so. Even odder is the idea that "only what he does, without reference to enjoyment, in full freedom and independently of what nature can procure for him passively, gives an absolute worth to his presence in the world as the existence of a person" as though it really makes sense to judge a person in terms of "absolute worth" or to do so in terms of what he does when he is not enjoying himself. I know that the history of this is connected with Calvinism...but it just seems impossible to wrap one's mind around it now in the year 2014 even as an optional way of looking at things, and hence it makes the entire project of a radical separation between the pleasant and the beautiful, and even the distinction between three kinds of pleasure, pretty implausible. At best we can say that some pleasures are prompted immediately by sensation, some mediated by reflection while using an indeterminate concept of some sort, and some by the thought that something is good, i.e. as useful or as morally good, for example the pleasure we take in admiring Martin Luther King's work for civil rights. There is a distinction somewhere between the merely pleasant and the beautiful, but it is pretty subtle. I wouldn't disagree, however, that happiness is far from an unconditioned good, as Kant puts it, for you would not think that the happiness of an evil person is an unconditioned good: but happiness of a person who deserves to be happy is an unconditioned good, surely.
As I argued in my book, the distinction between these different kinds of pleasures is not a strong one: the boundaries are soft. The pleasant often does involve some reflection and some vague concepts, for example. Kant insists that there is no disputing about taste with respect to the pleasant, but we do dispute about these things all the time: we argue over how good Indian food is for example, or which Indian dish or restaurant is the best. Kant says that "pleasantness concerns irrational animals also, but beauty only concerns men" which itself seems another pretty implausible idea, although it is understandable that if beauty requires at least an indistinct concept then the question remains whether other animals use anything like indistinct concepts (recent work with chimps, parrots, dogs, elephants, octopi, and porpoises, seems to so that they do.)
Perhaps Kant's most compelling case for a real distinction between the pleasant and the beautiful is" "As regards the interest of inclination in the case of the pleasant, everyone says that hunger is the best sauce, and everything that is eatable is relished by people with a healthy appetite, and thus satisfaction of this sort shows no choice directed by taste." We are talking about food again, but as opposed to Indian food, where one can talk about subtle differences in spice, or wine, where one can talk about the subtle distinctions Sancho's cousins observe in Hume's essay (although Kant thinks that taste in Canary wine is just a matter of physical taste and hence the pleasant) we are now just talking about what happens when you have a healthy appetite: then everything tastes good to you...and no judgment is really involved. I don't think that is true either, although a healthy appetite can make what is tasty more tasty and what is less good somewhat better. Even with a healthy appetite one can distinguish between finer and lesser cuisines. It might just enhance one's eating experience without making everything pleasant relative.
Labels:
beauty,
Indian food,
Kant,
pleasant,
taste,
the agreeable,
the pleasant
Wednesday, September 17, 2014
Plotinus and everyday aesthetics (and architecture)
For Plotinus (Ennead I.6, On Beauty, MacKenna translation) the beauty of the sensuous realm is hardly the most important kind of beauty. Yet he has something valuable to say about it. He begins his discussion of beauty by noting that there is both beauty of sight and of hearing (which includes music) in the sensuous world, as also a beauty of the realm above sense, including the beauty of human virtues. He will quickly turn to focus on this non-bodily realm. Still, he at least asks what makes material forms and certain sounds beautiful. His larger issue is whether there is One Principle for both kinds of beauty, the embodied and the bodiless, only the later being beautiful in itself. Since not all bodies are beautiful, he asks, what is it that "attracts the eyes" in a beautiful object, giving us joy at the sight of it? Most previous thinkers identified this with symmetry of parts, along with "a certain charm of color." We find this idea for example in the Pythagoreans, in Aristotle, and also in the Stoics. On this view, "only a compound can be beautiful," and the parts only have beauty "as working together to give a comely total." Yet, he argues, "beauty in an aggregate demands beauty in details." A beautiful whole cannot be made out of ugly parts. Moreover, there are things that are beautiful, for example, individual colors, the light of the sun, gold, lightning by night, and the stars, whose beauty cannot be understood in terms of symmetry. Similarly in a beautiful musical composition the individual tones are delicious in themselves. Moreover, things that are symmetrical are only sometimes beautiful. So it follows that symmetry "owes its beauty to a remoter principle." We also find that beautiful things perceived by the intellect, like noble conduct, excellent laws and abstract ideas also cannot be explained in terms of symmetry. Note that, by attacking symmetry as that which defines beauty, Plotinus is attacking the notion that beauty can be objective in a science-like way. The "golden mean" would similarly be rejected as the source of beauty, on his account. Instead, he focuses on something more mysterious, a certain aura, one might say, that is exemplified by such things as the light of the sun, the shimmering quality of beautiful colors, and so forth. (I discuss and update this concept in my book.)
What then is the Principle that makes material things beautiful? Plotinus sees this Principle as something which the soul can perceive immediately, name, recognize, welcome, and, most importantly, enter "into unison with it." The opposite of this happens when the soul falls "in with the Ugly" and denies and even resents the Principle. The point is best made in this quote: "the soul - by the very truth of its nature, by its affiliation to the noblest Existents in the hierarchy of Being," when it sees anything like such Existents (the Forms), "thrills with an immediate delight" because it senses its own nature as having this affinity. To the question, "what is there common between beauty in this world and beauty in the bodiless world?" the answer is: "all the loveliness of this world comes by communion in Ideal-Form." Ugly things, by contrast, have not "been entirely mastered by pattern, that is, by Reason." Beauty happens when Matter yields "in all respects to Ideal-Form." Further, the Ideal-Form enters by grouping and coordinating "what from a diversity of parts was to become a unity," and thus yields a "harmonious coherence." Here, "Beauty enthrones itself, giving itself to the parts as to the sum," as for example, when an architect confers beauty on "a house with all its parts," those parts including single stones which also may be given their beauty by "some natural quality." (One thinks of Frank Lloyd Wright's Falling Water.) The concluding idea of this chapter of his book is that the "material thing becomes beautiful...by communicating in the thought that flows from the Divine." But in more practical contemporary (and atheistic) terms we might interpret this to mean that the beauty of a house is a function not just of the ordering of the parts but of the way that a non-mathematics-based aura can be found not only in the whole but in each of the parts, as if there were a divine presence giving these things their unity.
Architecture is a leading idea in Plotinus's account of beauty. and thus in Chapter 3 he asks, "On what principle does the architect, when he finds the house standing before him correspondent with his inner ideal of a house, pronounce it beautiful? Is it not that the house before him, the stones apart, is the inner idea stamped upon the mass of exterior matter, the indivisible exhibited in diversity." This passage is an interesting combination of Plato, Aristotle and something else harder to describe. The description of the architect is just like Plato's description of a carpenter in relation to a bed in Book X of the Republic, where the carpenter look to the ideal bed in the world of Forms to create his own bed. Aristotle would insist that creation of an artifact involves both a material cause and the formal cause, the form being imposed on the matter. The notion "the indivisible" exhibited or expressed in diversity is unique to Plotinus at this stage (although in the eighteenth century we have the idea of beauty as unity in diversity in Hogarth, for example). The phrase "the stones apart" seems, however, to contradict what he has previously said about stones. Instead, one would think that the beauty of the individual stones contribute to the beauty of the whole, they being what he refers to as the diversity that is expressive of an imposed unity.
Perhaps the most interested passage is the following: "
So with the perceptive faculty: discerning in certain objects the Ideal-Form which has bound and controlled the shapeless matter, opposed in nature to Idea, seeing further stamped upon the common shapes some shape excellent above the common, it gathers into unity what still remains fragmentary, catches it up and carries it within, no longer a thing of parts, and presents it to the Ideal-Principle as something concordant and congenial, a natural friend: the joy here is like that of a good man who discerns in a youth the early signs of a virtue consonant with the achieved perfection within his own soul."
Consider "the perceptive faculty" to be what is later called the faculty of taste. What this faculty does is mapped out in a sequence of stages: (1) find a Platonic Form exemplified or expressed in the object (for example, Architecture within a building), (2) gather what remains fragmentary into a unity (by a kind of mental synthesis in perception), (3) internalize that unity within the mind, thus (4) erasing the division of the objects into parts (all parts are now seen as integrated aspects of an organic whole), and (5) posit the unity as congenial to the relevant Form, e.g. Architecture, from which (6) arises a joy in the soul of the critic (i.e. that part of the critic with greatest affinity with the world of Forms).
The next passage is also quite extraordinary. We had already learned that, on his anti-symmetry view, individual colors can be beautiful. We now will see that this beauty is a function of the presence of the Form within the object perceived as beautiful and as a diversity unified: "The beauty of color is also the outcome of a unification: it derives from shape, from the conquest of darkness inherent in Matter by the pouring-in of light, the unembodied, which is a Rational-Principle of an Ideal-Form." (Color is not here a matter of mere charm is previously suggested or as found in Kant, but more like color as found in its use in stained glass windows in Gothic churches.) The description of light as pouring in from the world of the Forms is reminiscent of Plato's explication of the metaphor of light as truth in the Allegory of the Cave. However, here we see that this beauty, which is not, again, based on symmetry, is a function of the overcoming of darkness and of the equivalent notion of unformed matter, where the presence of the Ideal-Form is not found in the mere Platonic relation of imitation (as when a drawn circle imitates the Form Circle) but rather in a suffusion of light/color. Fire is stressed in the next paragraph as being the body closest to the unembodied, as having "color primally," other bodies taking the Form of color from it, thus giving its light a particular splendour, "the splendour that belongs to the Idea."
This might on the face of it seem to be the end of the discussion of everyday aesthetics and Plotinus, as Plotinus in Chapter 4, leaves the realm of sense and images, the world in which beauty enters into matter to "ravish us." Instead, he focuses on "loftier beauties" of the soul unrelated to the sense organs, these beauties including noble conduct and learning, as well as the Forms of Justice and Moral Wisdom, themselves more beautiful than a beautiful sunset or dawn (something admired by Plotinus for its non-symmetry-based beauty based on light and its attendant color.) Yet, from a modern secular perspective, the beauties of personal virtue are also beauties of everyday life (and not completely divorced from what the senses can perceive if we include within this the way that perception can be infused with meaning to the extent that we can see, for example, the nobility in a person we know to be noble). Thus Plotinus asks: "What do you feel in presence of the grace you discern in actions, in manners, in sound morality, in all the works and fruits of virtue, in the beauty of souls [and the beauty of yourselves within]?" Isn't this too a matter of everyday aesthetics, perhaps a necessary feature of it? Is there not also a moral dimension to our perception of beauty in the people and people-produced artifacts and events around us? Here, too, there is a kind of aura, or as Plotinus puts it in his overly-metaphysical way: "shining down upon all [these moral virtues and their manifestations], the light of god-like Intellection." For Plotinus, it is that these things have reality of Being that makes them "really beautiful." Again, the metaphor of light is invoked here as within the realm of physical beauty: "this grace, this splendour as of Light, resting upon all the virtues." I am not going to discuss Plotinus's Puritan-like fulminations against ugliness in the realm of bodily sensation: this clearly opposed to one aspect of the aesthetics of everyday life, the aspect that includes the the very "pleasures of the body" that Plotinus despises. Suffice it to say that in Chapter 6 Plotinus adds one point about the everyday: "The beauty in things of a lower order - actions and pursuits for instance - comes by operation of the shaping Soul which is also the author of the beauty found in the world of sense. For the Soul, a divine thing, a fragment as it were of the Primal Beauty, makes beautiful to the fulness of their capacity all things whatsoever that it grasps and moulds." As with Plato, Plotinus has the soul conclude its upward path by rejecting beauties of this world: it "can never again feel the old delight in the comeliness of material forms." Moreover, he calls on the spiritual adept to "withdraw into himself, foregoing all that is known by the eyes, turning away for ever from the material beauty that once mad his joy." Too bad for him, I say.
One final comment may be made about Plotinus's vision of an aesthetics of personal self-improvement. This can be read in a Pragmatist vein (for example in line with the writings of Richard Shusterman) which in fact would subvert his Plotinus' overall purpose. We are able to see the virtuous soul and its loveliness by looking within: "And if you do not find yourself beautiful yet, act as does the creator of a statue that is to be made beautiful: he cuts away here, he smooths there, he makes this line lighter, this other purer, until a lovely fact has grown upon his work. So do you also: cut away all that is excessive, straighten all that is crooked, bring light to all that is overcast, labor to make all one glow of beauty and never cease chiseling your statue, until there shall shine out on you from it the godlike splendor of virtue, until you shall see the perfect goodness surely established in the stainless shrine."
What then is the Principle that makes material things beautiful? Plotinus sees this Principle as something which the soul can perceive immediately, name, recognize, welcome, and, most importantly, enter "into unison with it." The opposite of this happens when the soul falls "in with the Ugly" and denies and even resents the Principle. The point is best made in this quote: "the soul - by the very truth of its nature, by its affiliation to the noblest Existents in the hierarchy of Being," when it sees anything like such Existents (the Forms), "thrills with an immediate delight" because it senses its own nature as having this affinity. To the question, "what is there common between beauty in this world and beauty in the bodiless world?" the answer is: "all the loveliness of this world comes by communion in Ideal-Form." Ugly things, by contrast, have not "been entirely mastered by pattern, that is, by Reason." Beauty happens when Matter yields "in all respects to Ideal-Form." Further, the Ideal-Form enters by grouping and coordinating "what from a diversity of parts was to become a unity," and thus yields a "harmonious coherence." Here, "Beauty enthrones itself, giving itself to the parts as to the sum," as for example, when an architect confers beauty on "a house with all its parts," those parts including single stones which also may be given their beauty by "some natural quality." (One thinks of Frank Lloyd Wright's Falling Water.) The concluding idea of this chapter of his book is that the "material thing becomes beautiful...by communicating in the thought that flows from the Divine." But in more practical contemporary (and atheistic) terms we might interpret this to mean that the beauty of a house is a function not just of the ordering of the parts but of the way that a non-mathematics-based aura can be found not only in the whole but in each of the parts, as if there were a divine presence giving these things their unity.
Architecture is a leading idea in Plotinus's account of beauty. and thus in Chapter 3 he asks, "On what principle does the architect, when he finds the house standing before him correspondent with his inner ideal of a house, pronounce it beautiful? Is it not that the house before him, the stones apart, is the inner idea stamped upon the mass of exterior matter, the indivisible exhibited in diversity." This passage is an interesting combination of Plato, Aristotle and something else harder to describe. The description of the architect is just like Plato's description of a carpenter in relation to a bed in Book X of the Republic, where the carpenter look to the ideal bed in the world of Forms to create his own bed. Aristotle would insist that creation of an artifact involves both a material cause and the formal cause, the form being imposed on the matter. The notion "the indivisible" exhibited or expressed in diversity is unique to Plotinus at this stage (although in the eighteenth century we have the idea of beauty as unity in diversity in Hogarth, for example). The phrase "the stones apart" seems, however, to contradict what he has previously said about stones. Instead, one would think that the beauty of the individual stones contribute to the beauty of the whole, they being what he refers to as the diversity that is expressive of an imposed unity.
Perhaps the most interested passage is the following: "
So with the perceptive faculty: discerning in certain objects the Ideal-Form which has bound and controlled the shapeless matter, opposed in nature to Idea, seeing further stamped upon the common shapes some shape excellent above the common, it gathers into unity what still remains fragmentary, catches it up and carries it within, no longer a thing of parts, and presents it to the Ideal-Principle as something concordant and congenial, a natural friend: the joy here is like that of a good man who discerns in a youth the early signs of a virtue consonant with the achieved perfection within his own soul."
Consider "the perceptive faculty" to be what is later called the faculty of taste. What this faculty does is mapped out in a sequence of stages: (1) find a Platonic Form exemplified or expressed in the object (for example, Architecture within a building), (2) gather what remains fragmentary into a unity (by a kind of mental synthesis in perception), (3) internalize that unity within the mind, thus (4) erasing the division of the objects into parts (all parts are now seen as integrated aspects of an organic whole), and (5) posit the unity as congenial to the relevant Form, e.g. Architecture, from which (6) arises a joy in the soul of the critic (i.e. that part of the critic with greatest affinity with the world of Forms).
The next passage is also quite extraordinary. We had already learned that, on his anti-symmetry view, individual colors can be beautiful. We now will see that this beauty is a function of the presence of the Form within the object perceived as beautiful and as a diversity unified: "The beauty of color is also the outcome of a unification: it derives from shape, from the conquest of darkness inherent in Matter by the pouring-in of light, the unembodied, which is a Rational-Principle of an Ideal-Form." (Color is not here a matter of mere charm is previously suggested or as found in Kant, but more like color as found in its use in stained glass windows in Gothic churches.) The description of light as pouring in from the world of the Forms is reminiscent of Plato's explication of the metaphor of light as truth in the Allegory of the Cave. However, here we see that this beauty, which is not, again, based on symmetry, is a function of the overcoming of darkness and of the equivalent notion of unformed matter, where the presence of the Ideal-Form is not found in the mere Platonic relation of imitation (as when a drawn circle imitates the Form Circle) but rather in a suffusion of light/color. Fire is stressed in the next paragraph as being the body closest to the unembodied, as having "color primally," other bodies taking the Form of color from it, thus giving its light a particular splendour, "the splendour that belongs to the Idea."
This might on the face of it seem to be the end of the discussion of everyday aesthetics and Plotinus, as Plotinus in Chapter 4, leaves the realm of sense and images, the world in which beauty enters into matter to "ravish us." Instead, he focuses on "loftier beauties" of the soul unrelated to the sense organs, these beauties including noble conduct and learning, as well as the Forms of Justice and Moral Wisdom, themselves more beautiful than a beautiful sunset or dawn (something admired by Plotinus for its non-symmetry-based beauty based on light and its attendant color.) Yet, from a modern secular perspective, the beauties of personal virtue are also beauties of everyday life (and not completely divorced from what the senses can perceive if we include within this the way that perception can be infused with meaning to the extent that we can see, for example, the nobility in a person we know to be noble). Thus Plotinus asks: "What do you feel in presence of the grace you discern in actions, in manners, in sound morality, in all the works and fruits of virtue, in the beauty of souls [and the beauty of yourselves within]?" Isn't this too a matter of everyday aesthetics, perhaps a necessary feature of it? Is there not also a moral dimension to our perception of beauty in the people and people-produced artifacts and events around us? Here, too, there is a kind of aura, or as Plotinus puts it in his overly-metaphysical way: "shining down upon all [these moral virtues and their manifestations], the light of god-like Intellection." For Plotinus, it is that these things have reality of Being that makes them "really beautiful." Again, the metaphor of light is invoked here as within the realm of physical beauty: "this grace, this splendour as of Light, resting upon all the virtues." I am not going to discuss Plotinus's Puritan-like fulminations against ugliness in the realm of bodily sensation: this clearly opposed to one aspect of the aesthetics of everyday life, the aspect that includes the the very "pleasures of the body" that Plotinus despises. Suffice it to say that in Chapter 6 Plotinus adds one point about the everyday: "The beauty in things of a lower order - actions and pursuits for instance - comes by operation of the shaping Soul which is also the author of the beauty found in the world of sense. For the Soul, a divine thing, a fragment as it were of the Primal Beauty, makes beautiful to the fulness of their capacity all things whatsoever that it grasps and moulds." As with Plato, Plotinus has the soul conclude its upward path by rejecting beauties of this world: it "can never again feel the old delight in the comeliness of material forms." Moreover, he calls on the spiritual adept to "withdraw into himself, foregoing all that is known by the eyes, turning away for ever from the material beauty that once mad his joy." Too bad for him, I say.
One final comment may be made about Plotinus's vision of an aesthetics of personal self-improvement. This can be read in a Pragmatist vein (for example in line with the writings of Richard Shusterman) which in fact would subvert his Plotinus' overall purpose. We are able to see the virtuous soul and its loveliness by looking within: "And if you do not find yourself beautiful yet, act as does the creator of a statue that is to be made beautiful: he cuts away here, he smooths there, he makes this line lighter, this other purer, until a lovely fact has grown upon his work. So do you also: cut away all that is excessive, straighten all that is crooked, bring light to all that is overcast, labor to make all one glow of beauty and never cease chiseling your statue, until there shall shine out on you from it the godlike splendor of virtue, until you shall see the perfect goodness surely established in the stainless shrine."
Labels:
architecture,
aura,
beauty,
everyday aesthetics,
Plotinus,
Shusterman
Thursday, September 11, 2014
What is Beauty? Aristotle's contribution: tragic beauty
Although Aristotle states a theory of beauty in the Metaphysics: “The
chief forms of beauty are order and symmetry and definiteness, which the
mathematical sciences demonstrate in a special degree” (The Complete Works
of Aristotle Barnes ed., volume 2, 1705, 1078a36), the theory he
offers in the Poetics is quite different, and quite a bit more
original. The Metaphysics comment
is preceded by a statement that the mathematical sciences say a great deal
about beauty.
The Metaphysics theory can be found as far
back as the fragments and lore of Pythagoras. Pythagoras gave us the
terms "harmony" and "symmetry" both of which seem to be
central to his (or the Pythagoreans') theory of beauty. The reference to
mathematics also connects both the Pythagorean and the Platonic notions of
beauty. Aristotle, by contrast to Plato, was generally more inspired by
biology than mathematics, and this comes out in his discussion of beauty in the Poetics.
It is also noteworthy that in The Organon Topics Book
3 Part 3 Aristotle says, "if one thing be desirable for itself, and the
other for the look of it, the former is more desirable, as (e.g.) health than
beauty. A thing is defined as being desired for the look of it if, supposing no
one knew of it, you would not care to have it. Also, it is more desirable both
for itself and for the look of it, while the other thing is desirable on the
one ground alone. Also, whichever is the more precious for itself, is also
better and more desirable. A thing may be taken to be more precious in itself
which we choose rather for itself, without anything else being likely to come
of it." [taken from R. B.
Jones]
But as I have said, the most interesting contribution to a
theory of beauty is to be found in his Poetics. There, he
develops the notion of beauty as related to organic wholes. Yet, his
initial discussion of beauty does not actually mention the term. It is in
Chapter 3. There, he talks about how imitation is natural to man, how we
are the most imitative creatures, and how we delight in works of imitation. (I
am working here with The Oxford Translation of Aristotle edited by W. D. Ross
and appearing in Art in its Significance by Stephen David
Ross, 3rd. ed., 1994). It seems that this delight is an aesthetic
delight. He observes that we even delight in realistic representations of
"the lowest animals" and of dead bodies. (This sort of thing is
accounted for by some 20th century philosophers in terms of "taking an
aesthetic attitude." See, for example, Paul Ziff "Anything
Viewed.") He further observes that we delight in a picture because
we learn from it at the same time, for example we learn that a man falls into a
certain category. Even things we have not seen before can, when
represented, give us delight in the execution or coloring. We know
he is thinking of beauty here since he also mentions that harmony and rhythm
are natural to us.
When Aristotle gets around to defining tragedy in Chapter 6
of Poetics he doesn't explicitly mention beauty and, since the
purpose of tragedy is catharsis of pity and fear, it seems that beauty is not
central to tragedy. But there are two reasons to question
this conclusion. First, one could say that there is a kind of beauty in
that which causes catharsis. Second, his account of beauty is essential
to evaluating tragedy. I will discuss that later. Note also that
tragedy is often full of depictions of painful things...and these were recently
mentioned in the section on the value of imitation. In the
definition of tragedy he does explicitly mention "language with
pleasurable accessories" by which he means "with rhythm and harmony
superadded." This may imply that these things provide a kind of
beauty, although perhaps only as an add-on to the core experience of
catharsis. So the key issue is whether the play in its central purpose
can be understood in terms of beauty.
The central discussion of beauty comes in the second part of
Chapter 6 when Aristotle talks about the proper construction of a Plot.
We find that a tragedy is an "imitation of an action complete in itself, a
whole of some magnitude" and that the whole should have a beginning,
middle and end, the beginning and end being non-arbitrary. I take it that
"magnitude" does not just mean "size" but rather
"appropriate size," and maybe even more than that, i.e.
"appropriate size to be considered beautiful." For then he says
"Again: to be beautiful, a living creature, and every whole made up
of parts, must not only present a certain order in its arrangements of parts,
but also a certain definite magnitude." The analogy to the living
creature will be picked up later as he expands on the notion of an organic
whole. Clearly it is not enough for something to be beautiful to be made
up of ordered parts, but that the parts need to be arranged in a way similar to
the way they appear in an organism. Seemingly reverting to the
Pythagorean view, Aristotle follows this by saying that "Beauty is a
matter of size and order." Still, he understands "order"
now in a different way because of the animal analogy.
But, before we go into the animal analogy, we need to
consider his idea that beauty is impossible in a minute creature, or in one of
vast size. In the first case, the creature is not beautiful because it is
indistinct, and in the second case it is not beautiful because it cannot be
seen "all at once" and "the unity and wholeness ... is lost to
the beholder." So beauty has something to do not only with harmony,
symmetry and order but also with clarity, unity and wholeness.
When Aristotle applies this idea to poetry, he introduces a
psychological dimension. The beauty of a poem depends on our memory's
ability to take it all in, much like the beauty of a large object depending on
our perceptual ability to do so. So, he holds, the
longer a story is the more beautiful it is based on its magnitude. Here,
he is taking magnitude to mean "the right size." However, he
then gives another account of magnitude. It is a length that "by a
series of probable or necessary stages [the hero passes] from misfortune to
happiness or from happiness to misfortune." He says that this
"may suffice as a limit for the magnitude of the story." That
is, the story has good magnitude if it has the right length
for this series of probable or necessary stages to be worked through, i.e.
making a good plot (and thus bringing catharsis to the audience.)
Note that in the very next sentence, but the first sentence
of Chapter 9, he also uses the phrase "probable or necessary,"
although in this case referring to the function of the poet, which is to
describe "not the thing that has happened, but a kind of thing that might
happen, i.e. what is possible as being probable or necessary." So,
part of what is meant by "magnitude" is the sense of probable or
necessary movement within the poem with respect to the plot. This is the very
thing that distinguishes poetry from history, which is only concerned with what
"has been," not with what "might be." Thus,
Aristotle's defense of poetry's cognitive power against Plato, follows from his
theory of beauty as magnitude, where magnitude is seen as a quality of an
organic whole in which the parts are intimately related.
The key quote in this is to be found in Chapter 8, which is
mainly about the unity of a plot (unity being necessary for beauty). That
a plot is about one man is not enough to make it unified: there must be
one story. So here is the quote: "so in poetry the story, as an
imitation of action, must represent one action, a complete whole, with its
several incidents so closely connected that the transposal or withdrawal of any
one of them will disjoin and dislocate the whole. For that which makes no
perceptible difference by its presence or absence is no real part of the
whole." So, the organic whole is like the body of an organism:
if you take away an organ you will severely diminish the capacity for the
organism to function. Similarly the parts of the beautiful play are
closely intertwined that if you take away one you will destroy the beauty of
it. This is Aristotle's original idea about beauty.
There is one qualification to this. Aristotle also
holds that something can be made more beautiful if it goes beyond just
imitating an organic whole. The painter or poet can make something
true-to-life and yet make it more beautiful, by preserving the type and yet
also making it nobler: "Again, since Tragedy is an imitation of
persons who are above the common level, the example of good portrait painters
should be followed. They, while reproducing the distinctive form of the
original, make a likeness which is true to life and yet more beautiful.
So too the poet, in representing men...[who have] defects of character, should
preserve the type and yet ennoble it." (Chapter 15)
It may not be that all forms of beauty need to meet
Aristotle's standard as set forth here. At the same time, it is arguable
that organic beauty is a particularly impressive form of beauty, and may be
distinguished from that which, although called beautiful, may be a simple
beauty, or even merely charming or pretty. The concept of
"necessity" may be of value here: there is a kind of necessity
(not mathematical or causal) which reveals a compelling dynamic energy, that (coupled
with such things as order, harmony and symmetry) gives us beauty in this
sense. Thus it would make sense to apply the term beauty paradigmatically
to a great tragic play despite the painfulness of the events portrayed.
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