Showing posts with label essences. Show all posts
Showing posts with label essences. Show all posts

Monday, May 2, 2022

Is Metamodernism the answer?

 It seems that since the 1980s we have been looking for the answer to the question, what comes after postmodernism.  The most recently published effort in this direction is an impressive book by Jason Ananda Josephson Storm, a religious studies professor, titled Metamodernism:  The Future of Theory.  The University of Chicago Press, 2021.  I very much enjoyed reading this challenging book which I originally ordered because of my ongoing interest in Weitz's anti-essentialism.  Storm shows a great deal of wisdom about ongoing debates both in philosophy and in the social sciences.  However, as with all other writers on the topic, he missed Weitz's main point and principle discovery, namely that the history of defining art is a history of successes, not failures, as long as we take the proposed real definitions to actually be honorific re-definitions.  Unlike Weitz I hold these honorific re-definitions to be descriptions/constitutions of the emerging and always changing essences they define.  So my solution to this classical problem mediates between essentialism and anti-essentialism.   Storm rightly sees that we cannot stick with traditional essentialism and hence cannot define such key terms as "religion" and "art" in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions.  He also raises excellent objections to the family-resemblance approach (which he wrongly, along with everyone else, attributes to Weitz).  However he believes that the solution to the "legitimation crisis" of our time is a "process social ontology" which replaces the idea of "natural kinds" with that of "social kinds."  He believes that this gets beyond anti-essentialism.  He sees social kinds a "homeostatic property-cluster kinds" and a similar approach has been followed in aesthetics.  However, this approach drains any discussion of essentially contested concepts of their dynamic energy.  We just end of up with what was once called "descriptive metaphysics."  Dialectic is lost.

Some of the things that he says about social kinds do capture what I mean by "essences."  But they miss the Socratic question and the Socratic quest which I take to be foundational of philosophy and the paradigmatic philosophy language-game.  Such theories are merely descriptive and do not recognize the ideal aspect of essences.  As I have said (although mainly in unpublished writing), the ideal aspect is empty in content but is eternal and unchanging.  One might say that the "social kind approach" to essences fails to see and deal with the ladder of love in Diotima’s sense. In doing so, it fails to capture the best of idealism.  On my view, the essences (of social kinds) are emergent from the dialectic between the ideal aspect of essences and the processual social kind.  Without this dynamic there is no possibility of creativity in the analysis of, and constitution of essences.  I worked out my views on this way back in the 90s in -  “The Socratic Quest in Art and Philosophy,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 51:3 (1993) 399-410. and “Metaphor and Metaphysics,” Metaphor and Symbolic Activity (Special Issue on Metaphor and Philosophy) 10:3 (1995) 205-222.   

I do like the term "metamodernism" and I would say that metamodernism is the answer, but not Storm's version. 

  

Wednesday, April 8, 2020

From My Unpublished Book: Essences in Aesthetics and Philosophy 2


1.  Essences and Imagination.

Plato thought that the Forms were apprehended only by reason and that we need to escape the world of sensation to enter the world of essence. Essences belong to an invisible world very different from the visible world. This is partially true, although it is hard to tease that part out while sticking to anti-dualism, as we here wish. Essences belong to our world and they are perceived in the world (the world as we experience it), but they are invisible (i.e., non-evident) usually. They are not invisible in being something else than what is seen. Rather, they are something normally not seen in the seen.

Essences can be seen in things as giving rise to a kind of aura:  when we see something in its essentiality it emerges from everyday being as with intense aesthetic quality, as participating in Beauty (as Plato would put it).

So essences are not objects of a special faculty called “reason” (unless, of course, “reason” were redefined to mean something more like the kind of activity and perception I will be describing here…  something I would favor.) Essences, rather, are objects of a process that might be best described as the activity of a kind of imagination. We are not talking about any sort of imagination, not about, for example, creating images in the mind from adding elements not previously seen together, such as horns to horses, but the capacity to “see as.” In particular, this is a “seeing something as” in which we see something as what it essentially is. (As we shall see, this often takes the form of metaphorical seeing: seeing something as it essentially is by way of seeing it as something it is not.) And this process inevitably is involved with searching out of essence through dialogue and dialectic. Change of perception comes with change of language.

Plato almost saw this. For example, when he spoke of “recollection” he stressed that something perceptual in the world stimulates mental perception of the Forms, and elsewhere that this is a matter of attending to the meanings of words in dialogue. These two things do in fact work together except that essences are revealed in experiential being.

Moreover, essences are models tied to words. Before, I said they are between concept and Form, but it is more accurate to say they are between perception, concept and Form. Hence Plato’s specific denial of the body and sensual experience is overcome, rejected. Essences are not just in a private mind:  they emerge in a shared world through philosophical dialogue and through other dialogue-like engagements.

Essences are models, or model-like (in that the perceived thing becomes a model, a paradigm), and they are real and true to the extent that they work. And they are manifested both in enhanced creative activity and in the experience of aura. So, as indicated above, they are and are not seen. In effect, to see something in essentiality is to truly see it. Essences are only not seen in the sense of being unavailable outside the activity of philosophical or other similar dialectic of the spirit (as in the arts).

Thus, the world of essences is, unlike the world of Forms, just an aspect of our dynamic phenomenological space that emergences from out interaction with the environment as living beings trying to solve problems and live life. It can be seen as a special realm since one can seem as if in a special transcendent realm when perceiving the world in terms of essences  

The word “imagination” may not always be helpful here. It is not as though there were a separate faculty of the mind called “imagination.” Rather, essences are perceived with the same faculties that we use to perceive things in more practical contexts. But essences emerge in a special kind of perception.

Plato, again, is oddly right that entering this state of being is like entering another realm, especially insofar as these things are as if unchanging. And it is also as if we were eternal and unchanging, as if we were perceiving all of these with eternal unchanging souls. Soul emerges as essences emerge:  they emerge in tandem. But whereas Plato saw this as escaping the world of the senses, of perception, the current view is that in essences perception is intensified, as words, through dialectic, interact with things seen. In a sense it could be said, perhaps Vico saw this, that essences are created by the imagination:  again, this just means that we, as fully embodied beings, interact with the world in such a way that aura and essentiality emerge together.

Perhaps all of this is what Plato was pointing towards when he spoke of a method that was hypothetical, the hypotheses being the Forms. Essences are hypotheses taken as first principles, and tested. But unlike Plato, the proof is in the effectiveness of this emergence, in what is generated.

It could be argued that Plato even saw this too when he spoke of the proof of grasping of the Form of the Good being in terms of the creative products that emerge.

2.      The Essence of Art and Dialectics.

The essence of art is emergent upon art works, the institutions of the artworld, and the various debates surrounding the question "what is the essence of art?" and related questions. Traditionally, we think of these debates as philosophical. Yet there are also dialectical developments within other modes of what Hegel called Spirit, for example within art and within religion. Within art, there are debates that are not verbal. The essence of art is emergent mostly upon debates, both verbal and nonverbal, within the world or worlds of art, just as the essence of religion is emergent upon such debates (call them dialectics) within the world or worlds of religion. A nonverbal debate may be exemplified by Picasso responding to a painting by Matisse with a painting of his own that indirectly expresses a different conception of the essence of art. However, the essence of art is also, in part, emergent upon a dialectics not limited to art itself: first, upon the dialectic within the philosophy of art, and second, upon a dialectical interaction between the philosophy, art criticism, and art practice, and finally upon dialectics between classes, nations, political philosophy and economics. There is a layering of dialectic, although this is also interactional.

Much of the value of art comes from the way its form and content resonates with moments in these other dialectics.

There are canonical definitions, canonical works, and canonical debates (with competing positions accepted as at least viable or living) at any particular time in history…place too. The search for essences takes place within the background of these.

3.      Philosophy of Art not Parasitic.

Although it is sometimes tempting to think otherwise, philosophy of art is not parasitic upon art practice. It is not merely a reflection on art practice or on the use of concepts within the world(s) of art. Nor should we judge it merely in terms of whether it meets the needs of artists, although it might well meet some of those needs. Neither is it parasitic on criticism:  it is not simply meta-criticism. Thinking about criticism is useful for philosophers in the same way thinking about philosophy is useful for critics. Spirit manifests itself in these different ways. That is, the spirit of the age and culture can be found in philosophy, religion, art and science of a particular place and time. Of course in the history of the philosophy of art certain critics have attained the status of philosophers of art insofar as they participate in or contribute to philosophical debates.

Philosophy of art is dynamically interactive and symbiotically related to both art practice and art criticism. The claim that it is meta-criticism is a false modesty hiding an improper inferiority complex. Sometimes philosophy of art is portrayed meanly from the standpoint of a hostile critic or from that of the currently dominant "core" of philosophy. These characterizations need to be countered by all who care about philosophy and about art.

Philosophy of art is primarily philosophy. It is concerned with meeting the needs of the philosophical side of our culture (i.e. by way of answering the central or burning questions of philosophy, which themselves are grounded on the burning questions of the culture and of current humanity).  Thus philosophy of art (allied with its close associate, aesthetics) it is in competition and dialectical tension with the so-called or current "core" areas of philosophy, for example metaphysics, epistemology and ethics. As we shall see, philosophy of art/aesthetics poses some significant challenges to these core areas.


Monday, February 10, 2020

From my unpublished book: Essences in Philosophy and Aesthetics


1.       Essences exist.

Essences exist, but they are not eternal and unchanging.  The surprising claim made here is that essences change historically.  Since they change they seem very much unlike Plato’s Forms, and yet, like the Forms, they are the realities revealed in the deep thinking associated with the “what is X?” question.
Essences are the main objects of philosophical understanding.  They are also accessed through mythical and artistic investigation.  They seem to be eternal and unchanging because they are as if eternal and unchanging.  They are emergent historically and ontologically from, and upon, the natural world.  They are often emergent upon non-natural created worlds as well.  Those non-natural worlds are themselves emergent upon the natural world.  Essences, as I will argue, are not concepts, natural kinds, types, Forms or Universals.  But they are what Plato was trying to get at when he described Forms (but failed because he turned them into gods).  They are immanent, not transcendent.   
Throughout my discussion of essences my paradigm will be the essence of art.  The phrase "the essence of art" (as also the phrase "the essence of religion" and other such phrases) refers to something that can be described, albeit in different ways, and with different effects.   It refers to something that cannot be described literally.  Nor can it be defined in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, although such definitions are often useful as a way of articulating an understanding of that essence.   It does refer to something that can be described by way of certain seemingly necessary and sufficient conditions, and by certain metaphors and myths.  
Essences themselves are metaphor-like.  They are tensional, interactional, and capable of multiple interpretation in much the way metaphors are.   Just as there is a dimension of nature that corresponds to literally true statements there is an aspect of reality that corresponds to true metaphors.  Good and powerful definitions of essences are true metaphors.
The metaphoric-like nature of essences points to the idea that reality in its most significant aspect is a function of a dialectic of the fictional and the nonfictional, the unreal and the real, the unconcealed and the concealed.  

2.       Deep.

Essences are the objects of investigations that are deep.  Deep investigations are inexhaustible and comprehensive.  They go beneath mere surface appearance, and they are critical of accepted foundations.  They originate new fictional worlds, which are also, and at the same time, ways the world is.  
Deep investigations take into account the entire range of human experience:  not just the cognitive dimension, but also the sensuous, the emotional, and the imaginative.   Deep investigation, then, is phenomenologically deep.

3.       "Essence."

The word "essence" here, does not refer to natural phenomena, as in the essence of water.  The search for essences, as understood here, is a search for something that exists within the lived worlds of conscious and reflective beings.   Such entities could not exist without us. 
Water may have an "essence" under a completely different sense of that term than that used here.  Its essence would simply be a matter of what science is trying to define when it defines water.  One cannot model an essentialist investigation of human things, such as art and religion, on an essentialist investigation of purely physical things.  This is so, first, because human things are generally organic wholes, or participate in organic wholes, and second because human things are always constituted, in part, by consciousness.

4.       Culturally Emergent.

Essences are culturally emergent entities, and thus are like such other culturally emergent entities as minds, institutions, concepts, meanings, persons, and cultures themselves.  Essences are also biologically emergent through evolution.  Cultural emergence is emergent upon biological emergence.   Art, for example, may have been biologically emergent in our species 100,000 years ago.  The essence of art continues to emerge, but now it is culturally emergent.  The cultural emergence of art is on top of its biological emergence.
Essences emerge, and continue to emerge:  they emerge both ontologically and historically.   They emerge upon a substratum which itself is emergent in many ways.  For example, the essence of art is emergent in part on artists and their activities, and these, in turn, are culturally emergent. 
Essences are emergent upon, and therefore are aspects of, organic wholes.  Moreover the parts of organic wholes upon which essences are emergent also have aspects that are emergent upon the whole, and therefore upon the whole's emergent essence.  Emergence is therefore interactional.  Even the material world-as-experienced is emergent in this way.  For example, the experienced properties of a patch of paint pigment on a painting are emergent upon the contextual situation of the pigment within a larger whole (the painting) and upon the context of that painting within even larger wholes (e.g. the life of the artist, the historical movement, etc.).  Pigment also has emergent properties with respect to the history of its use and associations.

5.       Range of Essences.

We can speak of the essence of a person, an institution, a painting, or a concept, although the main concern of philosophers is over essences of things referred to by abstract general terms, such as "art" and "man."  When does a word refer to an essence?  When it refers to a culturally contested concept, that is, a concept the nature of which we argue over.  In other words, a word refers to an essence we argue over its definition, and this argument expresses differing overall world-views.
This is one place where essences depart from what Plato called Forms.  Plato considered largeness itself to be a Form.  Insofar as there is no culturally important debate over the nature of largeness, Largeness is not an essence in my sense of the word.  However, if there were to be a debate over largeness, as there is over life or art, then it would be an essence.

6.       Instantiation Upon Particulars.

Although culturally emergent entities can have physical properties, they are unlike physical objects in that they instantiate, and are embodied in, other particulars.  For example, a work of art instantiates the essence of art and is embodied in a physical object.  The cultural world is emergent upon the natural world.  An emergent entity is one that is embodied in that upon which it is emergent.  Thus, the cultural world is also embodied in the natural world.
Particulars become essences when they exemplify that essence.   This is perhaps a shocking claim.   We tend to think of particulars as radically different from essences.  But when a particular fully exemplifies beauty, for example, in the sense that it is a living exemplar, then it is the essence of beauty actualized and expressed.

7.       Metaphysical Emergence.

Essences arise from metaphysical emergence.  This is an extension of cultural emergence.  Just as works of art are emergent upon persons, communities, and their interactions, so too essences are emergent upon all of these at a higher level.  The essence of art, for example, is emergent upon persons, works of art, communities, and the art-relevant interactions between these as they relate to definitional debates.
Metaphysical emergence is not to be confused with metaphysical transcendence, the concept of which it replaces.  The idea of metaphysical emergence is that entities previously thought to be metaphysically transcendent are actually immanent within the world of experience.  However they are still ontologically distinct from those things upon which they are emergent.
The idea of foundationalism is here reversed.  The metaphysical does not form the foundation of the structured edifice of knowledge or of being.  Rather it is the crown of various events of emergence.  However, since metaphysical entities (essences) are organically related to the entities upon which they are emergent, they can also be seen as "within" these too.  The cultural world is itself made up of emergent entities directly, and upon the natural world indirectly.  However, there is no one-to-one emergence on physical objects.  For example, a sculpture is not one-to-one emergent upon a sculpture-shaped physical object.  Artworks are emergent upon, and embodied in, the materials of the art object and their relations to artists and public, all of which are culturally emergent entities.
8.       Essences, Concepts and Forms
As I said earlier, essences are neither concepts nor Forms.  But it is helpful to understand them as in some respects very like each.  For example, philosophers often see themselves as analyzing concepts.  But on one common interpretation of concepts this would mean that they are analyzing something in their minds, or at least something shared by many minds in a culture.   This is not what analyzing concepts really is since if it were it would be the same kind of work that lexicographers do.  Or maybe it would be that plus what psychoanalysts do.  But if you have an analysis of the essence of art, for example, you analyze art itself.  At the same time, in analyzing art itself you are analyzing some phenomena arranged and shaped under the word “art” and this is very much like what we mean by analyzing the concept of art.  This is why such analysis is inevitably historically situated.  To analysis the essence of art is to participate in the ongoing dialectic of that essence.  To create art seriously is also to do that.


Thursday, August 30, 2018

Plato's Seventh Letter: how ineffable nous trumps mere knowledge

Most of the people who reject the Seventh Letter see it as somehow inconsistent with the rest of Plato's philosophy.  I am not one of those who reject the Seventh Letter.  Plato was constantly experimenting, and so there are going to be differences between each presentation of his main ideas.  Moreover, it hardly makes sense to speak of inconsistency in Plato since, unlike Aristotle, almost all of his writings are dialogues.  Although Socrates often seems to represent Plato's own point of view, it is by no means clear when he does.  Moreover I suspect that many rejections of the philosophical parts of the Seventh Letter are more due to its violating certain intellectualist/rationalist prejudices on the part of philosophers doing the interpreting.  I find the Seventh Letter to be consistent with my interpretation of the rest of Plato's writings, at least as far as one can talk about consistency here.

I am using the L.A. Post translation here, found in The Collected Dialogues edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns.  The passage begins with the striking claim that Plato has not composed any work in regard to his doctrines, and that he won't even do so in the future.  (341d)  The reason for this is that there is no way to put it into words, unlike other studies:  "Acquaintance with it must come rather after a long period of attendance on instruction in the subject itself and from close companionship, when, suddenly, like a blaze kindled by a leaping spark, it is generated in the soul and at once becomes self-sustaining."  (341d)  Plato began this discussion by talking about acquaintance with doctrines or subjects, but this seems more like acquaintance with a realm of philosophical truth or maybe even a sort of intuitive oneness with the subject matter.  We tend to associate philosophical doctrines necessarily with something written.  But this is something that happens to the soul, and it is ineffable. 

In the next paragraph we learn that this "acquaintance" (hardly the right sort of word for this, it seems) is of "the nature of things."  Plato then says, "I do not...think the attempt to tell mankind of these matters a good thing, except in the case of some few who are capable of discovering the truth for themselves with a little guidance." (342e)  The term "little" seems misplaced here given that he had just said that there would be a long period of instruction.  Interestingly and perhaps with some degree of self-contradiction Plato then goes on to "speak on the subject at greater length" in order to make it clearer.  What he is going to give here is "a true doctrine, which I have often stated before, that stands in the way of the man who would dare to write even the least thing on such matters, and which it seems I am now called upon to repeat."  So, the point is that the doctrine that follows is preliminary to that which is ineffable and philosophically deep.  What follows is not exactly the same as what he said previously, but it is pretty similar, even though he does not use the term "Forms."   By "preliminary" I do not mean that there is another set of doctrines that can be explicitly stated.  I only mean that Plato believes that this "conversational" method gives you the self-sustaining kindled blaze...which is the whole point.

Plato starts off with three classes of objects "through which knowledge about [the nature of things] must come."  He says that "the knowledge itself is a fourth," which is to say that it is a fourth class of things, these in the mind, to consider here.  The fifth thing to consider is the "actual object of knowledge which is the true reality."  

To go into more detail, the first is the name, the second is the description or definition, and the third is the image.  The role of each is interesting to study in detail and this study will reveal some surprises.  For one thing it is quite surprising that Plato incorporates the image (eidolon) into his first three classes as something positive.  I think this is necessary for Plato.  When he attacks the eidolon he only does so when it is mistaken for the real thing.  It is always taken as a necessary starting point.  In the Symposium one must begin with appreciation of the body of a particular young man, for example. Later we will learn that the role of definition is not quite what we would expect either.  

The example Plato uses to explain his theory is a circle.  So, in this case, the name is "circle."  The definition is "the thing which has everywhere equal distances between its extremities and its center." And the third thing is the class of objects drawn or turned on a lathe.  Many would think that the word and the definition would be sufficient for knowledge.  But here we have the difference between mere knowledge and wisdom, or at least whatever wisdom is attainable by the philosopher.  Wisdom is going beyond definition and knowledge.

It is not surprising that Plato makes a distinction between the true circle and the mere image of a circle in the world of appearances.  For example if the drawn circle is erased this does "not affect the real circle to which these other circles are all related, because it is different from them."  A little surprising, however, is the further discussion of the fourth, which is now described as three things:  knowledge, understanding (nous) and correct opinion, for Plato elsewhere distinguishes between these, and here he seems not to care about that distinction, at least between knowledge and true opinion.  

The point he wants to make here is that these epistemic concepts, taken together, are found not in sounds or shapes but in minds, and that the real circle is not found in minds.  In any case he sees understanding as the closest "in affinity and likeness" to the fifth entity, the real circle.  This, too, might be surprising to some who might give this to knowledge (episteme).   But if knowledge is justified true belief then the justification and the belief must be stated in words.  Plato, at this time in his life allows understanding (which is not in words) to trump mere knowledge.

He goes on to extend this point to all of the other Forms (or, better, all things that can be said to have essences), for example shapes, surfaces, good, beautiful, just, bodies (artificial and natural), the elements (fire, water, etc.), every animal, qualities, and states.  To get a complete understanding of the fifth one must "get hold of the first four."  This is striking since one must get hold not only of the name and the definition but also of the image and, presumably, both knowledge and right opinion.  The term "get hold of" is not really explained, but seems to mean "gain a firm grasp of these things and their relations."

He then says "Furthermore these four [names, descriptions, bodily forms, concepts] do as much to illustrate the particular quality of any object as they do to illustrate the essential reality because of the inadequacy of the language."  The point is that the four illustrate particular qualities, and this may be confused with their philosophical purpose, i.e. to illuminate the essence.  This is the reason why he next says that no intelligent man will put into language what his reason has contemplated, i.e. not in written symbols, since writings cannot be changed.  (343a)  This is similar, as many have observed, to the Phaedrus attack on writing as opposed to knowledge based on personal conversation.

To help explain the meaning of what he has said here Plato notes that circles in the world of appearance, i.e. ones that are drawn in dirt or turned on a lathe, are the opposite of the fifth entity, the real circle.  The reason is that they would touch a straight line at several points, and this would mean that they would contain within them their opposite, i.e. straightness.  He then observes that names are not stable since you could call what we now call round straight and vice versa.  More interesting is that he applies this point to description (i.e. the definition) as well, since the definition is made up of words too, i.e. of "nouns and verbal expressions."  So, in general, the four are inaccurate.  (Note that he includes knowledge in this group, although perhaps not understanding!}

So there are two things, the essential reality and the particular quality, and "when the mind is in quest of knowledge not of the particular but of the essential, each of the four confronts the mind with the unsought particular, whether in verbal or in bodily form."  (343c)  So the four by themselves are not sufficient and can actually deceive us, focusing on the particular rather than on the essential.  The further problem is that "each of the four makes the reality that is expressed in words or illustrated in objects liable to easy refutation by the evidence of the senses."  And this leaves us prey to confusion and uncertainty.

Bad training leads us to accept the phenomenal presentations, including both definitions and knowledge as justified true belief, and not to look for real essences.  Those, like the Sophists, who are able to "handle the four with dexterity" can easily make a fool of the individual who tries to provide answers about the fifth entity.  The problem is not the mind of the speaker but the character of the four, which is "naturally defective."  

So how are we to proceed?  There is a method:  it is consideration of the four in turn "moving up and down from one another."  I take this to be central.  All four need to be considered in sequence:  it is not enough to move from word to definition, but one must also move then to the image, and then to knowledge.  And then one must also work one's way back down again.  We must recognize that whatever is in language is changeable.

I think that there is an implicit reference here to Heraclitus' saying that the path up and the path down are one and the same.  Plato often talks of two paths, one leading to the Forms and one leading away from the Forms.  To say that the path up and the path down are the same is to say, I believe, that wisdom is a process and a cycle in which one mounts to the Forms but also descends from them back to the world of appearances.  

As Plato observes, even this procedure "barely begets knowledge of a naturally flawless object in a naturally flawless man."  Most people are "defective" in that they have no interest in essences:  they are not philosophers.  

Plato goes further when he says "most people's minds with regard to intelligence and to what are called morals" are defective.  So  what is needed to engage in this search for essences is "natural intelligence and a good memory" - but also an "inborn affinity with the subject."  That is, one needs to have a passionate attachment to searching for essences, to philosophy, and also, which is the same thing, passionate attachment for self-improvement, achievement of arete. 

By natural affinity Plato may mean not simply a philosophical but a moral affinity, for he says "all who have no natural attitude for and affinity with justice and all other other noble ideals, though in the study of other matters they may be both intelligent and retentive" will fail to grasp the entity.  Also those who are naturally just and otherwise virtuous may have no intellectual ability and will also fail.  So "the study of virtue and vice must be accompanied by an inquiry into what is false and true of existence in general and must be carried on by constant practice throughout a long period..."  (344b)  This will involve comparing names, definitions and "visual and other sense perceptions."  And one must do this in "benevolent disputation by the use of question and answer..."  Only then will the "flash of understanding" blaze up, and the mind will be "flooded with light."  

All of this it seems to me is consistent both with the Republic discussion of the cave, line and sun, and with the ladder of love as presented by Diotima in the Symposium.  When one grasps the Good itself one does not grasp a definition.  Rather one is able to see the good in things.  When one grasps the Beautiful itself one does not grasp a definition but one is able to see the beautiful in things.  Words, definitions, images, and even knowledge itself (justified true belief) are just stepping stones to the flash of insight.  

Is this true?  Actually I think so, although I couldn't prove it.  Also, unlike Plato, I do not think that the real thing, the fifth, is eternal and unchanging.  Or at least it is not so except as ideal empty of content.  I only am sad that Plato used the circle as his main example  I think this confuses things since it makes it appear as though grasping a Form is much like knowing the definition of circle.  This, of course, is not his intention.  

Note on Secondary Sources.  W.K.C. Guthrie provides a useful discussion of this material in A History of Greek Philosophy: V  The later Plato and the Academy.  Cambridge U. Press, 1978.  







Thursday, June 16, 2016

What can aesthetics, and philosophy generally, learn from Husserl's phenomenology?

It is difficult to answer this question just by looking at the works of Husserl himself, somewhat easier with Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, and even with Sartre.  But let's give it a shot.   You can learn from anyone.  Yet the main things we can learn from Husserl need to all be "under interpretation," and an interpretation that he and his orthodox followers would not accept.  For example, yes we should "get back to the things themselves," and this means phenomena, i.e. the things and events in our experienced world as we experience them.  Start with experience:  this is a good philosophical rule, although I would like to allow this to include the experience of reading/thinking: experience does not have to be outside the library. Start from experience: this is the same call that is made by the American pragmatists, and that is a plus.  

Further, we can agree that philosophy involves description of experience, and even, shocking for some, that the aim of philosophical inquiry is intuition of essences.  However, unlike Husserl, the essences intuited are not eternal and unchanging.  (I have much to say about such essences in other writings, and will only outline my position here).  Essences are not universals in the traditional sense:  indeed they are individuals of a sort.  They even have local color, i.e. when one intuits an essence, say the essence of art, there is an experience involved that is not purely mental, that has a sensuous aspect.  Essences are patterns in the field of experience, very specific patterns notable for their generative power and their, at least at some point in their careers, infectiousness.  

It follows that, contra Husserl, and indeed, most other philosophers, with the possible exception of Heidegger, I hold that the difference between philosophy and poetry is not very great.  For example it is not true that philosophy just deals with universals and poetry just with particulars.  Rather, the essences that are perceived and described both in philosophy and in poetry have two aspects: a particular aspect and a universal aspect.  Both philosophy and poetry attempt to achieve understanding through metaphors, except that in philosophy the metaphors are not always seen as such, and do not operate quite the way metaphors do in poetry.  (Often the metaphors can be identified as key concepts in the definition, concepts which are best not understood in a dictionary definition way.)  Intuition of essences is also not purely subjective, but neither is it purely objective:  the subjective/objective distinction collapses here, both in philosophy and in poetry. 

Essences are real as intentional objects of phenomenological or philosophical (the same thing) inquiry, but are constituted as they are intuited.  That is, the discovery of them is also a making.  The distinction between concept and reality to which the concept refers dissolves in the intuition and description of essences.  Thus, doing something, for example Duchamp buying and displaying a urinal, can be a revelation and a constitution of essence even without language involved (also in Duchamp's case language is involved....that is almost inescapable.) Essences are patterns in experienced that are to some extent actualized by their definition, and the elaboration of this definition is further actualization.  

Again, I agree with Husserl that a kind of bracketing is needed for phenomenological insight, but the result is more like what Kant saw as disinterested aesthetic experience, the essences being more like what Kant saw as aesthetic ideas.  Both Kant and Husserl said that we should not think about the existence of the thing, except Kant talks about this in relation to aesthetic experience, i.e. experience of beauty, and Husserl in relation to phenomenological description.  The point here is that they are really talking about the same thing.  Phenomenological bracketing is aesthetic in Kant's sense.  

The intuition of essences does not give us, contra Husserl, anything unconditionally or absolutely true or necessary  (it gives us, in Kant's language, aesthetic ideas, not ideas of reason), but it does give us something which is as if such.  It is important that this experience of "as if absolute" or "as if necessary" is not just a mistake.  It is what gives meaning to existence.  

Bracketing needs to be seen as a number of different kinds of operations, all of which can be useful, none of which absolutely necessary.  The brackets can be around various things in order to achieve various results.  Different kinds of bracketing sets the brackets at different places.  For example, you can look at the world as if it were all a dream, and this can be useful in trying to achieve intuition of essences, since a pattern may emerge that would not if one always operated under practical assumptions about distinction between illusion and reality.  You can bracket out the non-formal properties and only bracket in the formal ones, or you can bracket out formal ones and only bracket in the non-formal ones that have to do, for example, with social context.  Toggling between the two, or even cycling between these perspectives and others, can usually bring better, more realistic results than sticking just with one.  

Husserl's claim that philosophy advances no theories is only true on one level, i.e. that true philosophy is not going to result in something eternal and unchanging.  However, it is not true on another level: for the result of any description of any intuited essence is a theory. That's what philosophical theories really are. (I make no claims here about scientific or mathematical theories.)  As Morris Weitz taught us (his great largely unrecognized philosophical discovery), you have a theory of e.g. art if you have an honorific definition of art, but an honorific definition of art is not a theory of art in the sense of a definition in terms of unchanging necessary and sufficient conditions, and all attempts to define art in terms of that are really just theories of art in the honorific sense.  I would only add that such honorific definitions if powerful or sound are based on an intuition of the essence of art and a description of that intuition.  The openness of art as an open concept requires definition and re-definition...the very creative process of art requires it. This goes across the board for all philosophical concepts and all of the essences that philosophy attempts to describe.  

Husserl also worried, according to Robert Solomon, whose essay "What is Phenomenology?" (Phenomenology and Existentialism ed. Robert C. Solomon, Littlefield, 1980, I am mainly thinking about here) that theories "always assert more than their data" (4). and this has no place in philosophy.  It is true that honorific definitions always assert something more than the data by itself permits, for honorific definitions prescribe as well as describe:  they look to the future and not just to the present.  But then an intuition of an essence has little to do with data anyway.  Data can be collected, but the gestalt that is the essence intuited goes beyond the collected data.  It very superficial to think that one can just describe data and get anything that can be called knowledge.

Essences violate the distinction between the ideal and the real:  they are real in a sense and ideal in a sense:  they are quasi-ideal and quasi-real.  But the idea of trying to be "theory-free" in the way Husserl wanted has the advantage of not allowing ones previously learned or currently dominant theories, for example being a Marxist or an Analytic Philosopher, to prejudice the results of eidetic inquiry.  Solomon asserts that "presupposition-less" means that "any concept and any proposition can be reassessed at any point" but then that is just was philosophy is anyway and does not distinguish any one philosophical school from any other.  

Husserl attempts to find a middle path between dogmatic axiomatic systems of philosophy and relativist ones like those of Dilthey and Marx which claim that there is no philosophy outside of socio-political context.  This is wise but only as strategy not as the final story:  in the end there is no philosophy outside of context, and yet bracketing allows for the kind of close observation, observation under conditions, that, in turn, allows for successful intuition of essences, intuition that can be challenged, revised, and enhanced when the brackets are moved.  Relativism is true overall, but relativism is well set aside in the game of philosophy:  much credit needs to be given to the moment of intuition, the moment of creative philosophical thought (this kind of thought by the way is not limited by any means to philosophy as a professional discipline or even to philosophy as a practice going back in method to such heroes as Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and Confucius.)  

We can have our "demand for absolute truth" that Husserl wants, but only in the sense that we are talking about an experience of absoluteness or necessity that comes with intuition of essences, essences that are only as if absolute, necessary, eternal, etc.  Of course we then give up Husserl's naive assumption that we can have truths that will be taken as true in any intellectual environment.  The dream is not a waste however.  In trying to achieve the universal through our honorific definitions of the subjects of philosophical inquiry we bridge over boundaries and fuse horizons.  

I wholly support Husserl's attempt to avoid "philosophical theories in disguise."  Philosophy to be deep must be skeptical and radical. Solomon gives an enlightening example.  He writes that for Husserl "a description of consciousness is constantly endangered by the many metaphors and traditional philosophical theories that present an image of the mind as a mysterious container or stream...A philosophy that begins by taking these metaphors and theories seriously has, according to Husserl, based itself on presuppositions instead of pure description."  (4-5)  Rewriting this the way I want it:  a description of consciousness which involves insight into essences inevitably involves, when successful, an intuition of essence, which inevitably involves a metaphor.  The key is to recognizes that one metaphor is never enough and will never do forever.  It is also to remember that no metaphor is ever fully exhausted.  The best thing for philosophy to do is to take these metaphors as seriously as possible since they are the products of phenomenology, but not to take the tired, no-longer working metaphors as seriously as one once did.  Learning how to see something serious as un-serious is the bracketing move called satire or parody.   At the same time, one has to take one's powerful new metaphors seriously, at least for a time.  That is what phenomenological pure description is, contra Husserl, all about.

  

Wednesday, February 24, 2016

Neither Scientific Realism nor Skepticism but Fictionalism

This blog entry is inspired by Jay L. Garfield's 1990 essay "Epoche and Sunyata:  Skepticism East and West" Philosophy East and West, 40:3, 285-307.  I have always been attracted to skepticism, however based on my studies in aesthetics over the last forty years I find I have some serious reservation about skepticism as presented at least by Garfield and perhaps also as presented by his hero Nagarjuna although I know too little about Nagarjuna to be able to say anything definite there.  I am all for philosophical therapy as a way of curing us of "cognitive and emotional ills born of extreme metaphysical, moral, or epistemological positions," however I suspect that another type of philosophical therapy is needed to cure us of the extremes of skepticism advocated by Garfield.  Garfield wants to avoid the title of "extreme" by situating his skepticism between nihilism and scientific realism exemplified by the position of Jerry Fodor.  I don't think that anyone is seriously a nihilist insofar as no-one really rejects all values.  So I think that extremes are extreme skepticism on the one hand a and scientific realism on the other.  I prefer extreme skepticism to this form of scientific realism, but think a much more plausible position would be in-between the two.  We can call this pragmatism, but for now I will call the position I want to advocate "fictionalism."  The term "fictionalism" has been used in the past and there may be an affinity between my version and these others, but I will not explore this here.  Let's make the point in a short way first. Where skeptics, including for example Wittgenstein, Nagarunga, and Garfield reject essences and causal powers, I accept these sorts of things as quasi-real.  They are certainly real in experience.  But they are not just subjective things:  they also have a reality that extends beyond the subjective.  For example, they can be found in what John Dewey calls the "situation."

Now most of Garfield's discussion is oriented to philosophy of science, but I always start with the philosophy of art and aesthetics, and that is where I will start here.  My principle is that any philosophical theory that fails to accomodate my strongest intuitions and reasoned beliefs about art and aesthetics must fail, ast least for me, in general.  Garfield wants to argue that we need no longer speak of causal powers, for example, but that we may replace such talk with talk of regularities.  I think, however, of my recent experience of viewing of a painting by Bonnard at the Legion of Honor in San Francisco.  A fundamental part of my experience of this painting is my awareness of the fact that it was painted by Bonnard.  Regularities have no real explanatory power for me here.  What helps me understand the painting is understanding a very particular causal relation between Bonnard, a real person who lived in the 19th and early 20th century, and the painting, and also between this painting and my own experience.   I do not deny that causal nexus is extremely complex.  It may well be that the causal power of Bonnard in creating this painting, and in inspiring certain emotional and appreciative responses in me, cannot be based on anything but a kind of fiction. But, if so, this is an extremely useful and a necessary fiction.  Without it, little sense can be made of my experience or of anything for that matter.  This is not metaphysics except in the Kantian way of reconstructing metaphysics in terms that that which is necessary a priori for experience:  transcendental but not transcendent metaphysics.  My fictionalism is really a Kantianism of a certain sort.  Such things as substance, causal power, personal identity (both of Bonnard and me), and meaning are all, on this account, necessary posits for any experience whatsoever.  (This is relativized and historicized for me in a way it cannot be for Kant however.  I do not rule out that talk the language games these concepts involve may be irrelevant in a thousand years.) When we have an experience of a painting that is an authentic experience we search for a meaning, seek to understand ourselves, open to ourselves to communication from another, and listen to the unveiling of essences, as Heidegger might put it.  None of these things (meanings, selves, essences) are eternal and unchanging in the Platonic way.  None of them are entirely independent of the search to understand them.  They are quasi-real and yet they are as if real. 

Garfield thinks that appeal to to Madhyamika Buddhist philosophy, particularly to Nagarjuna will help the skeptics, particularly in distinguishing the skeptic from the nihilist.  Based on the quotes he uses, I do not think so.  Nagarjuna says "If one understands how actions are devoid of inherent existence, then he sees the suchness of actions.  When he has seen suchness, he will have eliminated ignorance, and when there is no ignorance then actions which are caused by ignorance cannot arise in him and so the results of actions such as consciousness and so forth, up to acting and death will not be experienced by him." (287)  This is not for me.  As a Deweyan pragmatist I give primary place to experience.  Sure, actions are devoid of final interpretation, and one should always try to seek beneath the surface interpretation that is currently dominant to get to something real, and yet the claim to a knowledge that transcends ordinary "ignorance" is arrogant and unsupported, or only supported by appeals to experience by those who have achieved enlightenment, which is not much help to us ordinary mortals.  The end result, in escaping action, the results of action, consciousness and experience is, as Nietzsche well observed, a denial of life.  "Suchness" might of course be interpreted as being much like what I call quasi-real essences, meanings, etc.  But searches for suchness are denials of dialogue, whereas the process of dialogue is precisely the language game that gives meaning to the search for and the existence of the quasi-real.  I applaud the Buddhist desire to abandon closed-mindedness and hatred, but am deeply skeptical of what Nagarjuna calls "elimination of wrong views." (287)  There is irony in the notion that Nagarjuna may be identified with skepticism, since his insistence that there are "right views" that are only available for those who have achieved Nirvana is the height of what Sextus Empiricus would have called dogmatism.  In one respect Nagarjuna is somewhat like Descartes: both of these philosophers brilliantly use skeptical arguments but in both cases they use them towards dogmatic conclusions, although in Nagarjuna's case the conclusion is an experience or a state of being rather than a set of propositions that are clear and distinct. The goal of fictionalism is not the achievement of peace or ataraxia (although this can be a worthy goal) but something closer to what Nietzsche called "will to power" understood in the way I understand it as will to creative action that is deep, a will not to be the "last man" as Nietzsche describes him in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Heraclitus saw it long before Nietzsche, but more on that later.

Fictionalism also takes an in-between position on "suspension of belief."  The fictionalist recognizes that belief is a complex thing and that the objects of belief are not unchanging and are perspectival.  Yet the fictionalist believes in belief.  Belief motivates creative action, even if belief is in something quasi-real. The bracketing that is needed is found in trying not to take the object of belief too seriously, as though it were really real, real in a Platonic or a factual way, real in the way that truths are supposed to be timeless, real in the way that there is only one possible correct interpretation of any meaning, real in the model of scientific truth. The myth to avoid is to take the quasi-real as really real.  But Nagarjuna buys into that as well, believing as he does in Nirvana, non-ignorance, etc.  

Garfield may argue that I am still confusing skepticism with nihilism, which he denies as "philosophical  denial of the existence of that which - at least in some sense - clearly exists" as someone who "might deny that any of our statements about external objects, about ourselves or our moral responsibility, or about the meanings of words are true or warranted..."  Garflied claims, again, that skeptics are not nihilists.  Neither is the fictionalist.  So perhaps there is meeting point here. But maybe not.  The other extreme is supposed to be "reificationism."  Reification is making something not a thing as a thing or treating it as a thing.  The trouble is that fictionalists encourage reification too, up to a point:  for a fictionalist there is value to be gained from thinking about persons as having essential natures, of essences as being things that can be understood and explained, as causal powers as being the source of actions and created things, and so forth.  For example, we need to think that there is an essence of art in order to engage in a Socratic dialogue concerning that essence, or concerning art and what it is, which itself is a way to develop a new metaphor by which we may understand and develop future actions in the realm of art.  Only by debating about what art is can the future of art be assured. The quest for essences in all of these domains, personal identity, causal powers, meaning, etc.,  is the fount of creativity, something that both the dogmatists and the skeptics seek, usually unconsciously, to turn off.  

The skeptical response is to defend "the practices the nihilist seeks to undermine" by not grounding these practices on the kinds of things the dogmatists posit.  Yet the practices mean nothing if they do not have ideals.  The search for understanding of a text, a search for its meaning, posits that meaning as an ideal.  Fictionalism, or one could call it quasi-realism, does not deny ideals.  Each product of the quest for meaning is an actualization of the posited ideal. The ideal itself has no content or at least none aside from that of its many actualizations.  Further, the practice of creating a work of art that has meaning is meaningless if one does not posit meanings at least as quasi-real.  

According to Garfield the reificationist like Descartes "argues that experience presupposes a persistent self as its subject."  The fictionalist joins the skeptic in denying this, and yet experience presupposed an idea of the self and the idea of a search for the self, an attempt to answer the question "who am I" which the skeptic denies.  That answer can be better or worse, can change over time, can sometimes be very powerful and then wane in power.  The standard of truth for the fictionalist is pragmatist.  

The nihilist according to Garfield believes that there is no self or at least no self-knowledge.  This too is false.  The skeptical solution says Garfield is to hold that the self is a "forensic concept" and "conventional." (290) This is better, but leaves us in a sea of the conventional, denuding the Socratic or Heraclitean quest for the logos of any value.  To seek out the self is in no way to seek out something conventional.  To seek the self is more to break the bonds of the conventional.   Similarly Garfield holds that the skeptical solution to the problem of meaning "requires us to note that word meaning and the assertability of correctness regarding word use rests not upon [special semantic facts] but upon a network of social conventions regarding word use."  (290)  The fictionalist replies that that is not enough.  The network of social conventions regarding word use only provides us with material needed in the Socratic quest for meaning.  It is the background against which the real action occurs. It is not sufficient, for example to answer the question "what is art?" simply by saying that are is something to be understood in terms of the social conventions regarding how we use that word. That tells us nothing about how to move forward.  It is essentially a shallow solution to the problem.  It looks only to what is now, not to what is possible or necessary.   It tells us no story we can live with any authenticity.  It refuses to play the language game of seeking out the hidden, if we may combine Heraclitus and Wittgenstein in an unorthodox way.  

Finally, the skeptic, says Garflied, understands causal powers as replaced by understanding causal explanation as "grounded in regularities."  I would suggest that although this might work well for the natural sciences, it makes nonsense of the idea that in appreciating a work by Bonnard I am appreciated something created by Bonnard i.e. by way of a special causal power he had. Plato's story in the Ion of the magnets of inspiration going from the Muse to Bonnard to me makes better sense of my experience than "grounded in regularities."  The reificationist is closer to the truth than the skeptic in saying that, causal powers involve a "necessary connection" that explains.  I would only insist that the necessity is relativized and bracketed:  it is necessity within a perspective or relative to a situation, not absolute necessity.

The skeptic engages in suspension of judgment. The fictionalist, contrary to refusing to assent to a position while refusing to assert its negation would assent heartily to a position provisionally, hopefully in the act of creating that position by creating a powerful new metaphor that serves as a basis of understanding and creative action, followed by, later, for other purposes, or as an experiment, heartily assenting to its opposite, while constructing a new metaphor that allows this move to generate future creative activity.

So the fictionalist heartily opposes the position Garfield adopts from Sextus:  "that the external world is not more than what we observe, that personal identity is not more than an aggregation of experiences and capacities, that meaning is not more than convention, that causation is not more than regularity."  (291)  For the fictionalist there is more in every case, although not as much as the dogmatist or the scientific realist of Fodor's sort would hold. Oddly, the fictionalist agrees with Garfield that "Custom and the particular practices of the arts and sciences...yield all the knowledge, certainty, and justification we need in order to navigate the world, identify ourselves and others, speak intelligently, and explain natural phenomena" but with the proviso that all of these things already operate according to language games that have a philosophical side, that seek out something quasi-real, that seek to create new metaphors of understanding.   

The disagreement relates to how one approaches everyday life.  Garfield's skeptic (quoting from Hallie) says that in living undogmatically we observe the requirements of everyday life which are "the guidance of nature, the compulsion of feelings, the tradition of laws and customs, and the instruction of the arts."  Notice how static this all is, as though everyday life never included creative activity, as though it was nothing more than following convention.  Don't rock the boat is the motto of this "everyday life." Whereas, again, this is just background for the real business of life, creative making.

Garfield says that "to understand the conventional as conventional, and as empty of any reality or foundation beyond convention, is the goal of philosophical inquiry."  I say that to understand the conventional as full of potential as more than what it appears to be, as gateway to that which we experience as the most real not, as something foundational only in the sense that a new powerful metaphor is an inspiration moment that provides the beginning of new valuable processes, is the true goal of philosophical inquiry.  


  











Thursday, August 6, 2015

Is object-oriented ontology good for artists?

I have read that many artists are intrigued by Graham Harman's object-oriented ontology or object-oriented metaphysics.  Having just read his The Quadruple Object (Washington, USA:  Zero Books, 2011), I would say they could do better.  Harman's theory is fascinating, but deeply flawed.  Mainly he is inspired by Husserl, Heidegger and Whitehead.  Although he rejects Husserl's idealism, his theory inherits some of the weaknesses of Husserl's phenomenology.  Most importantly it suffers from a lack of the kind of insight a close reading of Dewey would provide.  Harman makes some of the same criticisms of traditional empiricists that Dewey made, and yet finds himself committed to a Cartesian-like dualism.  This is the fatal flaw of the theory.  Some might find Harman attractive simply because his theory is not anthropocentric. But there are other ways to go against anthropocentrism. Sometimes Harman worries that he might be considered a crackpot. Although I take much of what he says quite seriously and admire him for the scope of his thought, there is a crackpot dimension to it. Anyone who claims that he has isolated exactly ten ontological categories and then goes on to explicate the system in terms of the relations of suits in a deck of cards, as Harmon does in his ninth chapter, is hard to take seriously.  Or, to put it another way, Harman takes himself way too seriously.  

I was introduced to Harman by an article in the current issue of Art Forum, "Those Objects of Desire" by Andrew Cole (Summer 2015). Cole is critical of Harman although from a different perspective than I am.  He basically thinks that Harman has failed to see how Kantian his theory really is, and that personifying such objects as commodities runs up against criticisms already raised by Marx.  Although Cole makes some good points, my response draws more from the American Pragmatist tradition.
     
One way to test Harman's theory, which is supposed to cover all sorts of objects, is to see how it works in relation to a work of art. Heidegger himself in "The Origin of the Work of Art" developed his notion of the thingliness of a thing in relation to works of art, famously a painting by Van Gogh of shoes and a Greek Temple. Harman argues that all objects have two sides, one side being the real object, something much like Kant's thing-in-itself, and the other being what he calls the sensual object, i.e. the object-as-experienced. (It is not clear whether the thinks that the sensual dog and the real dog are two sides of the same dog or two completely different things, although usually he talks as though they are completely different things.)  He believes that real things are completely autonomous and do not depend in any way on relations to other things. This raises many concerns.   Use our example of a work of art. It is impossible to understand a painting by Edward Hopper, for example, without understanding something about the context in which it was created.  

I should put my Deweyan assumptions to the fore before going on. (David L. Hildebrand has written an excellent book that explains how Dewey avoids the very dilemmas that Harman finds himself in: Beyond Realism and Antirealism:  John Dewey and the Neopragmatists, Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2003).   Rather than saying that we should base our metaphysics on isolated or autonomous objects, Dewey would stress experience, although experience understood in his own way.  Dewey is no subjectivist or idealist.  On his account, experience arises out of the interaction between ourselves as live creatures and our environments.  Because Dewey takes a naturalist perspective he does not rank humans as anything special.  Animals and even plants can interact as live creatures with their environments, although the nature of their experience would be quite different from that of humans.  Nonetheless, Dewey is not guilty of a mechanistic worldview typical of previous naturalist philosophers, or of the simplistic approach to empiricism found in Locke and Hume.

For Dewey, and me, the live creature, say a human, confronts an object, say a watch, directly.  Rejecting dualism, Dewey would not accept that the watch that we confront sensuously is to be distinguished from the real watch.  There are, of course, many manifestations of the watch, many ways in which it appears to us. These manifestations are all ways we confront the watch. 

One of the ways in which Harman's philosophy is both anti-art and anti-aesthetic is the way in which he discusses sensuous qualities. Harman likes to talk about these qualities as "gems, glitter, and confetti of extraneous detail" (25).  The aesthetic aspect of experience is to be degraded to the merely pretty.  Following Husserl, he sees sensuous objects as "frosted over with accidental features" irrelevant to their identity.  Again, as he understands Husserl, the objects of our world are "heavily adorned with frivolous decorations and surface-effects."  Whereas Harman sees these sensuous qualities as superfluous, the everyday aesthetics position I advocate, approaches them as rich in meaning.  Moreover, from a pragmatist perspective, these meanings are played out in the activity of the live creature.  The sensuous qualities may be pursued to fulfillment, for example, in "an experience."  

Not to be overly negative, I want to give credit to Harman for stressing one point which he derives from Husserl.  He writes:  "what we encounter in experience are unified objects, not isolated points of quality.  Indeed...the individual qualities of things are already imbued with the style or feel of the thing as a whole.  Even if the exact hue of red in my apple can also be found in a nearby shirt or can of spraypaint, the colors will have a different feel in each of these cases, since they are bonded to the thing to which they belong."  (11)  This seems right, although at the same time one should take into account Goodman's idea that objects can exemplify certain qualities, thereby indirectly referencing all other instances of that quality.

Harman is opposed to something called "correlationism" which holds that "we cannot think of world without humans or humans without world."  He is right to reject this view.  We can certainly think a world unperceived by humans.  However, whatever we think and whatever we experience is, by necessity, thought or experienced by humans.  We cannot expunge that aspect of experience.  We start from out own positions in life and in philosophy.  There is a real world, but the world we experience is one that has us at the center and is experienced in our terms.  For example, any description we make of such a world is a description necessarily in a language of human making, with terms and meanings that carry out contribution.  So, although correlationism is false, it does point to a certain truth that Harman ignores.

Harman is also interested in Husserl's notion of eidetic features of the sensual object, features that make up the eidos of the object. Harman follows Husserl in thinking that real eidetic qualities "can only be the target of intellectual and not sensuous intuition."  The radical division of intellectual and sensuous intuition is the source of yet another problem:  this is another dualism that needs to be undercut.  All intellectual intuition is in part sensual and all sensual intuition is in part intellectual.  I have written about essences elsewhere and will have more to say about them in the future. Suffice it here to say that essences on my view are emergent from the activity of searching for essences.  Essences are not eternal and unchanging but emergent.  Nor are they solely intellectual objects. Moreover, they may be deeply connected to the particular and the accidental.  Some quality in all of its particularity can exemplify.  We can say for example that this particular thing standing for universal, but I think that sometimes it is deeper than that.   When a particular thing stands for a universal it does not do so in such a way as to lose its particular nature. 

Harman's object centered metaphysics is based as much on his interpretation of Heidegger as on his interpretation of Husserl.  In particular he focuses on Heidegger's understanding of a hammer. He also has his own understanding of what Heidegger means by the four-fold, which I will discuss in a future post.  I think that Heidegger's understanding of a hammer in Being and Time is deeply flawed, and this is the basis for many problems I also find in Harman.  Heidegger says that hammers are usually present to us only when they fail.  This idea undercuts (and is in deep opposition to) the entire aesthetics of design.  When I handle a hammer I am aware of its design.  It is satisfying when it feels good in my hand, looks good, and does its job well.  The awareness of the hammer I have when it is broken is different in kind from that:  it is an awareness of a functional ugliness.  But when a hammer works well, looks good, etc. it is a thing of beauty, more so of course for a carpenter than for me.  Heidegger and Harman just exclude from consciousness the aesthetically positive value of the hammer.

Let Vico intrude here.   Here is a quote from wikipedia on Vico:  "Vico is best known for his verum factum principle, first formulated in 1710 as part of his De antiquissima Italorum sapientia, ex linguae latinae originibus eruenda (1710) ("On the most ancient wisdom of the Italians, unearthed from the origins of the Latin language"). The principle states that truth is verified through creation or invention and not, as per Descartes, through observation: “The criterion and rule of the true is to have made it. Accordingly, our clear and distinct idea of the mind cannot be a criterion of the mind itself, still less of other truths. For while the mind perceives itself, it does not make itself.”"   Vico and Dewey are on the same page here:  Descartes, Husserl, Heidegger and Harman are on the other page.  We know the hammer through its creation and through using it in the act of creation.  Knowledge is connected with the live creature doing things in the world. Knowledge is an aspect of experience.  The hammer by no means functions behind or beneath experience.  Heidegger should have known better since he is the one who stressed the way in which technology has made us close our ears to Being.  It is technology when treated in a merely mechanical way that causes the hammer to recede.  Things lose the shiny sparkly quality of aliveness in a world which is mechanized.  Heidegger's and Harman's philosophy of the receding hammer is just a sign of the very concept of the thing as mere object of use that Heidegger critiques elsewhere.

Harman's Heideggerian talk of hammers withdrawing into "subterranean background, enacting their reality in the cosmos without appearing in the least" is offensive mystification.  In talking about what lies behind all phenomena, Heidegger and Harman go in the opposite direction of Dewey, since Dewey rejects precisely this dualism, the phenomena/noumena dualism that goes back to Kant, but even further to Descartes and ultimately Plato.  

The sentence "conscious awareness makes up only a tiny portion of our lives" (37) seems innocuous at first, perhaps trivially true, and yet what sense can really be made of it.  Even when engaging in psychoanalysis everything that happens to me is in consciousness: I become conscious of unconscious desires.  Moreover, the other manifestations of those unconscious desires also happen, for example in my Freudian slips, in daily life.  Conscious awareness makes up most of our lives, not a tiny portion...we are the lives we live, the lives we experience, our conscious lives.

Harman and Heidegger say that I usually fail to notice my eyeglasses.  In a way that is true.  If my attention is directed elsewhere from my eyeglasses I do not notice them: they are on the very edge of my consciousness.  However it is easy to redirect my attention to my eyeglasses, and this does not require that they be broken or even maladjusted.  I can attend more or less to my eyeglasses and to their various features, for example how well they work and how good they look.  Although the idea that tools "withdraw in order to be ready-to-hand quite authentically" just seems implausible when I think about my glasses, Heidegger at least recognizes that tools exist in terms of relations to other pieces of equipment, often in a system of interrelated things, for example ink and inkstand. 

The absurdity of Harman's position has be found in the sentence:  "the world in itself is made of realities withdrawing from all conscious access."  (38)  The realities we encounter in life, for example my glasses, do not withdraw from conscious access.  If I want to have conscious access to my glasses I simply attend to them.  When I lose my glasses I can find them:  that is because they are still available.

Following Heidegger, Harman says "an earthquake calls my attention to the solid ground on which I rely..."  I have been through a major earthquake, the Loma Prieta earthquake in Northern California.   I was in my backyard when it happened.   It drew my attention to the way in which the ground, which I formerly saw as solid, could take another form entirely, something more like a wave at sea.  Retroactively I could think of how my assumptions about the earth or the "solid" ground and what it could do were naive.  The solid ground is not always solid.  At the same time, it is easy for me to attend to the solidity of ground in non-earthquake times, for example when I am looking for a good foundation for a ladder.  What does it mean to "silently depend" on the solidity of the ground? 

Harman has a strange way of combining what seems to be common sense with nonsense.  He says "There will always be aspects of these phenomena [for example the solid floor of my home] that elude me; further surprises might always be in store.  No matter how hard I work to become conscious of things, environing conditions still remain of which I never become fully aware.  When I stare at a river, wolf....I do not grasp the whole of their reality."  Who could disagree!  And then "This reality slips from view into a perpetually veiled underworld., leaving me with only the most frivolous simulacra of these entities."  (39)  What sense can possibly be made of this idea?   It must mean something more than the mere truisms that preceded it.  

For Harman there are only two kinds of objects:  "the real object that withdraws from all experience, and the sensual object that exists only in experience."  (49)  The alternative position is that there is only one kind of object, the real object which is also the sensual object, i.e. the object that I sense.  Although we can imagine stuff that never can be experienced we can only deal with the world as experienced, and even the most hypothetical and intellectualized or fantastic objects are experienced in some way, for example unicorns are experienced by way of unicorn pictures even though it would be wrong to say that there are animals rightly called unicorns.