Theaetetus is an aporetic dialogue. There is no final answer given to the question "What is knowledge?" Although it seems that knowledge must be justified belief plus an account, none of the accounts of account pass muster. People generally assume that the answer is to be found either in (1) the notion of apprehension of the Forms as suggested in the Republic and other dialogues, or (2) the process of division in terms of species and genera described in later dialogues such as the Sophist, Philebus and Statesman, or (3) some sort of causal explanation as suggested in the Phaedo. I want to suggest that there is internal evidence within the Theaetetus for another solution.
However let's begin outside the Theaetetus with what we might think is required for a knowledge that is deep. Deep knowledge in our culture is often referred to as wisdom. We will distinguish here between having wisdom in general and having wisdom in something. We will deal with wisdom in general later. To have wisdom in something it is not sufficient just to be able to name all of the parts or even to give a definition of a thing of that sort. Deep knowledge requires being able to make predictions in that domain and being able to solve problems. Deep knowledge of car mechanics would require that we know about the parts and how they function in relation to each other. An even deeper knowledge of car mechanics would require knowledge of how cars respond to surrounding conditions, for example driver handling, road conditions and weather. Deep knowledge requires knowing something as an organic whole AND knowing how this thing functions in larger wholes to which it belongs. If we are trying to understand a car it is not sufficient just to know the definition of "car" and whether this car meets this definition. Nor is it sufficient to know this plus knowing all of the car's parts or even knowing all of the cars parts and their functional relations with each other.
Deep knowledge that is wisdom also requires contextualizing ones knowledge within the wider domain of culture and life itself. I person could have deep knowledge of torture on one level, i.e. in knowing the techniques, how to get confessions, etc., but fail to recognize the ultimate inability to synthesize this practice into the operations of a good society. So even an expert in torture would fail to have wisdom in the wider sense.
All of this I think, so far, is implicit in Plato. Another problem however is one that he raises and never adequately addresses. It is the problem of knowing particulars, for example knowing a particular person, say the person Theaetetus. (I am thinking of 208d-210b) To really know a person, let us hypothesize, is to know his or her essence. But Plato never talks about essences of particulars. This is a deep problem for Plato nonetheless. The philosopher-king, as described in the Republic, should be able to apply the knowledge he has gained from leaving the cave and perceiving the Forms to the world. But this requires being able to see, for example, the Good, in particulars.
The problem is that in order to really see the Good as it is present in the particular one must not only know the Good but also know the particular, and to know the particular is to know that which makes it unique, what distinguishes it from every other particular. The philosopher-king will not be able to do his job unless he is able to to do this. Similarly, following the Phaedrus, the rhetorician needs to be able to know his or particular audience in order to fit argument to audience. It helps to break possible audiences into types. But, as we are finding today with medicine, an individual-based approach has its own advantages. Moreover, the relationship between the Lover and the Beloved, or between the wise Teacher and his Student, is one that requires awareness of the particular. Socrates himself in the Theaetetus recognizes this as part of the role of the philosophical midwife: to deal with the particular idea that the subject gives birth to, and to match the particular student with his most appropriate teacher.
This is where aesthetics comes in, although in a way that, at first seems not to much involve the arts. (Later I will point out that it does very much involve them.) Two points need to be made. First, Plato seems on first sight to be the great anti-aesthetic philosopher. For example in the Republic he attacks lovers of sights and sounds. He consistently attacks most of the arts, for example in book X of the Republic. And yet aesthetics does play an important role in Plato, mainly by way of his erotics. In Diotima's theory of love as set forth in the Symposium Diotima requires that the philosopher begin with love of a particular body. This is followed by love a particular soul. Now it may be true that all of this is forgotten when one gets to beauty itself. But also remember that the process of moving up the ladder, as also reiterated in the Phaedrus through the allegory of the wings, requires both the Lover and the Beloved. They stimulate each other through appreciation of the beauty of the Beloved and the reflection of that in the Lover. They also stimulate each other through their shared discourses about virtue, i.e. about the excellences of things Plato's system just does not work without appreciation of beauty in particulars. Even when the Lover perceives the vast sea of beauty he perceives this, presumably, as a sea of particular things that are beautiful.
The Theaetetus starts off with questioning whether knowledge is perception. The term translated by "perception" is "aisthesis" from which we get the term aesthetics. This path to knowledge is ultimately rejected. But one has to wonder whether Plato is fully behind this rejection. Some of the arguments are just too quick. Perhaps he believes that perception does play an essential role in knowledge even though it can never be the whole story.
Moreover, when Plato describes, in the famous interlude, the philosopher as someone who, like Thales, just does not know where he is going, one thinks that this is precisely not the sort of person one would want for a philosopher-king. How could Plato be serious about the philosopher as described by Socrates in the interlude? This "philosopher" is incapable of handling himself in court or in the political realm. This would not be a person to make the pilot of the ship of state. There must be some irony here.
So, cutting to the quick, Platonic interpretation aside, here is my take on deep knowledge that can be called wisdom. Such knowledge is justified truth belief where the justification requires not only definition, classification, predictability, taking into account functional relations between parts, taking into account relations between the object known and surrounding context, but also knowledge of the essences of particulars, a kind of knowledge which is essentially aesthetic.
Earlier I suggested that the arts do not play a role in this. But in fact they do. Who are the experts in aesthetic cognition (a term first developed by the originator of aesthetics, Baumgarten)? They are the artists. Sophocles, a great artist, focuses not only on Oedipus as representing man but also as a particular person. Ironically, this works best for us in the audience because we too are particular humans as well as being human. Paying attention to the particular requires paying attention to sensual characteristics, i.e. the particular nature of Oedipus who does particular things that can be seen and recounted, for example putting out his eyes. Art engages us in the universal in the particular, and this distinguishes art from philosophy and science.
Wisdom goes beyond philosophy and science to gives us also knowledge of the universal in the particular. It has, therefore, a deeply practical or pragmatic dimension. Again, the philosopher- king will only be of use if he is able to perceive the Good as manifested in the particular thing and this requires knowing the particular thing. In short, wisdom requires synthesis of Art and Science, neither, by itself, being sufficient.
All of this is inspired by something said by Socrates as the end of the dialogue at 208d to 209d. Notice that we return here to a point at the very beginning of the dialogue which, in fact. did refer briefly to a visual art, and, in fact, refers first to music and then to visual art: "If you and I had each had a lyre, and Theodorus had told us that they were both similarly tuned, should we have taken his word for it straightaway? Or should we have tried to find out if he was speaking with any expert knowledge of music?" (144e Levett and Burnyeat). If then we are interested in faces being alike, for example Theaetetus and Socrates, we should go to someone with knowledge of drawing. And Theodorus is no artist, he is a Geometer. (145a) One would think that, on some accounts of Plato, Theodorus, being a Geometer, would be given some priority over the artist, for the Geometer has a better understanding of circles than a drawer of circles. But this is not the case. Somehow, the imitator of the bed who draws the bed, the very person who is degraded in the Republic, at last gains some respect here.
So, now at the end of the end of the dialogue we have a paradox. As Socrates puts it, "if you get hold of the difference that distinguishes a thing from everything else, then, so some people say, you will have got an account of it." Yet "so long as it is some common feature that you grasp, your account will be about all those things which have this in common." (208d) This poses, I believe, a deep problem with the theory that knowledge is true belief plus an account in terms the Forms. An account of the difference that marks out the uniqueness of an individual like Theaetetus should be something that is ineffable: it must not be in language since language always deals with the common. Or, alternatively, it can be in language, but language understood as being so flexible that the meaning of a word can be different in every case in which it is used. (I think this is the better option.)
Socrates' problem with this account of account is "how...did it come about that you were the object of my judgment and nobody else?" (209b1) Even when we mention the very visual characteristics that Theaetetus shared with Socrates, snub nose and prominent eyes, we have not distinguished him from everyone else because we have not distinguished him from Socrates. So Socrates asks Theaetetus, "Shall I even then be judging you any more than myself or anyone who is like that?" (209c1)
Then Socrates says ""It will not...be Theaetetus who is judged in my mind until this snub-nosedness of yours has left imprinted and established in me a record that is different in some way from the other snub-nosednesses I have seen...." (209c4) "and this will remind me, if I meet you tomorrow, and make me judge correctly about you," i.e. that you are indeed Theaetetus. (209c6) Isn't it interesting that this sort of talk takes us back to the discussions of the wax and aviary analogies which were brought up in relation to the issue of memory which was itself brought up in response to the defense of the perception theory of knowledge, that perception includes not only immediate perception but also remembered perceptions? The aesthetic theory of knowledge had been rejected, but now it comes back when talking about an account, and most importantly when talking about the last and therefore most viable account of account found at the end of the dialogue.
Yet Socrates draws out the argument in a different direction, saying, "then correct judgment must be concerned with differentness of what it is about," which leads to the idea that in correct judgment we already have an idea of how a thing differs from other things and so we do not need an addition of an account in terms of knowledge of differences. And if adding an account means getting to know the differences, not merely judging them correctly, then we are absurdly defining knowledge in terms of knowledge. And that is the end of the dialogue.
But what I have concluded is that there is an essential aesthetic component to knowledge, an aesthetic component which also contains an erotic component, and thus is essentially connected both to the love of beauty and to loving relations between humans. That is, I do not think Plato's whole story about knowledge can be told (a story which I find pretty close to being correct) unless the erotic and the epistemological dialogues are synthesized.
Showing posts with label wisdom. Show all posts
Showing posts with label wisdom. Show all posts
Thursday, November 15, 2018
Tuesday, October 14, 2014
Mindfulness and Everyday Aesthetics
I had my Introduction to Philosophy students read Thich Nhat Hanh's The Miracle of Mindfulness tr. Mobi Ho, Boston, Beacon Press, 1987. I have long thought of Buddhism as having possible implications for an aesthetics of everyday life. Nhat Hanh's book is largely a meditation on "The Foundation of Mindfulness" or the Satipatthana Sutta translated from the Pali by Nyanasatta. (Please forgive not including the proper marks on these names.) Arnold Berleant, an American aesthetician whom I will be commenting on at the upcoming American Society for Aesthetics national meeting in San Antonio, has provided us with a series of books outlining his "aesthetics of engagement." His notion is that aesthetics should be understood as closely allied with the original meaning of "aesthesis": that it involves all sense experience. So one idea is that proper aesthetic experience involves paying close attention to experience, and in particular, sensuous experience. This would ally Berleant with Buddhism. "Engagement" is like "mindfulness," although there are also some differences. Berleant downplays the element of pleasure in aesthetic experience: one can also have negative aesthetic experiences. Buddhism (and I am only thinking here of how Buddhism is expressed in The Miracle of Mindfulness) is somewhat different. That is, Buddhism seems to hold nothing to be ultimately negative. One is even encouraged to meditate on the decay our bodies will undergo after death. Another difference between the two is that "mindfulness," although it does get us to appreciate the things of everyday life in much the way everyday aesthetics does, does involve something similar to what Westerners have called "contemplation": and Berleant rejects the contemplative mode of experience as central to aesthetics. For him, engagement entails bodily engagement but not detached engagement. He associates contemplation with disinterestedness and "the aesthetic attitude," all three of which he rejects. Still, Berleant, who is also an important aesthetician of nature, would surely approve of the following quote from Nhat Hanh: "I like to walk alone on country paths, rice plants and wild grasses on both sides, putting each foot down on the earth in mindfulness, knowing that I walk on the wondrous earth. In such moments, existence is a miraculous and mysterious reality. People usually consider walking on water or in thin air a miracle. But I think the real miracle is not to walk either on water or in thin air, but to walk on earth. Every day we are engaged in a miracle which we don't even recognize: a blue sky, white clouds, green leaves, the black, curious eyes of a child- our own two eyes. All is a miracle." (12) Perhaps, however, the language of "mysterious" and "miracle" would be too religious for his taste. I do not find any problem with the language as such.
Of course mindfulness can be said to go beyond aesthetics. I often wonder where aesthetics leaves off and the practical (on the one hand) or the religious (on the other) begins. In response to a complaint that a work life does not allow these woodsy rambles, Nhat Hanh says, "keep your attention focused on the work, be alert and read to handle ably and intelligently any situation which may arise - this is mindfulness. There is no reason why mindfulness should be different from focusing all one's attention on one's work, to be alert and to be using one's best judgment." (14) Here there is no emphasis on the senses in the way we found in his country walk. Paying attention to the work at hand may even involve not paying attention to aesthetic qualities. So, for this and other reasons, I would not want to prematurely identify mindfulness with aesthetic engagement in Berleant's sense. There is an affinity, but mindfulness has other dimensions. Is a life devoted to an taking an aesthetic point of view (except in those cases where an ethical or a purely practical point of view is necessary) truly valid? (One thinks here of the question of Walter Pater's aestheticism).
A lot of the idea of mindfulness is based on methods of breathing. Paying attention to your breathing may give us aesthetic pleasure, but the main purpose seems to be as a method for achieving certain goals. One could argue, of course, that mindful breathing is itself an art and that, to be done rightly, it requires attending to certain aesthetic qualities. Nhat Hanh writes: "Your breathing should flow gracefully, like a river..." Moreover, the mastery of breathing is also art-like in that it involves control, much like the musician's control of an instrument and of the sounds it produces, and of course this is associated with the aesthetic quality of harmony, in this case "inner harmony." Thus one can speak of a positive aesthetic dimension to the results of breathing mindfully: "To master our breath is to be in control of our bodies and minds. Each time we find ourselves dispersed and find it difficult to gain control of ourselves by different means, the method of watching the breath should always be used." (20) There may also be an aesthetic dimension to the "one-ness of body and mind," which is made possible by this disciplined breathing. (23)
It is not seated meditation, however, that draws the everyday aesthetician to think about Buddhistic mindfulness but the extension of meditation to everyday life. Nhat Hanh most famously refers to mindfulness in washing dishes: "While washing the dishes one should only be washing the dishes, which means that while washing the dishes one should be completely aware of the fact that one is washing the dishes." (4) This could be misinterpreted by a Western philosopher to mean that one should just concentrate on the truth of the proposition, "I am washing dishes," which, I think, would be quite wrong. Rather, one should be conscious of one's every action in washing dishes while washing dishes. Maybe one should be conscious of the dishes too (as they are part of the total experience). Nhat Hanh also observes that if you are focusing on the cup of tea that you might have after this unpleasant task of washing dishes you are not fully focusing on the moment.
Sometimes I do not know how far the affinities go between everyday aesthetics and Buddhistic mindfulness. Nhat Hanh quotes a religious community as saying: "one should not lose oneself in mind dispersion or in one's surrounding. Learn to practice breathing in order to regain control of body and mind...." (22) Is there something wrong with aesthetic appreciation of one's surroundings? Or is this just that the task at hand, i.e. meditation, involves detachment from aesthetic experience of one's surroundings? If the sole issue is self-control to achieve "concentration and wisdom" then is the aesthetic somehow lost in the process? Or is it gained back at the end of the game?
Sometimes, mindfulness methods seem directly relevant to aesthetic experience. Nhat Hanh describes a day of mindfulness and says, "Drink your tea slowly and reverently, as if it is the axis on which the whole earth revolves - slowly, evenly, without rushing toward the future. Live the actual moment. Only the actual moment is life." This sounds like the pathway to aestheticism as well. Slow drinking of the tea would allow one to concentrate on its aesthetic qualities, and also the aesthetic qualities of one's own actions. The aesthetic demand is to notice the now...to live, as is also the demand of mindfulness.
One of the results of meditation is to "achieve inner peace and joy." (35) These can be seen as aesthetic qualities, although not of external objects but of one's own mind. Finding "peace and joy in this very moment" seems to be a requirement for a certain kind of aesthetic life as well. So, perhaps, the methods of mindfulness are not aesthetic in themselves but have an important aesthetic result.
One thing I have trouble with, not so much because of my commitment to aesthetics as because of my commitment to the sort of philosophy that goes back to Socrates, is the relatively negative attitude expressed towards thought, language and even conversation. If the goal of mindfulness is to not think through a thought but to simply acknowledge one's thoughts and then let them go then thoughtful exploration of ideas, philosophical dialogue, and thoughtful philosophical writing, become impossible. If the goal of conversation is not to concentrate on what is being said and on its implications but rather (as Nhat Hanh portrays it) on not being distracted from one's breathing by attending to the conversation, then it would be hard for a Socratic philosopher to see mindfulness as something that takes over much of one's life. Time that could be spent in dialogue or in talking, thinking or writing would have to be sacrificed to time spent in not doing those things. And this is always the dilemma for the Socrates-minded philosopher in thinking about mindfulness: which sort of wisdom do we want the most, the sort that comes through what we would call mindful dialogue or the sort that comes through mindful breathing and sitting?
However, the aesthetic payoff may be worth the price. Nhat Hanh writes that, with mindfulness, "Drinking a cup of tea becomes a direct and wondrous experience in which the distinction between subject and object no longer exists." (42) One thinks of Nietzsche's concept of the Dionysian which also results in ecstatic oneness. Yet,, Nhat Hanh contrasts the oneness with the cup of tea with "the illusory divisions of separate selves, created by concepts and language" and it is "concepts and language" that provides the path to the Socratic-style wisdom even in Nietzsche...there is no getting around it. (42)
Perhaps the ideal of philosophy would be to find a way to combine these two forms of wisdom.
Nhat Hanh stresses the interdependence of all things, and one thinks of Hegel. Certainly if one takes the path of contextualism in aesthetics (where the aesthetic object is only fully experienced when one understands its full context) one does think a lot of interdependence. But he also says: "This meditation is not a discursive reflection on a philosophy of interdependence. It is a penetration of mind into mind itself, using one's concentrative power to reveal the real nature of the object itself." (45) Is there room for philosophy then? Well, there might be, for Nhat Hanh sounds a lot like Edmund Husserl in his description of phenomenological method.
In any case, the way Nhat Hanh plays this out can be of some value to the aesthetician. Especially useful is his discussion of experiencing a table. "The table's existence is possible due to the existence of things which we might call 'the non-table world': the forest where the wood grew and was cut, the carpenter, the iron ore which became the nails and screws....If you grasp the table's reality then you see that in the table itself are present all those things which we normally think of as the nontable world."
Of course mindfulness can be said to go beyond aesthetics. I often wonder where aesthetics leaves off and the practical (on the one hand) or the religious (on the other) begins. In response to a complaint that a work life does not allow these woodsy rambles, Nhat Hanh says, "keep your attention focused on the work, be alert and read to handle ably and intelligently any situation which may arise - this is mindfulness. There is no reason why mindfulness should be different from focusing all one's attention on one's work, to be alert and to be using one's best judgment." (14) Here there is no emphasis on the senses in the way we found in his country walk. Paying attention to the work at hand may even involve not paying attention to aesthetic qualities. So, for this and other reasons, I would not want to prematurely identify mindfulness with aesthetic engagement in Berleant's sense. There is an affinity, but mindfulness has other dimensions. Is a life devoted to an taking an aesthetic point of view (except in those cases where an ethical or a purely practical point of view is necessary) truly valid? (One thinks here of the question of Walter Pater's aestheticism).
A lot of the idea of mindfulness is based on methods of breathing. Paying attention to your breathing may give us aesthetic pleasure, but the main purpose seems to be as a method for achieving certain goals. One could argue, of course, that mindful breathing is itself an art and that, to be done rightly, it requires attending to certain aesthetic qualities. Nhat Hanh writes: "Your breathing should flow gracefully, like a river..." Moreover, the mastery of breathing is also art-like in that it involves control, much like the musician's control of an instrument and of the sounds it produces, and of course this is associated with the aesthetic quality of harmony, in this case "inner harmony." Thus one can speak of a positive aesthetic dimension to the results of breathing mindfully: "To master our breath is to be in control of our bodies and minds. Each time we find ourselves dispersed and find it difficult to gain control of ourselves by different means, the method of watching the breath should always be used." (20) There may also be an aesthetic dimension to the "one-ness of body and mind," which is made possible by this disciplined breathing. (23)
It is not seated meditation, however, that draws the everyday aesthetician to think about Buddhistic mindfulness but the extension of meditation to everyday life. Nhat Hanh most famously refers to mindfulness in washing dishes: "While washing the dishes one should only be washing the dishes, which means that while washing the dishes one should be completely aware of the fact that one is washing the dishes." (4) This could be misinterpreted by a Western philosopher to mean that one should just concentrate on the truth of the proposition, "I am washing dishes," which, I think, would be quite wrong. Rather, one should be conscious of one's every action in washing dishes while washing dishes. Maybe one should be conscious of the dishes too (as they are part of the total experience). Nhat Hanh also observes that if you are focusing on the cup of tea that you might have after this unpleasant task of washing dishes you are not fully focusing on the moment.
Sometimes I do not know how far the affinities go between everyday aesthetics and Buddhistic mindfulness. Nhat Hanh quotes a religious community as saying: "one should not lose oneself in mind dispersion or in one's surrounding. Learn to practice breathing in order to regain control of body and mind...." (22) Is there something wrong with aesthetic appreciation of one's surroundings? Or is this just that the task at hand, i.e. meditation, involves detachment from aesthetic experience of one's surroundings? If the sole issue is self-control to achieve "concentration and wisdom" then is the aesthetic somehow lost in the process? Or is it gained back at the end of the game?
Sometimes, mindfulness methods seem directly relevant to aesthetic experience. Nhat Hanh describes a day of mindfulness and says, "Drink your tea slowly and reverently, as if it is the axis on which the whole earth revolves - slowly, evenly, without rushing toward the future. Live the actual moment. Only the actual moment is life." This sounds like the pathway to aestheticism as well. Slow drinking of the tea would allow one to concentrate on its aesthetic qualities, and also the aesthetic qualities of one's own actions. The aesthetic demand is to notice the now...to live, as is also the demand of mindfulness.
One of the results of meditation is to "achieve inner peace and joy." (35) These can be seen as aesthetic qualities, although not of external objects but of one's own mind. Finding "peace and joy in this very moment" seems to be a requirement for a certain kind of aesthetic life as well. So, perhaps, the methods of mindfulness are not aesthetic in themselves but have an important aesthetic result.
One thing I have trouble with, not so much because of my commitment to aesthetics as because of my commitment to the sort of philosophy that goes back to Socrates, is the relatively negative attitude expressed towards thought, language and even conversation. If the goal of mindfulness is to not think through a thought but to simply acknowledge one's thoughts and then let them go then thoughtful exploration of ideas, philosophical dialogue, and thoughtful philosophical writing, become impossible. If the goal of conversation is not to concentrate on what is being said and on its implications but rather (as Nhat Hanh portrays it) on not being distracted from one's breathing by attending to the conversation, then it would be hard for a Socratic philosopher to see mindfulness as something that takes over much of one's life. Time that could be spent in dialogue or in talking, thinking or writing would have to be sacrificed to time spent in not doing those things. And this is always the dilemma for the Socrates-minded philosopher in thinking about mindfulness: which sort of wisdom do we want the most, the sort that comes through what we would call mindful dialogue or the sort that comes through mindful breathing and sitting?
However, the aesthetic payoff may be worth the price. Nhat Hanh writes that, with mindfulness, "Drinking a cup of tea becomes a direct and wondrous experience in which the distinction between subject and object no longer exists." (42) One thinks of Nietzsche's concept of the Dionysian which also results in ecstatic oneness. Yet,, Nhat Hanh contrasts the oneness with the cup of tea with "the illusory divisions of separate selves, created by concepts and language" and it is "concepts and language" that provides the path to the Socratic-style wisdom even in Nietzsche...there is no getting around it. (42)
Perhaps the ideal of philosophy would be to find a way to combine these two forms of wisdom.
Nhat Hanh stresses the interdependence of all things, and one thinks of Hegel. Certainly if one takes the path of contextualism in aesthetics (where the aesthetic object is only fully experienced when one understands its full context) one does think a lot of interdependence. But he also says: "This meditation is not a discursive reflection on a philosophy of interdependence. It is a penetration of mind into mind itself, using one's concentrative power to reveal the real nature of the object itself." (45) Is there room for philosophy then? Well, there might be, for Nhat Hanh sounds a lot like Edmund Husserl in his description of phenomenological method.
In any case, the way Nhat Hanh plays this out can be of some value to the aesthetician. Especially useful is his discussion of experiencing a table. "The table's existence is possible due to the existence of things which we might call 'the non-table world': the forest where the wood grew and was cut, the carpenter, the iron ore which became the nails and screws....If you grasp the table's reality then you see that in the table itself are present all those things which we normally think of as the nontable world."
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